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General Research Question  
Teams are increasingly important in organizations for both decision-making and production 
(Bettenhausen, 1991; Ilgen, Major, Hollenbeck, & Sego, 1993; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). For 
companies to retain a competitive advantage, more emphasis is placed on processes as 
creativity and social innovation where added value is created by bundling forces via 
cooperation in work groups (Zaccaro, Marks, & DeChurch, 2012). 
 
In our globalized world, these teams and workgroups have become more diverse due to 
increasing internationalization of organizations, in operations and in workforce (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005; Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006; Zaccaro et al., 2012). Common 
practice after joint ventures, mergers, and other organizational restructurings, is the formation 
of new workgroups, consisting of employees originating from different organizations or 
departments that are now restructured into one. These heterogeneous groups then consist of 
(at least) two distinct subgroups. Group members are representing two (or more) social 
entities and categorize members of their own subgroup as ingroup while perceiving the other 
subgroup as outgroup.  
 
Several challenges arise for such heterogeneous groups: First, most frequently the subgroups 
in this group are of unequal size (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Subgroup members then 
represent either a majority or a minority in the group, and this group composition may impact 
members’ decisions to cooperate with the group. Members of the heterogeneous group are 
confronted with a crossed-groups social dilemma: should they continue to act in their self-
interest or the interest of their former group, which is now only a subgroup, or should they act 
to the benefit of all and contribute to their new workgroup? 
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Second, with the rise of the subgroups, inter-subgroup processes are instigated within the 
workgroup (Carton & Cummings, 2012); members evaluate their own in-subgroup more 
favorable than the out-subgroup (Gaertner et al., 2000; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), 
which frequently results in less contributions to the group interests, compared to the subgroup 
and individual interests (Wit & Kerr, 2002).  
 
Key challenge for organizations and their managers is to motivate team members to 
contribute to these heterogeneous groups and as such solve the social dilemma, not only to 
the benefit of the team, but also to the organization as a whole. Aim of this doctoral research 
is to identify potential antecedents of cooperation in such heterogeneous groups, where 
members deal with a crossed-groups social dilemma in the presence of an in-subgroup and an 
out-subgroup.  
 
In this introductory chapter we will first review the social dilemma literature, then tie in with 
findings from faultline and diversity research, to build the theoretical framework of this PhD 
at the cross-section of both literatures. We also look into the role of leadership to enhance 
cooperation in heterogeneous groups. Throughout this introduction we define the research 
objectives of this doctoral research. Finally, we elaborate on the experimental studies that 
were conducted to identify antecedents of cooperative decision-making in these 
heterogeneous groups. 
 
Social dilemmas 
Defining social dilemmas 
A social dilemma in essence poses a fundamental conflict between short-term interests of 
individuals and the longer-term interests of the groups of which they are part. The ‘dilemma’ 
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is that self-interested behavior (called defection) yields higher payoffs for individuals in the 
short-run, regardless of the decisions made by others, but everyone is better off if everyone 
cooperates than if everyone acts selfishly (Dawes, 1980; Komorita & Parks, 1996). The 
dominant strategy is to not cooperate, but when each group member acts rationally by 
choosing this strategy, the collective suffers. Each person has a choice: do what makes sense 
selfishly, or make a personal sacrifice for the good of the whole. If all make a sacrifice, then 
each will do better than if they all had acted selfishly (Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 2002).  
 
Social dilemmas are omnipresent in the workplace, where employees make daily decisions to 
engage in behavior that supports their group or team. These efforts often go beyond the role 
requirements of the job (Organ, 1997) and - although organizational citizenship behaviors 
may come at a personal cost - they significantly contribute to team effectiveness (MacKenzie, 
Podsakoff, & Ahearne, 1996), and overall organizational performance (Podsakoff & 
MacKenzie, 1994). So, if no one devotes time, energy and means to these activities, then all 
group members will be worse off, because the system will not operate as efficiently 
(Bergeron, 2007; Joireman et al., 2006). 
 
Social dilemmas and Game theory 
The study of social dilemmas is grounded in game theory, which focuses on strategic 
decision-making and the analysis of how individuals solve different conflicts of interest 
(Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Von Neuman & Morgenstern, 1947; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; for a 
review see Komorita & Parks, 1996). 
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To study individual decision-making in mixed-motive situations, where self-interest and 
other interest or group interest are at odds, several game-theoretic paradigms have been 
developed, all modeling the tension between individual and collective rationality.  
The underlying dynamic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Axelrod, 1984), and Social 
Dilemma (SD) games (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983) – such as public goods and 
common goods dilemmas – is that engaging in self-interest is the most rational choice with 
the higher pay-off, but contributing to the collective always is the most sustainable option, 
resulting in higher long-term pay-offs in case others also engage in collective interest. In a 
PD game individuals make the trade-off between personal and joint interest in a dyad, 
whereas in the SD game individuals weigh their self- interest in relation to multiple other 
group members.  
In yet another type of game (e.g., Bornstein, 2003), the individual has to decide upon 
cooperation toward his own group, which is involved in a competition with another group. 
These so-called team games encompass an intra-group conflict (personal interest vs. own 
group interest) as well as an inter-group conflict (own group interest vs. other group interest). 
Individuals not only have to weigh individual and collective interests, but also their own 
group’s interests. In both the Inter-group Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game (Bornstein & Ben-
Yossef, 1994) and the Inter-group Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) 
game (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008), the groups in conflict are homogeneous in 
composition.  
In studies of so-called Nested Social Dilemmas (Wit & Kerr, 2002; Polzer, Stewart, & 
Simmons, 1999; 2005; Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012), an individual’s decision 
to cooperate reflects the simultaneous dynamics between individual, subgroup and group 
interests. The NSD paradigm addresses situations in which members are part of only one 
homogeneous group, consisting of two subgroups.  
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During an organizational restructuring, such as the merger of two former organizations into 
one, the post-change collective comprises a multitude of newly formed groups, that are 
heterogeneous in composition. For an individual employee in such heterogeneous groups, 
some members originate from his pre-merger ingroup and other members originate from the 
pre-merger outgroup. Given the unequal size of the subgroups present in the larger group 
(Lau & Murnighan, 1998), subgroup members of ingroup and outgroup will either form a 
(numerical) majority or minority in the newly formed group (Carton & Cummings, 2012; 
O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010).  
 
When these (sub)group members decide to contribute to the group, this benefits not only 
members of the individual’s in-subgroup but also members of the out-subgroup. So, either a 
larger number of in-subgroup members or out-subgroup members profit from an individual’s 
cooperation. The existing game paradigms do not allow yet to study individual decision-
making in such heterogeneous groups. Consequently, we need another game paradigm that 
addresses this specific situation: the Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma (CSD) paradigm.  
 
Research objective 1: The first objective of this dissertation is to develop the Crossed-
Groups Social dilemma (CSD) game. This game allows to investigate cooperative decision-
making in heterogeneous groups and will be validated in several experimental studies.  
 
Research objective 2: The second objective of this dissertation is to investigate with the 
CSD game to what extent members’ decision to cooperate with the heterogeneous group is 
influenced by the group composition - with an in-subgroup and an out-subgroup. 
 
  8 
Antecedents of cooperation in social dilemmas 
For decades, rational choice theory has dominated the field of economics with the assumption 
of ‘homo economicus’ or ‘rational man’. According to this principle, when a dilemma arises 
between self-interest and the interest of the group in which individuals take part, all members 
would act according to the dominant strategy and thus choose selfishly.  
 
However, as the interest in game theory surged, also in social and behavioral sciences, more 
and more research consistently showed that people cooperated, although these theories of 
rational choice said they should not (Ledyard, 1995). In other words, individuals do not 
always make the most rational and optimal decision, but rather the one that is most 
satisfactory to them, also referred to as bounded rationality (Simon, 1991). In decision-
making, rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive 
boundaries of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision 
(Gigerenzer & Reinhardt, 2002). Findings in the fields of behavioral economics, psychology, 
evolutionary biology and other disciplines have widely supported this assumption and in turn 
steered research to focus on the study of antecedents of cooperative decision-making in social 
dilemmas: under which conditions would individuals forfeit their rational self-interest to 
cooperate with the group to the benefit of all, although this might not personally give them 
the highest gains on the short-term?  
 
There is a vast body of research on the antecedents of intra-group cooperation in social 
dilemmas,  investigating antecedents of individuals’ trade-off between their private interests 
and those of their group (for a review see Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2004). In the same 
realm, considerable effort has been invested in understanding inter-group cooperation in the 
context of prisoner’s dilemmas (Insko et al., 1998; Schopler & Insko, 1992; Wildschut, Insko, 
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& Pinter, 2007; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003), comparing intra-group 
decision-making of individuals with inter-group decision making (individuals versus groups, 
groups vs. groups, individuals vs. individuals of other groups). However, these studies have 
investigated decision making of individuals intra-group and inter-group separately, which 
surpasses the simultaneous dynamics between individual, subgroup, and group interests in 
individuals’ decision making (Wit & Kerr, 2002). Clear example is the dilemma that arises 
after corporate acquisitions, when employees continue to act in the interest of themselves or 
colleagues of their old company, despite the interests of the new group in which their old 
colleagues now only form a subgroup (Hogan & Overmyer-Day, 1994; Terry & Callan, 
1998). 
 
To identify antecedents of cooperation in crossed-groups social dilemmas, where group 
members have to deal with mixed motives, we can build upon a research tradition identifying 
factors that promote collectively interested behavior at the expense of self-interested behavior 
in social dilemmas (for a review see Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2004; van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2012). Several situational factors that impact cooperation 
levels in social dilemmas have been investigated, such as: environmental uncertainty 
(Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 1990; De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, 
2006; Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 1999; Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988), rewards 
and punishment (Balliet, Mulder, & van Lange, 2011; Gächter, 2000), autocratic leadership 
(Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 1984; Samuelson & Messick, 
1986; Van Vugt, Jepson, Hart, & De Cremer, 2004), democratic leadership (Van Vugt & De 
Cremer, 1999), equality heuristics (Allison & Messick, 1990; Roch, Lane, Samuelson, 
Allison, & Dent, 2000), and framing (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Parks, Sanna, & Posey, 2003; 
Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000).  
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Next to these situational factors, also individual antecedents of cooperation in social 
dilemmas have been studied. People differ in fundamental ways in how they approach social 
dilemmas, and how they interact in social dilemmas (van Lange et al., 2013). Willingness to 
sacrifice for the group is influenced by a variety of factors and is driven by personally held 
goals or social dispositions (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). One 
such motivational orientation is Social Value Orientation (SVO), reflecting how people 
weigh their own and their interaction partner’s outcomes in an interdependent relationship 
(van Lange, 1999; Yamagishi et al., 2013).   
In general, a distinction is made between three types of social value orientations: prosocials, 
individualists, and competitors (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Messick & McClintock, 
1968; van Lange, 1999). Prosocials pursue joint outcomes and equality in outcomes, and are 
more likely to engage in the same level of cooperation as (anticipated from) the 
interdependent other. Proselves are either individualists (maximizing outcomes for self with 
little or no regard for others’ outcomes) or competitors (maximizing relative advantage over 
others’ outcomes). Research shows that prosocials tend to contribute more than proselves in a 
social dilemma game (Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; 
Roch & Samuelson, 1987). Proselves generally act less cooperatively, irrespective of their 
levels of identification with fellow group members (Kramer & Goldman, 1995). Being 
members of a heterogeneous group - consisting of two distinct subgroups (in-subgroup and 
out-subgroup) - prosocials and proselves might differ in their reactions to the composition of 
the group or both may be equally (in)sensitive for group composition. Preliminary evidence 
can be found in representative negotiations research, where prosocials were more willing to 
sacrifice self-interest to benefit constituency (cf. in-subgroup) and adversary (cf. out-
subgroup) combined than proselves (Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013). 
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Research objective 3: The third objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether 
prosocials and proselves react differently to the composition of the heterogeneous group -
with an in-subgroup and an out-subgroup subgroup - and how this impacts their decision 
to cooperate with the group. 
 
Faultlines and diversity 
Next to our research on the effect of individual social value orientation, we also aim to study 
situational antecedents of cooperation in these heterogeneous groups, where members are 
presented with a crossed-groups social dilemma. Above we identified some previously 
researched factors in the social dilemma literature. These, however, have been investigated 
more in the context of homogeneous groups. Consequently, we will also build on the faultline 
and diversity literature with findings on decision-making in heterogeneous groups. We focus 
on the concept of social categorization, which has been investigated both in the context of 
social dilemmas as in faultline-based heterogeneous groups. In what follows, we first 
demonstrate the link between the crossed-groups social dilemma, group faultlines, and 
identity-based subgroups, to then elaborate on the effects of social categorization on 
cooperation levels when these faultlines are more (faultline activation) or less salient 
(faultline deactivation) in the group.   
 
Crossed-groups social dilemma and faultline-based group 
When two prior separate groups start working together in one workgroup (e.g. in alliance, 
organizational merger) a strong faultline may arise based on employees’ membership of one 
organization/department or the other (Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001), causing a crossed-
groups social dilemma: members of these groups are now crossed into one new workgroup 
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and in the trade-off between self-interest and group interest, members will also take the 
interests of their subgroup – that is now nested in the group – into account.  
 
Faultlines are defined as “hypothetical dividing lines that split a group or a team into two (or 
more) subgroups based on one or more individual attributes” (Lau & Murnighan, 1998, p. 
328), such as pre-merger group membership. In the newly composed group the basis for a 
faultline – a crack or a divide – is, by definition, present and gives rise to two distinct in- and 
out-subgroups. Members do not come to the group as individuals, but rather as 
representatives from two different social entities (Li & Hambrick, 2005), nested in the group. 
This (salient) subgroup membership emphasizes differences between subgroups and can have 
an impact on their decision to contribute to the group (Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
 
Identity based subgroups and Social Categorization 
Identity-based subgroups are formed when members share a common identity, as is the case 
with the in-subgroup out-subgroup arising in the larger faultline-based group. Two other 
types of subgroups have been identified in inter-group processes research (Carton & 
Cummings, 2012). The class of knowledge based subgroups builds on theory of information 
processing (Galbraith, 1974)  and emphasizes that organizations have developed specialized 
units to adapt to specific domains of knowledge (e.g. accounting, marketing, customer 
service,…). Resource-based subgroups arise along hierarchies according to differences in 
subgroups’ abilities to claim resources; this tenet builds on social dominance theory (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999). This doctoral research focuses on identity-based subgroups, building on 
social categorization (Turner et al., 1987) and social identification (Taijel & Turner, 1986) 
theory. 
 
  13 
Social identity is defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership (Taifel, 1981, p. 255)”. Social identity and social 
categorization theory (Taifel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1975; Turner, Brown, & Taifel, 1979) 
stresses the importance of group membership per se in understanding inter-group relations. A 
person’s membership groups in effect define crucial aspects of one’s self, and play a major 
part in how one perceives and behaves towards members of other groups (i.e., how one 
weighs individual interests versus subgroup and collective interests) (Hogg & Vaughan, 
2010). 
 
To understand individual decision making behavior, research clearly needs to acknowledge 
the way in which the individual mind is structured by people’s social (sub)group 
memberships (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Oakes, 
1986). Group behavior and the perception of (sub)groups as real entities is made possible by 
the capacity of individuals to define themselves psychologically and to act as (sub)group 
members (Turner, 1982). The extent to which individual decision makers identify with their 
(sub)group and use this identification as a reference point for their decision behavior is 
referred to as their social identity (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Schneider, 1990; Messick & 
Brewer, 1983).  
 
Identity in a given situation can range from highly individuated personal identities to shared 
collective or group identities. Individuals’ personal and group identities tend to be inversely 
related, so that when one identity is salient, the other recedes in importance. Consequently, 
increasing the salience of an individual’s social identity can result in a de-emphasis on the 
self. When identity moves from the personal to the group level, there is “a shift towards the 
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perception of the self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from 
the perception of self as a unique person (Turner, 1987, p.50-51)”. People who think of 
themselves as sharing a common (sub)group membership become relatively more concerned 
with the welfare of those in that (sub)group (Brewer, 1979, 1991; Kramer & Brewer, 1984), 
and thus are more likely to forfeit their private interests in favor of common interests (Wit & 
Kerr, 2002). 
 
Social categorization in social dilemma and faultline research 
This important psychological processes of social identification and categorization is critical 
to individual cooperation rates in social dilemmas. Members who strongly identify with their 
group have been shown to invest more in public goods dilemmas and exercise greater 
restraint in resource dilemmas than low-identifying group members, both in laboratory and 
field dilemmas (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Dawes & Messick, 2000; Kramer, 1991; Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984; Kramer & Goldman, 1995; Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993; Van Vugt 
& De Cremer, 1999; Wit & Wilke, 1990). Strong social identification incites individuals to 
assign more weight to their (sub)group’s interests, converse to their personal interests.  
 
The effects of social categorization have not only been studied in social dilemmas with 
homogeneous groups, but are shown to have important implications in heterogeneous 
faultline-based groups as well. Social categorization and identification is enhanced by 
increasing the salience of faultlines in the (heterogeneous) group, referred to as faultline 
activation (Van der Kamp, Jehn, & Tjemkes, 2012). The merging of two prior separate 
groups into a new workgroup is enough a trigger to activate the faultlines and initiate the 
subgroup formation (Chrobot-Mason, Ruderman, Weber, & Ernst, 2009; Hambrick et al., 
2001). Making the faultline more salient will shift group members’ cognitive processes and 
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result in more attention for subgroup interests and less attention for the interests of the larger 
group. Members of subgroups thus do not always interact as individual agents but quite often 
on behalf of the social subgroups to which they belong and with which they identify (Wit & 
Kerr, 2002).   
 
Stronger and activated faultlines are frequently found to result in greater conflict, reduced 
team cohesion, performance and satisfaction (Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Choi & Sy, 2010; 
Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Thatcher, 
Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003). The subgroups resulting from these faultlines may cause an 
imbalance in the distribution of power, resources, and abilities (Lau & Murnighan, 1998), and 
differences in team outcomes (O-Leary & Mortensen, 2010), while their presence has 
important implications for inter-subgroup dynamics (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Consequently, 
it is of utmost importance to group outcomes to prevent and deal with subgroup formation 
and its resulting team conflict (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, the process of minimizing the salience of activated faultlines in teams - and 
thus subgroup categorization - via faultline deactivation, has been hardly tapped into (Van 
der Kamp et al., 2012). Previous research did advance some specific interventions, effective 
in focusing individuals on the group as a whole, to enhance cooperative decision-making in 
faultline-based groups and minimize the adversities of faultlines: team goal setting (van 
Knippenberg, Dawson, West, & Homan, 2011), leadership style (Gratton, Voigt, & Erickson, 
2007 ; Kunze & Bruch, 2010), reward structure (Homan et al., 2008), prodiversity beliefs 
(Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007), task autonomy and goal structure 
strategies (Rico, Molleman, Sanchez-Manzanares, & Vegt, 2007; Rico, Sànchez-Manzanares, 
Antino, & Lau, 2012). 
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Inter-group comparisons may also focus individuals’ attention to their group and lead to 
favoritism towards the own group (Turner, Brown, & Taifel, 1979). For example, the practice 
of comparing the outcomes of one group to another can enhance a connection between 
members of that group, make them act upon the common goal of obtaining better outcomes 
than the other group and rise contributions to their own group (cf. Carton & Cummings, 
2012; Gunnthorsdottir & Rapoport, 2006; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). When faultlines operate, 
such a common goal, evoked by inter-group comparison, can stimulate group members to 
overcome their divisive subgroups (Lau & Murnighan, 2000). A superordinate goal or shared 
objective (Anderson & West, 1998; van Knippenberg et al., 2011) may override the tendency 
of identity-based subgroups to promote identity fragmentation (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). 
 
Research objective 4: The fourth objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether 
under faultline (de)activation group members react differently to the composition of the 
heterogeneous group – with an in-subgroup and an out-subgroup - and how this impacts 
their decision to cooperate with the group. 
 
Research gaps  
Our research addresses several gaps in both faultline and social dilemma literature. First, the 
interest in the field of study on group faultlines, although limited in size, is rapidly surging 
(e.g. Rico et al., 2012, Thatcher & Patel, 2012). Most faultline research addresses the 
alignment of demographic characteristics and its impact on the formation of subgroups and 
team outcomes. However, there is a call to further investigation on faultlines composed of 
non-demographic attributes, such as geographic work location (e.g. Polzer et al., 2006), and 
workgroup members’ origin in faultline-based groups (Li & Hambrick, 2005). Although 
  17 
faultlines can inhibit team processes, such as cooperative decision-making, to date the 
research on management of team faultlines remains scarce (Rico et al., 2012). 
 
Second, faultline and strategy literature recently introduced the conceptualization of alliances 
as social dilemmas causing tension between cooperation and competition (Li & Hambrick, 
2005; Zeng & Chen, 2003). However, to date there is little investigation on how cooperation 
can be achieved and sustained in newly composed workgroups, although lack of cooperation 
is a main cause of the relatively high failure rate (Arino & de la Torre, 1988; Doz & Hamel,, 
1998; Park & Russo, 1996; Teece, 1992; Ulrich & Van Dick, 2007; Yan & Zeng, 1999). Past 
research has focused mainly on the enhancement of cooperation at an organizational level, 
but little attention has been devoted to the implications for employees on the work floor being 
confronted with conflicts of interests in newly composed workgroups.  
 
Third, although the effects of group composition and emerging subgroups are well-
documented in diversity and faultline literature, these findings have to our knowledge not yet 
been implicated on cooperative decision-making in social dilemmas. Previous social dilemma 
research already showed that a focus on present subgroups resulted in decreasing 
contributions to the group (Polzer et al., 1999; Polzer, 2004; Wit & Kerr, 2002). However, 
the link between the composition of subgroups and contributions to the group has to date not 
been investigated.   
Finally, this study answers the call for research that investigates the effect of a superordinate 
goal when stronger faultlines are activated (Rico et al., 2012). 
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Faultline deactivation via superordinate goals: Limitations 
On the one hand, faultline deactivation via a superordinate goal may reduce subgroup 
categorization in faultline teams by lowering comparative fit, promoting group welfare, and 
increasing subgroup cooperation (Rico et al., 2012). However, faultline deactivation can also 
lead to identity threat (Pearsall, Ellis, & Evans, 2008). Establishing a superordinate goal and 
categorization could undermine the distinctiveness of the subgroups, producing a threat to the 
integrity of members’ separate subgroup identities and their need for subgroup 
distinctiveness.  As a result, group members could maintain relatively high or even increased 
levels of inter-subgroup bias (Brown & Wade, 1987; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Jetten, Spears, 
& Manstead, 1997). Group members may feel that their subgroup identity is not accounted 
for in the workgroup and counteract with non-cooperative behavior in the workgroup.  
 
On the other hand, faultline deactivation with the superordinate goal might result in a process 
of decategorization (Gaertner & Dividio, 2000). Due to the strong reduction in salience of 
subgroup distinctions, group members may categorize themselves at an individual level - not 
on a (sub)group level - and perceive themselves and other group members as individuals 
(Hewstone et al., 2002).  
Superordinate recategorization alone is thus not always the optimal strategy to promote inter-
subgroup harmony and cooperation (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; González & 
Brown, 2003). Clearly, research needs to investigate  the conditions for superordinate goals to 
work, depending on the specific context in which (sub)groups are interacting (Crisp, Turner, 
& Hewstone, 2010). Prior research already showed that the benefits of superordinate goals 
might be achieved better when they are combined with other managerial strategies (see also 
Rico et al., 2012). This tenet is the point of departure for the study of the second situational 
antecedent of cooperation in this doctoral research: visionary leadership. 
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Leadership 
Visionary Leadership and Superordinate Goals 
Leadership might increase the effectiveness of faultline deactivation on cooperation levels in 
heterogeneous groups. Team leaders are continuously challenged by situations in which 
social identification - based conflicts can occur, due to faultlines that cross a group’s structure 
(Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009). The presence of a leader in heterogeneous groups might reduce 
out-subgroup schemas (Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012; Pittinsky & Simon, 2007) and 
establish trust in the (cooperative) intentions of other subgroup members.  
 
Articulating a vision for long term cooperation as the only viable option for all (sub)group 
members to tackle the crossed-groups social dilemma, might be a powerful means to further 
induce superordinate categorization. A leader supervising group members’ cooperation might 
instill more assurance that under his management members from the out-subgroup will also 
cooperate and considerably lowers the risk for group members to be the ‘sucker’ rather than 
the ‘savior’.  
 
Consequently, we propose combining faultline deactivation via a superordinate goal, with 
visionary leadership to deal with the potential identity threat or decategorization, associated 
with the superordinate goal. This strategy – as a second situational antecedent of cooperation 
in the heterogeneous group - may allow to capitalize on the positive effects of a superordinate 
goal in faultline-based groups. Research that investigates the effectiveness of different 
managerial and leadership strategies to deal with identity - based group faultlines, is scarce to 
date, although it has been advanced as a promising avenue worth exploring (Kunze & Bruch, 
2010; Rico et al., 2012). 
  20 
 
Leadership in social dilemma and faultline research 
Several studies already demonstrated the positive impact of leadership on cooperation with 
the group in social dilemmas (e.g. De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002; Mulder & Nelissen, 
2010; Pinter et al., 2007; Stouten, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2005; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 
1999). Leaders can increase cooperation by encouraging group members to contribute their 
time and/or finances to the group and by supervising and regulating the provision of common 
resources. A leader that envisions repeated interactions in the future can induce a long-term 
perspective (‘shadow of the future’), and - from the stand-point of maximizing outcomes - 
motivate group members to shift away from their self-interest to the interests of the group 
(cfr. Axelrod, 1984; Kelley, 1984, 1997; Rapoport, 1967).  
 
To gain insight into how leaders deal with the presence of subgroups and motivate members 
in the heterogeneous groups to tackle the conflicts of interest, we build upon inter-group 
leadership, faultline, and diversity literature. Although to date research has had limited 
attention for leadership across (sub)groups (Pittinsky & Simon, 2007) and the connection 
between group faultlines and leadership (Kunze & Bruch, 2010; Rico et al. 2012), prior 
studies offer some direction. Transformational leadership has been found to increase the 
positive effects of age-based faultlines (Kunze & Bruch, 2010), of functional diversity 
(Somech, 2006), of educational background diversity (Shin & Zhou, 2007) on for example 
team performance (Kearney & Gebert, 2009). This type of leadership has the potential to 
craft a new collective identity (Conger, Kanungo, & Menon, 2000; Halevy, Berson, & 
Galinsky, 2011; Kunze & Bruch, 2010; Pittinsky & Simon, 2007) by introducing shared 
factors (Gaertner et al., 1993). 
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Research objective 5: The fifth objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether under 
a visionary leader group members react differently to the composition of the heterogeneous 
group – with an in-subgroup and an out-subgroup - and how this impacts their decision to 
cooperate with the group. 
 
Leader affiliation in heterogeneous groups 
The leader of a faultline-based group most frequently originates from the one or the other 
membership subgroup, which is common practice after change processes such as mergers and 
joint ventures (see Li & Hambrick, 2005; Zeng & Chen, 2003). As such, the leader is 
affiliated more closely to one subgroup than to the other, which can impact his potential to 
increase cooperation levels in this newly formed group (Hogg et al., 2012). 
 
A vast amount of leadership research (Yukl, 2002) has focused on the effects of properties 
and characteristics of the individual leader on cooperation. However, this approach has been 
criticized for placing too much emphasis on the intrinsic quality of the leader and too little 
emphasis on the social systems or groups within which leadership is embedded (Chemers, 
2001; Hall & Lord, 1995; Haslam & Platow, 2001; Lord, Brown, & Harvey, & Hall, 2001; 
Pawar & Eastman, 1997). Leaders are most often also members of the (sub)groups they lead, 
and characteristics of the leader as a (sub)group member can influence leadership 
effectiveness (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003).  
 
The social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; van 
Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004) 
emphasizes the interaction between individuals’ social identification and the leader’s 
effectiveness in engaging subgroup members to contribute time, energy, effort, and resources 
to interdependent tasks and actions that benefit the group and organization. Individual 
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perception of a common identity with the leader is crucial for the leader’s effectiveness in 
mobilizing individual efforts toward collective goals (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004).  
 
For (sub)group members who strongly identify with their (sub)group, leadership 
endorsement, perceptions of leadership effectiveness, and actual leadership effectiveness are 
strongly influenced by how (sub)group prototypical the leader is perceived to be (Hogg et al., 
2006). This prototypicality implies that the leader is representative of the (sub)group’s 
identity and acts according to the (sub)group norm (Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg, 
Hains, & Mason, 1998). (Sub)group members will often favor leaders who display 
(sub)group prototypical characteristics ahead of those who display qualities that are simply 
stereotypical of leaders in general (De Cremer, van Dijke, & Mayer, 2010; Haslam, Reicher, 
& Platow, 2011).  
 
Research objective 6: The sixth objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether group 
members react differently to the composition of the heterogeneous group – with an in-
subgroup and an out-subgroup - depending on the affiliation of their (visionary) leader 
and how this impacts their decision to cooperate with the group. 
 
Research gaps 
To date, research on group faultlines and leadership is scarce, although the presence of a 
leader can determine whether diversity positively or negatively affects team functioning 
(Joshi & Roh, 2009; van Knippenberg et al., 2004; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). 
Also, the impact of leadership on cooperation in nested- and crossed-groups social dilemmas 
has remained relatively unexplored, despite the theoretical underpinnings for its effects. Our 
study is one of the first that provides a test of the effects of visionary leadership and leader 
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affiliation on cooperation levels in a faultline-based group, where group members need to 
deal with a crossed-groups social dilemma due to subgroupings. 
 
Overview of this dissertation 
We conducted five experimental studies to address our research objectives. These empirical 
studies were bundled in three papers, of which the theoretical framework, design and results 
are described in Chapter 2 to 4.  
 
In Chapter 2, we address research objective 1 to 3. In the paper entitled ‘Group composition 
and Social Value Orientation in Crossed-Groups Social Dilemmas’ we first lay-out the 
properties of the crossed-groups social dilemma game, designed to investigate cooperative 
decision-making in heterogeneous groups with subgroups. Second, we show how group 
composition has an impact on (sub)group members’ decision to cooperate with the group. 
Third, we investigate how prosocials and proselves react to this group composition and how 
this social value orientation influences their contributions to the group. This paper reports on 
the results of two studies, where the second one replicated research findings to increase the 
validity of our results. 
 
In Chapter 3, we specifically address research objective 4, i.e. to investigate the effect of 
faultline (de)activation on cooperation levels in the heterogeneous group. In the paper 
‘Bridging the Faultline Gap: Subgroup Composition and Goal Structure in Crossed-Groups 
Social Dilemmas’ we further validate the crossed-groups social dilemma game and show how 
group members’ sensitivity to the group composition can be altered by faultline 
(de)activation.  Again two studies were conducted, with the aim of replicating the research 
findings. 
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In Chapter 4, we address research objective 5 and 6,  in the paper entitled ‘Visionary Leader 
Affiliation and Faultline Deactivation in Crossed-Groups Social Dilemmas’. We investigate 
whether visionary leadership and leader affiliation, combined with faultline deactivation, has 
an effect on group members’ cooperation levels in the heterogeneous group. To this end, this 
study integrates findings from faultline and diversity literature with theory on charismatic and 
visionary leadership, inter-group leadership, and social identity processes in leadership. 
 
We conclude this dissertation with an epilogue in which we highlight the empirical, 
methodological, and managerial implications of the research conducted. We show how our 
findings add to the literature on social dilemmas, faultlines and diversity, inter-group 
leadership, and leadership prototypicality. We also identify interesting avenues for future 
research.   
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ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces the Crossed-groups Social Dilemma game paradigm (CSD) that allows 
analysis of individual decision-making in 10-person heterogeneous groups. These 
heterogeneous groups are designed to simulate decision-making groups that result from  
mergers, joint ventures, and organizational restructuring, by modeling the presence of 
members of a former ingroup and a former outgroup in a newly formed heterogeneous group. 
Participants’ cooperative behavior was assessed in two successive heterogeneous 10-person 
groups.  These two groups differed with regards to the number of in-subgroup and out-
subgroup members. Results of Study 1 confirmed that overall participants consistently 
showed parochial cooperation, i.e., more cooperation in a heterogeneous group with a 
majority of in-subgroup members than in a heterogeneous group with a majority of out-
subgroup members. Prosocials were more likely to display consistent cooperation regardless 
of the composition of their  heterogeneous groups whereas proselves were mostly consistent 
defectors. These findings were replicated in Study 2. 
 
Keywords: Crossed-groups social dilemma, Parochial cooperation, Social Value Orientation, 
Group composition, Diversity, Game theory, In-subgroup, Out-subgroup. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A social dilemma or multi-person prisoner’s dilemma poses a fundamental conflict 
between short-term interests of individuals and the longer-term interests of the groups of 
which they are part. The ‘dilemma’ is that self-interested behavior (called defection) yields 
higher payoffs for individuals in the short-run regardless of the decisions made by others, but 
everyone is better off if everyone cooperates than if everyone acts selfishly (Dawes, 1980; 
Komorita & Parks, 1996). The essence of a social dilemma is that each person has a dominant 
strategy, but when each acts rationally by choosing this strategy, the collective suffers. Each 
person has a choice: do what makes sense selfishly, or make a personal sacrifice for the good 
of the whole. If all make a sacrifice, then each will do better than if they had all acted 
selfishly (Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 2002).  
Many organizational and workplace problems pose such social dilemmas (Foddy, 
Smithson, Schneider, & Hogg, 1999; Komorita & Parks, 1996; Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 
1992; Messick & Brewer, 1983). Examples are problems of resource distribution within 
organizations (Kramer, 1991), employees’ choice to engage in organizational citizenship 
behaviors (Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels, & Duell, 2006), provision of public services (Eek, 
Biel, & Garling, 2000), and dilemmas in business competition, such as cut-throat pricing and 
competitive advertising (Raiffa et al., 2002).  
In social and organizational settings, groups confronted with social dilemmas are 
frequently heterogeneous and the dilemma takes the shape of a conflict of interests between 
different parties. Especially after change processes when new groups are formed, the interests 
of employees from different departments and/or organizations (i.c. merger, alliance, joint 
venture) have to be reconciled. As subgroups arise in these new groups, the social dilemma 
embodies the nested social structure and interests of the group members (Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
In the trade-off they make between personal interests and the new group’s interests, group 
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members also take into account the interests of their subgroup, which is now nested in the 
newly formed group. Their decision to invest time, energy, monetary means in the new 
group, however, may not only depend on the mere presence of subgroups, but even more so 
on the composition of the group (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). 
Social Dilemma games and the Crossed-groups Social Dilemma 
Most game-theoretic paradigms to study individual decision-making in mixed-motive 
situations, model a tension between individual and collective rationality. The underlying 
dynamic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Axelrod, 1984), and Social Dilemma (SD) 
games (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983) – such as public goods and common goods 
dilemmas – is that engaging in self-interest is the most rational choice with the higher pay-
off, but contributing to the collective always is the most sustainable option, resulting in 
higher long-term pay-offs in case others also engage in collective interest. In a PD game 
individuals make the trade-off between personal and joint interest in a dyad, whereas in the 
SD game individuals weigh their self- interest in relation to multiple other group members. A 
long research tradition has been built around the identification of individual and contextual 
factors that promote collectively interested behavior at the expense of self-interested behavior 
(for a review see Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2004). And considerable effort has been 
invested in understanding the difference of cooperation in inter-individual interactions 
compared to inter-group interactions (Insko et al., 1998; Schopler & Insko, 1992; Wildschut, 
Insko, & Pinter, 2007; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003), termed as the 
discontinuity effect.  
In yet another type of game (e.g., Bornstein, 2003), the individual has to decide upon 
cooperation toward his own group, which is involved in a competition with another group. 
These so-called team games encompass an intra-group conflict (personal interest vs. own 
group interest) as well as an inter-group conflict (own group interest vs. other group interest). 
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Individuals not only have to weigh individual and collective interests, but also their own 
group’s interests. However, in both the Inter-group Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game 
(Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994) and the Inter-group Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing 
Difference (IPD-MD) game (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008), the groups in conflict are 
homogeneous in composition.  
In studies of so-called Nested Social Dilemmas (Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 
2012; Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006; Polzer, Stewart, & Simmons, 1999; Wit & 
Kerr, 2002), an individual’s decision to cooperate reflects the simultaneous dynamics 
between individual, subgroup and group interests. The NSD paradigm addresses situations in 
which members are part of only one homogeneous group, consisting of two subgroups. 
However, after a merger of two former organizations into one, the post-merger collective 
comprises a multitude of newly formed groups, that are heterogeneous in composition. For an 
individual employee in such new heterogeneous groups, some members originate from his 
pre-merger ingroup and other members originate from the pre-merger outgroup. In the NSD 
paradigm group members cannot advantage one group over the other, based on the 
composition of these (sub)groups. 
Crossed-groups social dilemmas arise when members of ingroup and outgroup are 
crossed into one new group – forming then an in-subgroup and an out-subgroup – and 
individuals have to decide upon cooperation with this heterogeneous group. Until now, none 
of the existing game theoretic paradigms addressed decision-making in heterogeneous 
groups, consisting of subgroups, to study the effect of group composition on participants’ 
decision to cooperate. The new paradigm advanced in this paper models the presence of in-
subgroup and out-subgroup members in a Crossed-groups Social Dilemma (CSD) game. 
Participants’ cooperative behavior is assessed in two consecutive heterogeneous 10-person 
groups that differ with regards to the number of in-subgroup and out-subgroup members. The 
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one 10-p. group consists of the participant and 6 other in-subgroup members and 3 out-
subgroup members (the Majority- Ingroup (MI) group); the other 10-p. group consists of the 
participant and 2 other in-subgroup members and 7 out-subgroup members (the Majority-
Outgroup (MO) group). A participant’s cooperative choices in these groups equally benefit 
members of this individual’s in-subgroup but also members of his or her out-subgroup. In the 
MI group a larger number of in-subgroup members than out-subgroup members profit from 
an individual’s cooperation, whereas in the MO group a larger number of out-subgroup 
members than in-subgroup members profit from this cooperation. Participants’ repeated 
choices in these two heterogeneous groups yield choice patterns and allow to study their 
choice as a function of the composition of the group.  
Aim of this paper is to test hypotheses about the effects of group composition on 
cooperative decision-making in heterogeneous groups with the CSD paradigm: To what 
extent do individual members of newly formed groups differentiate in their level of 
cooperation between a  group that consists of a majority of in-subgroup members and a group 
that consists of a majority of out-subgroup members? Second aim is to test hypotheses about 
whether Social Value Orientation as an individual difference characteristic influences the 
effect of group composition on cooperation. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Group composition  
In case of inter-group conflict, persons tend to regulate this conflict through parochial 
cooperation; they self-sacrifice to contribute to ingroup welfare (ingroup love) and to aggress 
against competing outgroups (outgroup hate) (Bornstein, 2003; Halevy et al., 2008; De Dreu 
et al., 2010). In an evolutionary analysis of parochial cooperation, Caporael, Dawes, Orbell 
and Van De Kragt (1989; see also Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991) have argued that, in 
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general, people show a preference to cooperate with members of their ingroup. Also, 
interactions between groups are more competitive than interactions between individuals 
(Cohen, Wildschut, & Insko, 2010; Insko et al., 1998; Insko et al., 2005; Pinter et al., 2007; 
Schopler et al., 2001; Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Wildschut et al., 2003). Other research has 
consistently shown that increasing the salience of people’s ingroup membership (by unit-
forming factors such as shared characteristics, shared fate, shared rewards, or the mere 
presence of members of an opposing outgroup) enhances their preference to cooperate with 
members of their ingroup, sometimes at the expense of people who do not belong to their 
ingroup (e.g. Baron, 2001; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Komorita & Lapworth, 1982, Orbell, 
Van De Kragt & Dawes, 1988; Polzer, 2004; Polzer et al., 1999; Wit & Kerr, 2002).  
When people are involved in interactions simultaneously with members of their 
ingroup as well as outgroup members, the question arises as to whether the difference in 
ingroup / outgroup composition within the group will lead to different decisions to cooperate 
or not. From intra-group conflict literature we know that heterogeneity in groups can result in 
better team outcomes because of its effects on social categorization processes and increased 
information processing (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; van 
Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Williams & O’Reilly, 
1998). Diversity, however, can also undermine group cohesion and it may elicit hostilities 
and inter(sub)group competition, detracting from team performance. The effects of diversity 
are largely dependent on the extent to which differences in a group lead to subgroup 
formation, or coalitions (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Only the fact of merging two prior 
separate groups can invoke a faultline
1
, splitting up the group in subgroups (Li & Hambrick, 
2005). Faultlines in groups are positively and significantly related to intra-group conflict 
(Pearsall et al., 2008; Polzer et al., 2006; Zanutto et al., 2010), although there is also evidence 
                                                          
1 Faultlines are “hypothetical dividing lines that split a group or a team into two or more subgroups based on one or more 
individual attributes” (Lau & Murnighan, 1998, p. 328). We will focus more extensively on this concept in Chapter 3.   
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of high levels of cooperation within subgroups (Bezrukova, Spell, & Perry, 2010; Hart & Van 
Vugt, 2006; Phillips, Mannix, & Neale, 2004). In other words, faultlines will divide a group 
into subgroups, which increases conflict and distrust across subgroups within the team (Choi 
& Sy, 2010; Greer & Jehn, 2007), but also results in individual group members attending to 
the interests of their subgroup(s) within that team. Often members of faultline-based 
subgroups have a strong connection with one another and a rather negative stance toward 
members who are not part of their own subgroup (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Pickett & Brewer, 
2001), also related to inter-subgroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002).   
Based on intra-group and inter-group conflict research, we hypothesize in a crossed-groups 
social dilemma: 
 H1: Group composition has a significant effect on cooperation in crossed-groups social 
dilemmas: Group members cooperate more if the majority of their group consists of in-
subgroup members (MI), than if the majority of their group consists of out-subgroup 
members (MO) (parochial cooperation). 
 
Social Value Orientation  
Considering that in a heterogeneous group, members are more likely to cooperate if 
the group consists of a majority (rather than a minority) of in-subgroup members, entertains 
the question as to whether certain group members are more motivated to cooperate than 
others, regardless of the composition of this group. Willingness to sacrifice in relationships is 
influenced by a variety of factors and is driven by personally held goals or social dispositions 
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). One such motivational orientation 
is Social Value Orientation (SVO), reflecting how people weigh their own and their 
interaction partner’s outcomes in an interdependent relationship (van Lange, 1999; 
Yamagishi et al., 2013).  In general, a distinction is made between three types of social value 
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orientations: prosocials, individualists, and competitors (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; 
Messick & Clintock, 1968; van Lange, 1999). Prosocials pursue joint outcomes and equality 
in outcomes, and are more likely to engage in the same level of cooperation as the 
interdependent other. Proselves are either individualists (maximizing outcomes for self with 
little or no regard for others’ outcomes) or competitors (maximizing relative advantage over 
others’ outcomes). 
Extensive research showed that prosocials tend to contribute more than proselves in a 
social dilemma game (Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; 
Roch & Samuelson, 1987). Proselves act less cooperatively, irrespective of their levels of 
identification with fellow group members (Kramer & Goldman, 1995). For proselves the 
pursuit of long-term self-interest and personal well-being, immediate or distant, is the 
primary or exclusive goal (van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Similarly, it is 
found that, in distributive bargaining and two-party negotiations, prosocials tended to demand 
less and concede more than negotiators with a proself orientation (e.g., Aaldering, Greer, Van 
Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013; Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; De Dreu & van Lange, 1995; Gillespie, 
Weingart, & Brett, 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 2003; Schei & Rognes, 2003; Trötschel & 
Gollwitzer, 2007). Consequently, we hypothesize: 
H2: Prosocials will cooperate more than proselves in a crossed-groups social dilemma, 
regardless of group composition.  
 
Interaction Group composition x SVO 
When presented with a social dilemma, the most ‘rational’ decision – in line with 
principal agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) – is to prefer defection over cooperation. 
Nevertheless, individuals most often violate this assumption of rationality, when confronted 
with a conflict of interests. They sacrifice self-interest for the group, often acting upon social 
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categorization and group identity processes (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 
1984; Polzer, 2004; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Social group memberships and the way in which 
people define themselves as part of those categories determine how they act as group 
members (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; Turner & 
Oakes, 1986), and are critical to individual cooperation rates in social dilemmas. Group 
membership per se can lead to more contributions towards the own ingroup (Dawes & 
Messick, 2000; Kramer, 1991; Kramer & Goldman, 1995; Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 
1993; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999; Wit & Wilke, 1990), often to the detriment of outgroup 
members (Bornstein, 2003; Halevy et al., 2008).  
Prior social dilemma research indicated that prosocials and proselves behave 
differently, when they are members of a group. Prosocials consistently make cooperative 
choices, irrespective of their level of identification with fellow group members (De Cremer & 
Van Dijk, 2002; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999), whereas proselves show less cooperation 
overall (Kramer & Goldman, 1995). The question arises as to whether prosocials’ and 
proselves’ willingness to cooperate would remain stable, regardless of the composition of the 
groups of which they are part. In heterogeneous groups, individuals are involved in 
simultaneous interactions with members of the in-subgroup and the out-subgroup, as is often 
the case in mergers, reorganizations, alliances,… Would prosocials then consistently 
cooperate regardless of their groups’ composition or would they contribute significantly more 
to the group in which in-subgroup members were in the majority? Although there is still 
limited research on the difference between prosocials’ and proselves’ cooperative behavior 
toward members of ingroup and outgroup combined, results of previous studies offer some 
direction. 
Prosocials are found to cooperate more towards fellow group members with whom 
they identify strongly than under low identification (Kramer & Goldman, 1995). Proselves, 
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on the other hand, are much more indifferent toward other group members, and always follow 
the strategy that leads to the highest personal benefit (Balliet et al., 2009; De Dreu et al., 
2000; van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007). In representative negotiations, 
prosocial representatives appeared to be more willing to self-sacrifice if this served their 
constituency only than when it indirectly served their adversary too. Proselves, on the other 
hand, showed consistently selfish behavior, towards both constituency and adversary 
(Aaldering et al., 2013).  
We can assume that prosocials and proselves understand cooperative and competitive 
behavior in fundamentally different ways, based on the Transformation hypothesis of 
Interdependency Theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978): prosocials view rationality in collective 
terms and thus are more likely to cooperate than proselves who tend to see rationality in 
individual terms (egocentrically) (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986, van Lange, 
Liebrand, & Kuhlman, 1990).  According to Kelley and Stahelski’s (1970) so-called Triangle 
Hypothesis (see also van Lange, 1992), proselves hold homogeneous views of others by 
assuming that most others are non-cooperative like themselves, whereas prosocials hold 
heterogeneous views of others by assuming that others may be either cooperative or non-
cooperative. Rather than expecting reciprocity, it seems that prosocials are more likely to 
cooperate because they believe that that is the right thing to do, regardless of whether other 
individuals do the same (cf. Joireman, van Lange, Kuhlman, Van Vugt, & Shelley, 1997; van 
Lange et al., 1998). Although they might expect more cooperation from ingroup members 
and less from outgroup members (Hewstone et al., 2002), they will still cooperate. In other 
words, the collective is more salient to prosocials and in case of nested interests they are 
likely to show more self-sacrificial cooperation towards this collective level of ingroup and 
outgroup combined (Polzer et al., 1999), instead of being preoccupied by the subgroup level. 
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Prosocials are not only prepared to self-sacrifice for their group, but also show 
cooperation and make large concessions towards their counterpart across different settings  
(e.g., De Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu & van Lange, 1995; Giacomantonio, et al., 2010; Van 
Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004). In representative negotiations, they are more willing 
to sacrifice self-interest to benefit constituency and adversary combined than proselves 
(Aaldering et al., 2013). Consequently, we hypothesize: 
H3: Prosocials prefer consistent cooperation in a crossed-groups social dilemma, whereas 
proselves defect consistently. 
 
STUDY 1 
METHOD 
Sample  
Participants were 392 undergraduate psychology students enrolled in a Western-
European university, both men (22%) and women (78%) with M age = 20.4 years. Data 
collection took place during the first lecture of the course, when students were still unfamiliar 
with one another. After being seated they received an envelope with experimental 
instructions in a booklet. From then on participants were not allowed to talk to each other. 
They were seated far enough from one another to prevent them seeing each other’s materials 
and decisions.  
Social Value Orientation (SVO) 
First, participants filled out the measure of Social Value Orientation (van Lange, 
Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). This measure consisted of nine items, each containing 
three alternative outcome distributions between self and an anonymous other. Each item 
contained a prosocial (e.g., self: 500, other: 500), an individualistic (e.g., self: 550, other: 
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300) and a competitive alternative (e.g., self: 500, other: 100). Participants were asked in the 
instructions to state their nine preferences. An exemplary item: 
     A B C 
You get 500 500 550  
Other gets 100 500 300 
In this example, if you chose A, You would receive 500 points and the Other would receive 
100 points; If you chose B, You would receive 500 points and the Other 500 points; If you 
chose C, You would receive 550 points and the Other 300 points. This measure is internally 
consistent (e.g., Parks, 1994), reliable over substantial time periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, 
& Cotterell, 1992) and not related to measures of social desirability (Platow, 1994 ).  
Participants were classified as prosocials or proselves, following the standard 
procedure (van Lange et al., 1997). Of the 392 respondents, 354 could be classified as having 
either a prosocial or a proself SVO. There were 209 (53.4%) prosocials and 145 (37%) 
proselves of which most were Individualists (n = 129, 33%) and the rest Competitors (n = 16, 
4%). Because in the current context no differences in cooperative behavior were expected 
between individualists and competitors, these two groups were combined to form one 
category of proselves, as in earlier studies (e.g., Kramer et al., 1986; Mc-Clintock & 
Liebrand, 1988; van Lange, 1999; van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  Participants who made less 
than six out of the nine choices, consistent with one of the two social value orientations (n = 
38, 9.6%), were excluded from further analyses.  
CSD vignette 
The booklet contained the scenario of a 10-person Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma 
(CSD). Each participant took the role of a factory manager.  Each  had to decide either to 
‘limit production’ at the factory to avoid overproduction (cooperation) or to ‘stick to the 
current production level’ (defection), which would result in overproduction if the other 
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managers decided similarly. Managers of factories producing at maximum capacity would 
always earn more profit than those reducing production, irrespective of the number of other 
managers who decided to reduce their production rate. However, the more managers stuck to 
their high production rates, the lower the profits all of them earned. If all ten managers 
decided to stick to their current production rates, this would yield all of them a lower profit 
(10 million Euros each) than if all of them decided to reduce their production rates (25 
million Euros each). 
After reading  the instructions and inspecting the pay-off matrix (Appendix 1), which 
was explained by an example of the choice configurations (“ If 7 managers stick to the 
current production and 3 managers reduce production, then profit for those who ‘stick’ is 16 
mio Euro, whereas those who ‘reduce’ only make 11 mio Euro”), participants received 
information on the composition of the 10-person groups that were the context in which they 
had to make their choice.   
Group Composition Manipulation (within subjects)  
Participants were informed they had to make consecutive choices in two differently 
composed 10-person groups.  They were told that some of the managers in each group would 
be  psychology students from their own university (ingroup members) and others would be 
psychology students from another neighboring university (outgroup members). In one 10-p. 
group, students from the own university were in the majority. The Majority Ingroup (MI) 
group consisted of 7 managers from their own university (including themselves) and 3 
managers from the neighboring university. In the other 10-p. group, students of the 
neighboring university were in the majority. The Majority Outgroup (MO) group consisted of 
3 managers from their own university (including themselves) and 7 managers from the 
neighboring university. The order in which the type of group was presented was 
counterbalanced in the booklet. 
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We checked the group composition manipulation with four items, in the MI group and 
MO group separately. Participants were asked to indicate how many of the members of their 
own subgroup (including themselves) they expected to ‘stick to the current production level’ 
and how many they expected to ‘reduce the production’. They also indicated how many of 
the members of the other subgroup they expected to ‘stick’ and how many they expected to 
‘reduce’. All participants comprehended that the 10-p. group consisted of 7 in-subgroup 
members and 3 out-subgroup members in condition MI (Majority Ingroup), and that the 10-p. 
group consisted of 3 in-subgroup members and 7 out-subgroup members in condition MO 
(Majority Outgroup). 
Measures 
After the introduction of their first group’s composition (MI or MO), participants 
completed a series of questions. To assess choice behavior, they were asked whether they 
would ‘stick to their present production level’ or ‘reduce their present production level’.  
They were also asked how many of the participants of their own subgroup (including 
themselves) and the other subgroup they expected to ‘stick’ to current production levels and 
how many they expected to ‘reduce’ production. These questions measured actual 
expectations of other group members’ cooperative behavior and checked respondents’ 
comprehension of the group composition. Due to the phrasing of the questions, participants’ 
responses included their own choices in each of the two groups. Consequently, we first 
corrected the original responses of participants who made cooperative choices themselves 
toward the MI group and/or toward the MO group. For example, when a participant acted 
cooperatively ( i.e. indicated that he would reduce his own production), and indicated that he 
expected 5 out of 7 in-subgroup members to cooperate in the MI group, then participant’s 
expected number of co-operators was corrected from 5 to 4; this indicated that  he expected 4 
in-subgroup members, in addition to himself, to cooperate. Because cooperative expectation 
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was measured on a different scale in MI (seven in-subgroup members) than in MO (three in-
subgroup members), proportions of cooperation were calculated, e.g. if a participant expected 
4 other in-subgroup members to cooperate, then the expected proportion of cooperation was 
calculated as 4/6 ingroup subgroup members (= .67). 
To  assess participants’ understanding of the pay-off matrix, they  were asked to write 
down  the profits (in million Euros) to be earned by those in the 10-p. group who ‘stuck’ and 
the profits to be earned by those who ‘reduced’.  
Lastly, to measure their concern with group welfare, participants rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale (“very important” to “not at all important”) how important was a joint reduction 
in production and, thus, a higher return  for the group as a whole.  
After completing the first decision and all of it supporting questions, participants were 
requested to proceed to the next page of the booklet and the instructions for the other group 
scenario. Thus, the first half of all participants then read the instructions of the MO group, 
while the second half of all participants read the instructions of the MI group 
(counterbalancing). Participants were requested to answer the same series of questions in this 
context: choice behavior, cooperative expectations, pay-off matrix).  Participants were asked 
to indicate their gender and age and then complete a post-experimental questionnaire about 
their  identification with in-subgroup and out-subgroup members.  This  was measured with 
three items on a 5-point scale: ‘I identify with L participants2’, ‘I  feel connected with L 
participants’, ‘I am concerned with L participants’ (α = .93); and ‘ I identify with R 
participants’, ‘I  feel connected with R participants’, ‘I am concerned with R participants’ (α 
= .91) (Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009).  They also read a paragraph on ‘guarantee of 
anonymity’. 
                                                          
2 ‘L participants’ refers to in-subgroup members from participants’ own university; ‘R participants’ refers to out-subgroup 
members from the other university.   
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To investigate the distinct perceptions of prosocials who consistently cooperated 
across groups and those who contributed more to the group in which their ingroup was nested 
as a majority subgroup, we conducted exploratory analyses to compare identification with in-
subgroup and out-subgroup, concern for the group welfare, and cooperative expectations 
about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members. 
Debriefing  
After completing the booklet all  participants were collectively debriefed by means of 
a lecture on social dilemmas and received a report on some of the prior results.  
Procedure of data analysis 
To test the hypotheses we used two data-analytic approaches. First, to test Hypothesis 
1, 2, and 3, we used the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) procedure (Liang & Zeger, 
1986) that treated the repeated (non)cooperative choices of individual participants in the 
crossed-groups social dilemma game as the units of analysis. As an extension of the 
Generalized Linear Model (logistic regression), this procedure allows for the analysis of 
repeated measurements of binary (‘reduce production’ or ‘stick to production’) response 
variables, with correction for the non-independence of data. Data are assumed to be 
dependent within subjects and independent between subjects. The hypotheses were tested by 
the Wald statistic that has a Chi-square distribution and results were reported in probabilities 
of cooperation in the MI- and MO group separately. 
Second, to understand how prosocial and proself participants responded differently to 
group composition, we analyzed participants’ choice patterns - based on their repeated 
choices in MI and MO respectively (C-C, C-D, D-C, D-D)
3
 - with a Chi-square analysis. C-C 
and D-D choice patterns indicated consistent cooperation and  defection, respectively, in both 
MI and MO. C-D patterns indicated cooperation only when in-subgroup members were in the 
                                                          
3 C denoting a Cooperative choice (‘limit production’) and D denoting a Defective choice (‘stick to the current production 
level’) 
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majority (MI), not when outgroup subgroup members were in the majority (MO). D-C 
patterns indicated cooperation only when outgroup subgroup members were in the majority 
(MO), not when ingroup subgroup members were in the majority (MI).  
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Order. The order of presenting the MI group (7-3) and MO group (3-7) did not yield a 
different pattern of results (Wald χ² (1) = 1.24, p < .27). Overall, cooperation probabilities 
were very similar in the MI-MO order (.54) as in the MO-MI order (.59).  
Hypothesis 1: Group Composition. There was a significant main effect of group 
composition on cooperation (Wald χ² (1) = 5.96,  p < .02), indicating that, overall, participants 
made significantly more cooperative choices in the MI group (.63) than in the MO group 
(.47), i.e. a difference of 16%
4
. Hypothesis 1 on parochial cooperation was supported by the 
data. 
Hypothesis 2: SVO. The GEE method showed a significant main effect of SVO on 
cooperation (Wald χ² (1) = 14.67, p < .001). Overall, prosocials made significantly more 
cooperative choices (.67) than proselves (.42), i.e. a difference of 25%
5
.  
Hypothesis 3: Group Composition x Social Value Orientation. There was no 
significant interaction effect of group composition and social value orientation on 
cooperation (Wald χ² (1) = 2.08, p < .15).  
 
                                                          
4 For the ease of interpretation the magnitude of all effects are reported in probabilities instead of Odds ratios (Exp (B)). 
These probabilities (Estimated Marginal Means) were calculated via a non-linear transformation of the Odds. 
 
5
 The means of the overall probabilities (of cooperation) for both prosocials and proselves are calculated via the means of the 
MI and MO Odds (of cooperation) that are then back transformed to probabilities (EMMeans) with the function Exp (x)= 
Exp [(ln(p/1-p) + ln (p/1-p))/2]/ 1+ Exp [(ln(p/1-p) + ln (p/1-p)/2]. 
For Prosocials: Exp[((ln(.77/.23) + ln(.57/.43))/2]/ 1 + Exp[[((ln(.77/.23) + ln(.57/.43))/2]= Exp [1.21+ .29 /2 ]/ 1 + Exp 
[1.21+ .29/2]= Exp (.75)/ 1+ Exp (.75) = 2.12/3.12 = .67 
For Proselfs: Exp[((ln(.48/.52) +ln(.37/.63)) /2]/ 1 + Exp[((ln(.48/.52) +ln(.37/.63)) /2]= Exp[(-0.08 - .53)/2]/ 1+ Exp[(-0.08 - 
.53)/2]= Exp (-.31)/ 1+ Exp (-.31)= 1.36/2.36 = .42. 
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Table 2.1. Cooperation probabilities in the MI group and MO group for prosocials and 
proselves (n = 354) 
 MI MO SVO 
(main effect) 
 
Prosocials 
 
.77 
 
.57 
 
.67 
Proselves .48 .37 .42 
GroupComposition 
(main effect) 
.63 .47 
 
 
The results showed that prosocials made more cooperative choices toward the MI 
group (.77) than toward the MO group (.57)
6
, i.e. a difference of 20% (Table 2.1)
7
. Proselves 
also made more cooperative choices toward the MI group (.48) than toward the MO group 
(.37), i.e. a difference of 11%. Prosocials did not show a significantly different sensitivity to 
the composition of the group than proselves. 
To understand how prosocials and proselves responded to group composition, we 
performed a Chi square analysis on participants’ choice patterns. This analysis allowed us to 
compare the frequencies of prosocials’ and proselves’ repeated choices in the MI group and 
MO group respectively. Choice patterns (MI-MO) were generated by placing participants’ 
choice in the MI group before that in the MO group. There was no significant interaction 
effect of order with group composition and social value orientation (B = .78, Wald χ2 (1) = 
2.45, p < .12). Consequently, this recoding strategy could be reliably executed.   
 
                                                          
6 The probabilities obtained from the GEE analyses are calculated via the accumulated frequencies of participants’ 
cooperative choices in the MI group and MO group. To obtain the probability of cooperation in the MI group for prosocials 
the frequencies of C-C and C-D choices are summed: 111 C-C choices + 49 C-D choices/ 209 prosocials = .77. To obtain the 
probability of cooperation in the MO group for prosocials the frequencies of C-C and D-C choices are summed: 111 C-C 
choices + 9 D-C choices/ 209 prosocials = .57. 
7
 These results are based on a (non-linear) transformation of the logOdds ratios into estimated marginal means (expected 
probabilities). A significant interaction effect in GEE logistic regression analysis indicates that the difference in logOdds 
between the conditions is significant. To double-check whether this significance also held for the estimated marginal means, 
a GEE linear regression analysis with identity link was performed of which the results are reported here. 
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Table 2.2. Choice patterns of prosocials and proselves (n = 354)  
  
MI-MO  
C-C 
 
MI-MO 
C-D 
MI-MO 
D-C 
MI-MO 
D-D 
Prosocials   
 
52.6% 
 
 
23.4% 
 
 
4.3% 
 
 
19.6% 
 
Proselves  
 
26.9% 
 
 
20.7% 
 
 
9.7% 
 
 
42.8% 
 
     
 
There was a significant difference in choice patterns between prosocials and proselves 
(χ² (3) = 33.29,  p < .0001) (Table 2.2). Prosocials (52.6%) were more consistent cooperators 
(C-C), whereas proselves (42.8%) were more consistent defectors (D-D). About an equal 
proportion of prosocials (23.4%) and proselves (20.7%) preferred to cooperate only when the 
in-subgroup was in the majority (MI) (C-D). In conclusion, the inspection of choice patterns 
showed that prosocials differed from proselves in their responses to group composition: 
Prosocials chose cooperation significantly more consistently (C-C) and proselves chose 
defection significantly more  consistently (D-D). 
Additional measures 
(Sub)group identification. Participants identified significantly more with in-subgroup 
members (M = 3.23, SD = 1.10) than with out-subgroup members (M = 1.94, SD = .92 ; t (353) 
= 18.48,  p < .0001).  
Prosocials showed stronger identification with their in-subgroup members (M = 3.28, 
SD = 1.11) than proselves (M = 3.16, SD = 1.09 ; t (352) = 1.06, p < .29)  and showed stronger 
identification with out-subgroup members (M = 2.02, SD = .95) than proselves (M = 1.83, SD 
= .87 ; t (352) = 1.98, p < .05). Prosocials showed more concern for welfare of the MI group (M 
= 4.33, SD = 1.03) than proselves (M = 4.05, SD = 1.07; t (352) = 2.92, p < .01).  They also 
  64 
showed more concern for welfare of the MO group (M = 4.21, SD = .90) than proselves (M = 
3.86, SD = .94; t (352) = 3.15, p < .01). 
Cooperative expectations. Participants expected in-subgroup members to cooperate 
more frequently in the MI group (M = .47, SD = .28 ) than in the MO group (M = . 26, SD = 
.27 ; t (352) = 11.68, p < .0001). Participants also expected out-subgroup members to cooperate 
more frequently in the MO group (M = .52, SD = .32 ) than in the MI group (M = .37, SD = 
.36 ; t (352) = 6.91, p < .0001). In other words, participants expected more cooperation when 
group members’ in-subgroup was in the majority than when their in-subgroup was in the 
minority in the heterogeneous group. 
Prosocials in the MI group expected more in-subgroup members (M = .50, SD = .27) 
to cooperate, than proselves (M = .43, SD = .28 ;  t (352) = 2.41, p < .02); they also expected 
more out-subgroup members (M = .40, SD = .35) to cooperate compared to proselves (M = 
.33, SD = .35; t (352) = 1.75, p < .08). Prosocials in the MO group expected more out-subgroup 
members (M = . 54, SD = .31) to cooperate compared to proselves (M = .49, SD = .32; t (352) = 
1.59, p < .11). Overall, prosocials expected more cooperation of other group members than 
proselves, regardless whether the other group members belonged to the ingroup or the 
outgroup. 
Perceptions of prosocials with C-D patterns (n = 49) and with C-C patterns (n = 110) 
differed in several ways: Prosocials with C-C patterns were more concerned with the welfare 
of the MO group (M = 4.49, SD = .82) than those with C-D patterns (M = 3.82, SD = 1.15; t 
(157) = 4.21 , p < .0001), they expected more cooperation of in-subgroup members in the MO 
group (M = .33, SD = .27) than prosocials with C-D patterns (M = .16, SD = .26; t (157) = 3.72, 
p < .002), and they expected more cooperation of out-subgroup members in the MI group (M 
= .55, SD = .35 ) than prosocials with C-D patterns (M = .29, SD = .34; t (157) = 4.42 p < .001). 
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DISCUSSION  
Results of Study 1 confirmed the hypotheses on group composition and social value 
orientation. Participants were more likely to cooperate  in the 10-p. group with a majority of 
in-subgroup members (MI) than in the group with a minority of in-subgroup members (MO) 
(H1). This finding was evidence for parochial cooperation, as participants’ contributions were 
affected by the majority versus minority status of their in-subgroup. Group members 
identified more with in-subgroup members than with out-subgroup members and expected 
group members to cooperate more when their in-subgroup was in the majority than when it 
was in the minority. Overall, prosocials cooperated more than proselves (H2) and they 
expected more frequent cooperation of group members than proselves. Prosocials and 
proselves displayed equal sensitivity to group composition, but prosocials were more 
consistent cooperators (C-C) whereas proselves were more consistent defectors (D-D) (H3). 
Prosocials identified more with in-subgroup and out-subgroup members than proselves, and 
they showed more concern for the group welfare, both in the MI - and MO group. Additional 
descriptive data confirmed the results found in Study 1. To replicate these results and to gain 
insight in the underlying mechanism of participants’ choices in the MI- and MO group, we 
ran a second experiment with a similar design. We now also measured participants’ 
identification with the MI 10-p. group and with the MO 10-p. group, next to cooperative 
expectations of in-subgroup and of out-subgroup members. This allowed to investigate these 
variables as potential parallel mediators of the group composition effect on choice.  
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STUDY  2 
METHOD 
Sample  
Participants were 404 undergraduate psychology students enrolled in a Western-
European university, both men (22%)
8
 and women (78%) with M age = 22 years. Data 
collection took place during the first lecture of the course with a similar procedure as in Study 
1. 
Social Value Orientation (SVO) 
We used the same measure of Social Value Orientation as in the first experiment. 
Participants were again classified as prosocials or proselves, following the standard procedure 
(van Lange et al., 1997). Of the 404 respondents, 357 could be classified as having either a 
prosocial or a proself SVO. There were 225 (56%) Prosocials and 134 (33%) proselves of 
which most were individualists (n = 112, 29%) and the rest competitors (n = 14, 4%). 
Individualists and competitors were again combined to form one category of proselves. 
Participants who made less than six out of the nine choices, consistent with one of the two 
social value orientations (n = 45, 11%), were excluded from further analyses.  
Procedure 
The CSD vignette, manipulation of the group composition variable, and measures 
were similar to the ones used in Study 1. 
Measures 
In addition to the measures of Study 1, we now also measured participants’ 
identification with the MI 10-p. group and the MO 10-p. group with three items on a 5-point 
scale (adapted from Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009): ‘I identify with the 10-p. group of 7 
L and 3 R participants ’, ‘I  feel connected with the 10-p. group of 7 L and 3 R participants ’, 
                                                          
8 We double checked the descriptive data and surprisingly the men-women distribution was similar in both samples of Study 
1 and Study 2. 
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‘I am concerned with the 10-p. group of 7 L and 3 R participants (α = .93) (for the MI 
group)
9
; and ‘ I identify with the 10-p. group of 3 L and 7 R participants, ‘I  feel connected 
with the 10-p. group of 3 L and 7 R participants’, ‘I am concerned with the 10-p. group of 3 L 
and 7 R participants’ (α = .92) (for the MO group). Identification with the in-subgroup (α = 
.94) and identification with the out-subgroup (α = .92) were also measured, as in Study 1. 
To investigate the perceptions of prosocials who consistently cooperated across 
groups (MI and MO) and those who contributed more to the group in which their in-subgroup 
was nested in a majority, we conducted exploratory analyses to compare identification with 
in-subgroup and out-subgroup, 10-p. group identification, concern for the 10-p. group 
welfare, and cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members between 
those groups of prosocials.  
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
The group composition manipulation was checked with the same four items as in 
Study 1. Again, all participants comprehended that the 10-p. group consisted of 7 in-subgroup 
members and 3 out-subgroup members in condition MI (Majority Ingroup), and that the 10-p. 
group consisted of 3 in-subgroup members and 7 out-subgroup members in condition MO 
(Majority Outgroup). 
Hypotheses were tested with the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) procedure 
to check overall cooperation probabilities of prosocials and proselves in the MI group and in 
the MO group. A Chi-square analysis of participants’ choice patterns was conducted to 
understand how prosocial and proself participants responded differently to group 
composition. 
Cooperative choice behavior 
                                                          
9
 L participants’ refers to in-subgroup members from participants’ own university; ‘R participants’ refers to out-subgroup 
members from the other university.   
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Order. The order of presenting the MI group (7-3) and MO group (3-7) did not yield a 
different pattern of results (Wald χ² (1) = .16, p < .70). Cooperation probabilities were very 
similar in the MI-MO order (.60) as in the MO-MI order (.58).  
Hypothesis 1: Group Composition. There was a significant main effect of group 
composition on cooperation (Wald χ² (1) = 52.06, p < .0001), indicating that, overall, 
participants in the MI group (.69) made significantly more cooperative choices than when in 
the MO group (.48), i.e. a difference of 21%. Hypothesis 1 on parochial cooperation was 
supported by the data. 
Hypothesis 2: SVO. The GEE method showed a significant main effect of SVO on 
cooperation (Wald χ² (1) = 14.03, p < .0001). Overall, prosocials were significantly more 
likely to make a cooperative choice (.65) than proselves (.49), i.e. a difference of 16%.  
Hypothesis 3: Interaction Group Composition x Social Value Orientation. There was 
no significant interaction of group composition and social value orientation on cooperation 
(Wald χ² (1) = .15, p < .70). 
 
Table 2.3. Cooperation probabilities in the MI group and MO group for prosocials and 
proselves (n = 359) 
 MI MO SVO 
(main effect) 
 
Prosocials 
 
.76 
 
.58 
 
.65 
Proselves .54 .39 .49 
GroupComposition 
(main effect) 
.69 .48 
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Prosocials in the MI group (.76) were more likely to make a  cooperative choice than 
prosocials in the MO group (.58), i.e. a difference of 18% (Table 2.3)
10
. Proselves in the MI 
group (.54) also made more cooperative choices than in the MO group (.39), i.e. a difference 
of 15%. However, prosocials did not show a significantly different sensitivity to the 
composition of the group than proselves.  
To understand how prosocials and proselves responded to group composition, we performed 
a Chi square analysis on their choice patterns. This analysis compared prosocials’ and 
proselves’ repeated choices in the MI and MO group. Again, choice patterns (MI-MO) were 
generated by placing participants’ choice in the MI group before that in the MO group. There 
was no significant interaction effect of order with group composition and social value 
orientation (B = .20, Wald χ2 (1)= .15, p < .70). Consequently, this recoding strategy could be 
reliably executed.   
 
Table 2.4. Choice patterns of prosocials and proselves (n = 359)  
  
MI-MO  
C-C 
 
MI-MO 
C-D 
MI-MO 
D-C 
MI-MO 
D-D 
Prosocials   
 
49.3% 
 
 
25.8% 
 
 
4.9% 
 
 
20% 
 
Proselves  
 
32.1% 
 
 
26.9% 
 
 
7.5% 
 
 
33.6% 
 
     
 
There was a significant difference in choice patterns between prosocials and proselves 
(χ² (3) = 12.99, p < .005) (Table 2.4). Most prosocials (49.3%) were consistent cooperators (C-
C), whereas most proselves (33.6%) were consistent defectors (D-D). About an equal 
                                                          
10
 These results are based on a (non-linear) transformation of the logOdds ratios into estimated marginal means (expected 
probabilities). A significant interaction effect in GEE logistic regression analysis indicates that the difference in logOdds 
between the conditions is significant. To double-check whether this significance also held for the estimated marginal means, 
a GEE linear regression analysis with identity link was performed of which results were reported. 
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proportion of prosocials (25.8%) and proselves (26.9%) preferred to cooperate only when 
their in-subgroup was in the majority (MI) (C-D). The inspection of choice patterns showed 
that prosocials differed from proselves in their response to group composition: Prosocials 
were more consistent cooperators (C-C) and proselves were more consistent defectors (D-D). 
Additional measures 
(Sub)group identification. Participants identified significantly more with in-subgroup 
members (M = 3.48, SD = 1.07) than with out-subgroup members (M = 2.24, SD = .95 ; t (351) 
= 18.40, p < .0001). Participants identified more strongly with the MI group (M = 3.27, SD = 
1.00 ) than with the MO group (M = 2.66, SD = .95 ; t (353) = 12.11,  p < .0001).  
Prosocials showed stronger identification with in-subgroup members (M = 3.54, SD = 
1.06) than proselves (M = 3.38, SD = 1.08 ; t (350) = 1.36, p < .18) and showed stronger 
identification with out-subgroup members (M = 2.34, SD = .95 ) than proselves (M = 2.04, 
SD = .94 ; t (356) = 2.91, p < .004). Prosocials showed more concern for group welfare of the 
MI group (M = 4.26, SD = .84) than proselves (M = 4.07, SD = 1.06, t (355) = 1.93, p < .05); 
and they showed more concern for welfare of the MO group (M = 3.98, SD = 1.01) than 
proselves (M = 3.78, SD = 1.21, t (356) = 1.63, p < .10). 
Cooperative expectations. Participants expected more in-subgroup members to 
cooperate in the MI group (M = .51, SD = .25) than in the MO group (M = . 29, SD = .28; t 
(348) = 12.55, p < .0001). Participants also expected more out-subgroup members to cooperate 
in the MO group (M = .54, SD = .30) than in the MI group (M = .41, SD = .35 ; t (348) = 6.93, p 
< .0001). In other words, they expected members to cooperate more when their own in-
subgroup was in the majority than when their in-subgroup was in the minority. 
Prosocials expected more in-subgroup members to cooperate in the MI group (M = 
.52, SD = .25) than proselves (M = .49, SD = .26;  t (357) = 1.26, p < .21); they also expected 
more out-subgroup members to cooperate in the MI group (M = .45, SD = .36) than proselves 
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(M = .35, SD = .33 ; t (357) = 2.71, p < .007). Prosocials expected more out-subgroup members 
to cooperate in the MO group (M = . 56, SD = .30 ) than proselves (M = .50, SD = .30 , t (357) 
= 1.72, p < .08). Overall, prosocials expected more group members to cooperate than 
proselves, regardless whether they belonged to the in-subgroup or the out-subgroup. 
Perceptions of prosocials with C-D patterns (n = 58) and C-C patterns (n = 110) 
differed in several ways: Prosocials with C-C patterns were more concerned with the welfare 
of the MO group (M = 4.42, SD = .75) than those with C-D patterns (M = 3.34, SD = 1.10; t 
(166) = 7.48, p < .0001), they identified more with the MO group (M = 2.96, SD = 1.01) than 
those with C-D patterns (M = 2.64, SD = .75, t (164) = 2.14, p < .05), they identified more with 
the out-subgroup (M = 2.62, SD = .96 ) than those with C-D patterns (M = 2.02, SD = .68, t 
(166) = 4.14, p < .0001), they expected more cooperation of in-subgroup members in the MO 
group (M = .38, SD = .29) than prosocials with C-D patterns (M = .21, SD = .24; t (167) = 3.76, 
p < .0001), and they expected more cooperation of out-subgroup members in the MI group 
(M = .61, SD = .32) than prosocials with C-D patterns (M = .26, SD = .29; t (167) = 7.03, p < 
.0001) 
Exploratory Mediation Analysis 
Simple mediation. To gain more insight into the relationships between group 
composition, group identification, cooperative expectations of in-subgroup and out-subgroup, 
and choice behavior, we conducted an exploratory mediation analysis. Current statistical 
techniques do not allow yet to conduct the analysis with clustered data (time in individual) 
and a binary outcome variable in the model. Consequently, we analyzed the effects of the 
first group composition in which participants made their choice, in either the MI group or the 
MO group. This procedure eliminated the repeatedness from the design which allowed to test 
for mediation effects with the PROCESS procedure of Hayes (2013). Group composition at 
Time 1 (MI or MO), and Choice at Time 1 (cooperation or defection) were defined as the 
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predictor and outcome variable respectively. The variables ‘identification with the MI group’, 
‘identification with the MO group’, ‘cooperative expectations about in-subgroup members’, 
and ‘cooperative expectations about out-subgroup members’ were included as parallel 
mediators in the model. Indirect effects were calculated as the products of the estimates (ab) 
of the effect of the factor on the mediator (a), and the effect of the mediator on the dependent 
variable (b). Whether the indirect effects were significant was determined via the 
bootstrapping confidence intervals.  
We conducted a simple mediation analysis on the sample of Study 1, where 
cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members were measured. This 
analysis showed that group composition indirectly influenced cooperative choice through its 
effects on cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members. 
Participants expected in the MI group more cooperation from in-subgroup members (a1 = .19, 
p < .0001), and they expected less cooperation from out-subgroup members (a2 = -.19, p < 
.0001). And participants who expected more cooperation of in-subgroup members (b1 = 2.76, 
p < .0001) and more cooperation of out-subgroup members (b2 = 1.50, p < .001), all showed 
more cooperation with their group. The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the 
indirect effects based on 5000 bootstrap samples did not include zero, for cooperative 
expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members (for ab1 = .52: .78 to .32; for ab2 
= -.29: -.15 to -.47 respectively), so there was evidence of the indirect effect of group 
composition on cooperative choice through cooperative expectations about subgroup 
members. 
From the simple mediation analysis conducted on the sample of Study 2, group 
composition indirectly influenced cooperative choice through its effects on identification with 
the MI group, on identification with the MO group, and on cooperative expectations about in-
subgroup and out-subgroup members. Participants showed in the MI group stronger group 
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identification (a1 = .63, p < .0001), expected more cooperation from in-subgroup members 
(a2 = .17, p < .0001), and expected less cooperation from out-subgroup members (a3 = -.11, p 
< .01). And participants who identified more with their group (b1 = .79, p < .0001), who 
expected more cooperation from in-subgroup members (b2 = 2.76, p < .0001) and more 
cooperation from out-subgroup members (b3 = 1.90, p < .0001), all showed more cooperation 
with their group. The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects 
based on 5000 bootstrap samples did not include zero, for group identification and 
cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members, which indicated 
significance of these effects (for ab1 = .49: .69 to .30; for ab2 = .47: .72 to .29; for ab3 = -.21: -
.09 to -.40 respectively).  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
After organizational restructuring, mergers, in project teams, employees are often 
regrouped in new entities and face a crossed-groups social dilemma: to act in the interest of 
themselves or their old group, or in the interest of the new heterogeneous group in which they 
and members of their former ingroup are a subgroup. Crucial for organizations is to 
understand how these employees – presented with a conflict of interests - can be motivated to 
cooperate, acting for the benefit of the new heterogeneous group as a whole.  
Summary of Findings  
This research set out to investigate the impact of group composition and individual 
social value orientation on group members’ willingness to cooperate in heterogeneous 
groups. First we discuss the effects of group composition, to continue thereafter with the 
findings related to social value orientation.  
Group composition 
Both studies showed a robust effect of group composition: group members were more 
inclined to cooperate with a 10-p. group consisting of a majority of in-subgroup members, 
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than when their in-subgroup was in the minority (parochial cooperation). Additional analyses 
confirmed the mediating effects from group composition to choice behavior via group 
identification and cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members.  
Group identification. Participants identified more strongly with the in-subgroup than 
with out-subgroup members, and more with the group in which this in-subgroup was nested 
as a majority. Higher levels of cooperation were in turn related to higher levels of group 
identification, in line with previous social dilemma studies (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Wit & 
Kerr, 2002; Wit & Wilke, 1992). There was a ‘cascading’ effect of identification: the 
presence of in-subgroup members with whom participants identified, instilled identification 
with the heterogeneous group in which this in-subgroup was nested as a majority. Results of 
Study 2
11
 showed that participants identified more with their in-subgroup than with the MI 
group and the MO group, in which in-subgroup members were nested. These results are 
consistent with nested social dilemma research (Halevy et al., 2012; Wit & Kerr, 2002), 
showing that group members prioritize the interests of their in-subgroup over and above the 
interests of the group in which their in-subgroup is nested. In the crossed-groups social 
dilemma the 10-p. groups consisted of two clear subgroups with members originating from 
the participant’s own or another university, forming either a majority (MI group) or a 
minority (MO group) of own university members in the heterogeneous 10-p. group. In 
making their choices, participants made a trade-off between their self-interest and the interest 
of the heterogeneous group. Although they could not contribute directly to in-subgroup 
interests, they were more likely to make a cooperative choice when their in-subgroup was in 
the majority than when it was in the minority.  This behavior indicates they favored their own 
in-subgroup over the interests of the heterogeneous group as a whole.  
                                                          
11 Participants’ identification with the MI group and with the MO group was only measured in Study 2, not in Study 1. 
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Our results indicated that group composition also generated a strong faultline, 
dividing the group into two distinct subgroups. Prior research showed more cooperation in 
increasingly heterogeneous groups because of less subgroup categorization (van Knippenberg 
& Schippers, 2007). However, in the crossed-groups social dilemma setting of this study, 
majority-minority social category diversity gave rise to in-subgroup/out-subgroup hostilities 
(cf. Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1998; Pelled, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999), and the 
presence of a majority of out-subgroup members might have increased the salience of in-
subgroup membership. The stronger concern for and identification with their in-subgroup 
motivated participants, when presented with nested interests,  to contribute more to the group 
in which their in-subgroup was in the majority (MI) than to the group with a minority of in-
subgroup members (MO).  
Cooperative expectations. Participants, especially prosocials, did not always act as 
individual ‘agents’ but many based their choices on the strength-in-numbers of  their in-
subgroup in the heterogeneous group. Our results showed that they expected more 
cooperation from subgroup members in the group in which their subgroup was nested as a 
majority. So they expected in-subgroup members to cooperate more in the MI group, and out-
subgroup members to cooperate more in the MO group. These expectations were shown to 
act as parallel mediators of the group composition effect, together with group identification. 
Participants’ choice behavior covaried with their expectations about other (sub)group 
members’ behavior, which is in line with prior social dilemma research (Dawes, McTavish, 
& Shaklee, 1977; Messick et al., 1983; Schroeder et al., 1983; van Lange & Liebrand, 1989; 
Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). 
Status. An alternative explanation for the MI-MO effect is the relative (sub)group 
size, as a potential antecedent of status (Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Guinote, 2004; Ng, 
1982). Subgroups that have numerically more members (majority subgroups) tend to have 
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higher status (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002), defined as “the prominence, respect, and 
influence individuals enjoy in the eyes of others” (Anderson et al., 2006, p. 1094; for other 
definitions see also Fiske, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In the MI group the in-subgroup 
may have been viewed as being in a high-status position because it was in the majority in the 
heterogeneous group. So, a member of a majority subgroup, nested in the heterogeneous 
group, might contribute more to the group in order to confirm the subgroup’s status and 
identity (Ellemers & Scheepers, 2005; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; 
Turner, 1987). In a similar vein, the in-subgroup may have been viewed as being in a low-
status position in the MO group because it was in the minority. So a member of the minority 
subgroup, nested in the heterogeneous group, might contribute less to the group in order to 
protect self-interest and avoid being taken advantage of by the majority (Insko et al., 1998; 
Pemberton, Insko, & Schopler, 1996). They may react adversely to the fact that the high-
status out-subgroup, being in the majority, will have greater influence (Terry, 2003; Van 
Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003). 
Social Value Orientation 
When comparing prosocials’ and proselves’ choice patterns, they demonstrated 
similar levels of cooperation when their in-subgroup subgroup was in the majority  (20-25%) 
(C-D). Prosocials and proselves both identified more with their in-subgroup and with the MI 
group than with the out-subgroup and with the MO group. Noteworthy is that, next to 
prosocials, proselves were also more concerned with the group welfare in the MI group than 
in the MO group. Proselves showed higher contribution levels with increased group 
identification, in line with the goal transformation hypothesis (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; 
De Cremer, van Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & van Leeuwen, 2008). A stronger willingness to 
sacrifice was associated with greater commitment toward the in-subgroup members. This fits 
in with prior research, showing that the commitment-sacrifice link can be even more 
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pronounced among proselves (van Lange et al., 1997), although other studies also showed 
high levels of ingroup favoritism in prosocials (Aaldering et al., 2013; De Dreu et al., 2010). 
Prosocials and proselves also acted differently upon the heterogeneous group 
composition. Prosocials most frequently (50%) displayed consistent cooperation (C-C) 
whereas proselves were mostly (34-43%) consistent defectors (D-D). Additional descriptive 
data analyses for both studies indicated that prosocials showed more concern for the group 
welfare in both MI- and MO groups, and in general expected more cooperation of other group 
members, compared to proselves. Proselves were more self-interested and displayed lower 
levels of concern and cooperation toward members of both in-subgroup and out-subgroup. 
Prosocials attached more importance to a joint reduction in production in both groups than 
proselves, and even if all other group members would defect, prosocials would continue to 
engage in cooperation
12
. These findings concur with Interdependency Theory (Kelley & 
Thibaut, 1978), stating that the willingness to sacrifice in relationships is influenced by a 
variety of factors, including not only personally held goals or social dispositions, but also 
beliefs regarding a partner’s willingness to sacrifice (cf. Kelley, 1979; McClintock & 
Liebrand, 1988). Prosocials acted out of collective rationality, whereas proselves were more 
self-oriented with an individual rationality.  
But what were the prosocials’ motives for a D-D choice (vs. a C-D choice), and did 
they actually relative more to the collective group interests (vs. subgroup interests)? In 
previous studies on inter-group conflict, ingroup and outgroup were always separate entities 
and a choice to contribute came only to the advantage of the ingroup, and fairly often even to 
the detriment of the outgroup, referred to as ingroup love and outgroup hate (Halevy et al., 
                                                          
12 Participants responded to the following item: ‘If I would be really sure that all other nine group members would limit their 
production in this 10-p. group, I would choose to…(choose one alternative): stick to the current production level OR limit 
production.’ In the MI group 80% of the prosocials chose to limit production (20% chose defection); in the MO group 76% 
of the prosocials chose to cooperate (24% chose defection). Similar percentages were found in Exp 2. A vast majority of 
prosocials thus decided to cooperate in both groups (‘limit production’), despite the temptation to free-ride. 
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2008). In the crossed-groups social dilemma, however, out-subgroup members belonged to 
the same group as in-subgroup members. The only way for participants to advantage their 
own subgroup was to contribute to the collective in which their subgroup was nested, 
together with a majority or minority of out-subgroup members. So a consistent cooperative 
choice might be motivated not so much by collective interests but rather by a desire to 
advance their own subgroup (parochialism).  
Representative negotiations research showed that prosocials self-sacrificed for the 
collective – containing both constituency and counterpart – but mostly motivated to benefit 
their ingroup; they accepted the benefit to the rivaling outgroup as ‘collateral damage’ 
(Aaldering et al., 2013; Abbink, Brandts, Hermann, & Orzen, 2012; De Dreu et al., 2010). 
We conducted exploratory analyses across Study 1 and 2 to compare the perceptions of 
prosocials with C-C en C-D choice patterns toward in-subgroup, out-subgroup, and the 
heterogeneous 10-p. group. Results indicated that prosocials with C-C behavior identified 
more with out-subgroup members, identified more with the MO group, were more concerned 
with the group welfare in the MO group, and expected more cooperation from the out-
subgroup members in the MI group and from the in-subgroup members in the MO group, 
compared to prosocials with C-D behavior. Prosocials displaying C-D behavior identified 
significantly more with their in-subgroup. These findings suggest that prosocials displayed C-
C behavior with a strong concern towards both in-subgroup and out-subgroup members, 
while C-D behavior was motivated rather out of in-subgroup-only interests, or parochialism.  
Contributions and future research 
This research has methodological contributions, and adds to the literature on social 
dilemmas, faultlines and social value orientation. First, we developed a new game theoretic 
paradigm to study cooperative decision-making in heterogeneous groups with subgroups, in 
which participants are confronted with conflicts of interest in crossed-groups social dilemmas. 
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Measuring cooperation repeatedly in different group compositions allowed to investigate the 
effects of heterogeneity in crossed-groups social dilemmas. To date, the impact of group 
composition on cooperative decision-making in social dilemmas is scarcely researched.   
Secondly, prior social dilemma research shows that if group members thought of the 
group in terms of two subgroups, they acted more in the subgroup’s interest and acted less in 
terms of their self-interest or the collective interests, including those of others in the group 
who were not members of their in-subgroup (Wit & Kerr, 2002).  Our research indicates that 
when participants were presented with heterogeneous groups, comprising two distinct 
subgroups, indeed a certain amount of them preferred cooperation in the group with a 
majority of in-subgroup members. However, a significant proportion of participants choose to 
forfeit self-interest and cooperate with the group (C-C – consistent cooperation), despite 
strong subgroup identification with (and more cooperative expectations from) their in-
subgroup than with the out-subgroup members. Some of them also acted selfishly toward the 
group, making a D-D choice (consistent defection), and as such placed self-interest above 
subgroup interests. These results show that in a social dilemma, the presence of subgroups 
and associated subgroup identification does not necessarily result in less attention for the 
collective interests.  
Thirdly, with our study we contribute to the research on group faultlines. Although 
limited in size, the interest in this field of study is rapidly surging (e.g. Rico, Sànchez-
Manzanares, Antino, & Lau, 2012, Thatcher & Patel, 2012). Previous faultline and diversity 
studies already indicated that the effects of heterogeneous group composition on group- and 
individual performance and group member satisfaction are determined by the salience of a 
certain form of diversity (i.e. gender, organizational tenure, pre-merger organization of 
origin,…) experienced by group members (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Jehn, Bezrukova, & 
Thatcher, 2008; Lawrence, 1997). Perceived differences even have a larger effect on group 
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outcomes than actual differences (Strauss, Barrick, & Connerley, 2001; Turban & Jones, 
1988). The presence of a strong faultline throughout both of our studies - splitting up the 
group in an in-subgroup and out- subgroup - led to social category diversity. We showed that 
these (sub)group identifications clearly impacted cooperation levels in a heterogeneous 
group, with participants attending more to the interests of a group containing a majority of in-
subgroup members. However, not only identification processes were determining cooperative 
choice, but also cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members. 
These variables acted as parallel mediators of the group composition effect on cooperation. 
Measuring identification with the (sub)groups, expectations about (sub)group members’ 
cooperation, and concern with group welfare in both studies gave insight into when consistent 
cooperators would arise (cf. Weber & Murnighan, 2008). Limitation of our studies is that 
perceptions were measured after individuals had made a series of cooperative and/or 
competitive choices. These choices might have influenced the reports of participants’ 
perceptions and might be linked to post-hoc justification (Messé & Sivacek, 1979).  
 Another interesting avenue for future research involves the study of how and when 
the present faultline – splitting up the group in two subgroups – could be deactivated, as a 
potential mechanism to increase overall cooperation rates in newly composed groups and to 
simultaneously decrease parochial cooperation. Defined as the process of minimizing the 
salience of activated faultlines in teams, faultline deactivation can be introduced by an 
external trigger that shifts attention away from (demographically) aligned subgroups (Van der 
Kamp, Tjemkes, & Jehn, 2012). Changing the cognitive representation of the group situation 
from one involving two separate subgroups to one involving one collective group 
(recategorization), and common goal-setting (Rico et al., 2012; van Knippenberg, Dawson, 
West, & Homan, 2011), might act as faultline deactivators in this context, encouraging 
consistent cooperation. 
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Finally, these studies not only tied in with social dilemma and faultline research, but 
also provided some new insights into the boundary conditions of social value orientation 
effects. From prior research we know that social value orientation will exert its effects mainly 
in situations of high uncertainty (de Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & De Cremer, 2006; Roch 
& Samuelson, 1997). The crossed-groups social dilemma in which participants were placed 
might be characterized as an uncertain context: no actual interactions between group 
members, no visual contact, no prior acquaintance with other members. The only cue 
participants could go by was the faultline separating the in-subgroup and out-subgroup. 
However, this faultline appeared to provide a strong context (Snyder & Ickes, 1985), as 
distinct subgroups triggered cooperation rates in the majority ingroup (MI) more than in the 
majority outgroup (MO), even in this minimal group situation. Both prosocials and proselves 
showed fairly equal levels of parochial cooperation. On the other hand, did prosocials’ and 
proselves’ choice patterns reflect most frequently behavior in line with their individual 
disposition, namely consistent cooperation and consistent defection respectively. Although a 
strong situation usually allows for little interpersonal differences in people’s behavior, 
prosocials acted in line with their tendency to cooperate more whereas proselves acted mostly 
selfish. These findings add to the literature showing that not all strong situations 
automatically lead to the suppression of behavior in line with individual social value 
orientation, but that it might depend on the type of situation. The degree to which prosocials 
and proselves will be influenced by the strength of the situation or perceive the situation as 
strong can differ. In prior research, proselves are found to act mostly self-interested in a wide 
array of contexts, so they are most consistent in their behavior and less influenced by the 
context. Prosocials on the other hand revealed themselves in a context of mixed motives as 
attending more to their own group’s interests than to the collective interest (Aaldering et al., 
2013). Future research could further investigate in which types of (strong) situations 
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prosocials and proselves might act differently, how strong they perceive the situation. For 
example, based on the theory of collective and individual rationality as motives for their 
behavior (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), we could expect that for proselves individual incentives 
might motivate cooperation more than for prosocials. Explicitly measuring participants’ 
reasons to cooperate in the MI- and MO groups can tease out the motivational mechanism 
underlying prosocials’ and proselves’ decisions. This would also offer more insight in their 
motives for consistent cooperation and consistent defection respectively.  
The effects of social value orientation in crossed-groups social dilemmas might also 
differ over time. In a one-shot game, participant choices are mostly a function of disposition, 
whereas in an iterated context with repeated rounds, behavior is not only a function of 
dispositional social motives but more so of other group members’ prior behavior (Balliet, 
Parks, & Joireman, 2009). The effects of SVO on cooperation in a crossed-groups social 
dilemma may alter over time, based on the feedback (given in between rounds) of others’ 
behavior. Prior research showed that co-operators and individualists assimilated the low level 
of cooperation of competitive partners, whereas competitor’s behavior did not change in 
response to another competitor (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). So, 
although SVO has been found to be a stable trait over time (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 
2008), the presence of competitors in the group - even in a minority - could drastically shift 
cooperation rates (see also Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramírez-Marín, 2009) in crossed-
groups social dilemmas and may shift prosocials’ C-C choices to D-D and C-D choices. Also, 
the effects of SVO will likely change as the group matures: reactions to other group members’ 
behavior might be different in the initial phase of group formation compared to when 
employees are more familiar with one another, and gained experience in working together.  
Managerial implications 
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Insights from the present studies have implications for organizations as well. 
Employees who work simultaneously with members of their ingroup and with members of an 
outgroup are likely more willing to cooperate when their cooperation profits mainly members 
of their ingroup. They will cooperate more if their group consists of a majority of in-subgroup 
members than when it consists of a minority of in-subgroup members (and their cooperation 
mainly profits outgroup members). Similarly, they might cooperate more in groups that 
merely consist of in-subgroup members than in heterogeneous groups that consist of both in-
subgroup and out-subgroup  members.  
However, not all employees will act alike when confronted with the same situation: 
The present results suggest that employees with a prosocial SVO are more willing to show 
cooperative behavior in heterogeneous groups not only toward in-subgroup members, but 
also toward the out-subgroup. Proselves, on the other hand, are much more likely to show 
less cooperation toward their in-subgroup ánd out-subgroup. For organizations this implies 
that the same inter-group situation can elicit fundamentally different responses from different 
employees, depending on their social value orientation. 
Clearly, team management will need to be diversified and adapted to (subgroups of) 
team members, with attention for the composition of the team. A majority of prosocials in the 
team could be advantageous, because consistent contributors can act as a role model to other 
members and create an implicit group norm of cooperation (Weber & Murnighan, 2008). 
However, a minority of proselves can be more persuasive and influential than the co-operators, 
who tend to be ignored when in the minority. This because group members accord more 
weight to their messages than to those of co-operators (Steinel et al., 2009). Overall, proselves 
showed lower cooperation rates and preferred self-interest over cooperation with the group. 
One way to increase cooperation rates in proselves could be to further increase the situational 
strength. Strong situations are more structured and defined and therefore provide salient cues 
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for behavior (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). In strong situations, behavior is usually guided more by 
constraints of the situation and less by interpersonal differences (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). 
The increase in complexity of heterogeneity and compounded faultlines - based on the 
alignment of group members’ different characteristics - can provide salient situational cues for 
cooperation, by which proselves might forfeit their intrinsic motivation for defection to the 
advantage of increased cooperation rates.  
A longer-term solution to the cooperation on an organizational level would not only 
be the search for consistent co-operators displaying organizational citizenship behaviors, but 
more so to garner broad support when they do emerge. These team members can effectively 
catalyze cooperation, even when other group members’ inclinations are not prosocial, and 
often appear to benefit from their cooperative actions (Weber & Murnighan, 2008). 
Encouraging organizational citizenship behavior of employees will come to the benefit of 
individuals, teams, and the broader organization, and it carries potential to dissipate the 
negative effects of heterogeneous group composition.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Vignette Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma Game 
"Imagine all ten of you being the manager of one of ten private firms producing product X. In 
order to increase your profits, you all have just made large private investments to heighten the 
production capacity of product X. Because all ten of you did so, each in his or her own firm, 
the total production of X will soon exceed the public demand, resulting in a drop in prizes. 
You all have to choose between sticking to your present (high) production rate or reducing 
your production rate to a level under its present capacity. Firms producing at maximum 
capacity will always earn more profit than those reducing their production rate, irrespective 
of the number of other managers who decide to do so. However, the more firms that stick to 
their high production rates, the lower the profits all of you earn on product X: If all ten of you 
decide to stick to your high production rates, this will yield all of you a lower profit (10 
million Euros each) than if all of you decide to reduce your production rates (25 million 
Euros each). In the table below, you see how profits vary as a function of the decisions made 
in your 10-person group”. 
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Appendix 2. Pay-off matrix of the 10-p. Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma game 
 
Choice          Pay- off for “stick”  Pay-off for “reduce” 
configuration         (x million)   (x million) 
 
 
 0 STICK \         10 REDUCE   ---   25 
 1 STICK \  9 REDUCE   28   23 
 2 STICK  \  8 REDUCE   26   21 
 3 STICK  \   7 REDUCE   24   19 
 4 STICK  \   6 REDUCE   22   17 
 5 STICK  \   5 REDUCE   20   15 
 6 STICK   \   4 REDUCE    18   13 
 7 STICK  \   3 REDUCE   16   11 
 8 STICK  \   2 REDUCE   14     9 
 9 STICK   \   1 REDUCE   12     7 
10 STICK  \   0 REDUCE   10   --- 
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Bridging the faultline gap: Subgroup composition and Goal Structure in 
Crossed-Groups Social Dilemmas 
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ABSTRACT 
How should organizations deal with the dilemma that arises during and after change 
processes such as corporate mergers and alliances, when employees continue to act in the 
interest of their prior ingroup, at the expense of the new group’s interests, in which their 
ingroup is now just a subgroup? The results of a Crossed-groups Social Dilemma (CSD) 
game confirmed that participants consistently showed parochial cooperation, i.e., more 
cooperation toward a heterogeneous group with a majority of in-subgroup members than 
toward a heterogeneous group with a majority of out-subgroup members. Participants’ 
sensitivity to the subgroup composition could be attenuated by faultline deactivation 
processes to make the in-subgroup – out-subgroup distinction less salient via a superordinate 
goal. Results were replicated in a second experimental study. Implications for research and 
management practice are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Crossed-groups Social Dilemma, Parochial cooperation, Faultlines, In-subgroup, 
Out-subgroup, Subgroup composition, Subgroup size, Faultline deactivation, Superordinate 
goal, Game theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In general, teamwork has gained increasing importance in organizations for both 
decision-making and production (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991; Ilgen, Major, 
Hollenbeck, & Sego, 1993; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). For companies to retain a competitive 
advantage, more emphasis is placed on processes as creativity and social innovation where 
added value is created by bundling forces via cooperation in work groups (Zaccaro, Marks, & 
DeChurch, 2012). At the same time in our globalized world, these groups have become more 
diverse due to increasing internationalization of organizations, in operations and in 
workforce. Strategic processes within and between organizations, such as joint ventures, 
mergers, and other internal organizational restructurings also result in increasingly 
heterogeneous workgroups (Li & Hambrick, 2005). Common practice then is the formation 
of newly composed teams, consisting of employees originating from different organizations 
or departments that are now restructured into one. The emergence of these heterogeneous 
groups poses significant challenges for the organization and its managers.  
Firstly, regrouping employees with distinct backgrounds into one workgroup can give 
rise to subgroup formation, depending on the alignment of the individual differences within 
the group, also referred to as faultlines. These faultlines are defined as “hypothetical dividing 
lines that split a group or a team into two or more subgroups based on one or more individual 
attributes” (Lau & Murnighan, 1998, p. 328).  Faultlines are found to have positive effects on 
creativity, group learning, and team performance (Bezrukova & Uparna, 2009; Bezrukova, 
Jehn, Zanutto, & Thatcher, 2009; Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003; Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 
1999; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelson, 1993). The presence of subgroups and their 
accompanying psychological support may even provide positive benefits to individual group 
members (Spell, Bezrukova, Haar, & Spell, 2011). Stronger faultlines, however, also 
frequently result in greater conflict, reduced team cohesion, performance and satisfaction 
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(Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Choi & Sy, 2010; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Kerr & 
Tindale, 2004; Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003). Subgroups may 
cause an imbalance in the distribution of power, resources, and abilities (Lau & Murnighan, 
1998), and differences in team outcomes (O-Leary & Mortensen, 2010), while their presence 
has important implications for inter-subgroup dynamics (Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
Consequently, it is of utmost importance to group outcomes to prevent and deal with 
subgroup formation and its resulting team conflict (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2011; Jehn & 
Bezrukova, 2010). 
Secondly, after a merger or organizational change, a strong faultline may arise within 
the newly composed group, based on members’ prior group membership. This faultline 
divides the group  into two distinct subgroups with group members representing two social 
entities and categorizing members of their own subgroup as ingroup while viewing the other 
subgroup as outgroup (Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006). Employees are faced with the 
inherent tension between cooperation and competition in this new group. They can continue 
acting in the interest of themselves or their former ingroup, at the expense of the workgroup 
in which their ingroup is now just a subgroup. Result is short-term wins, but if all group 
members act similarly collective loss awaits for the new group. Due to the presence of these 
heterogeneous workgroups in organizations, employees and their managers are faced with a 
social dilemma: forfeit acting in the interest of themselves or their in-subgroup to advance the 
workgroup and the organization as a whole, or reap the profits of self-interest? Free-riding 
always results in higher wins, regardless of other group members’ choices, but if all engage 
in this behavior individual benefits are lower than if all would contribute to the group.  
To address these challenges we integrate theories on faultlines, intragroup and inter-
group conflict, and social dilemmas, to offer a new perspective on the cooperation-
competition dilemma in these heterogeneous workgroups. First, we investigate cooperative 
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decision-making in faultline-based groups with the crossed-groups social dilemma approach, 
as a useful framework to study the conflict of interests arising for group members. The CSD 
paradigm (De Pauw, Wit, & Van den Broeck, 2013) allows us to model the composition of 
an in-subgroup and an out-subgroups into a social dilemma and to gain understanding into 
how group composition impacts individual group members’ decision to cooperate. Second, 
we propose the strategy of faultline deactivation via a superordinate goal to counteract the 
(negative) effects of team faultlines. We report on the results of two vignette studies that 
investigated this intervention’ s distinctive impact on group member cooperation. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
A social dilemma or multi-person prisoner’s dilemma poses a fundamental conflict 
between short-term interests of individuals and the longer-term interests of the groups of 
which they are part. On the one hand, all individuals in the group get a higher payoff for not 
cooperating than for cooperating, regardless of what others do. But on the other hand, if no 
one cooperates then individual payoffs are lower than if everyone had cooperated. So, all 
group members are better off if everyone cooperates than if everyone acts selfishly (Dawes, 
1980; Komorita & Parks, 1996). 
Social dilemmas are omnipresent in the workplace, where employees make daily 
decisions to engage in behavior that supports their group or team. These efforts often go 
beyond the role requirements of the job (Organ, 1997) and - although organizational 
citizenship behaviors may come at a personal cost - they significantly contribute to team 
effectiveness (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Ahearne, 1996), and overall organizational 
performance (Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1994). So, if no one devotes time, energy and means 
to these activities, then all group members will be worse off, because the system will not 
operate as efficiently (Bergeron, 2007; Joireman, Kamdall, Daniels, & Duell, 2006). 
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In social dilemmas, individuals make a trade-off between self-interest and the 
interests of the group of which they are part. When workgroups are formed after 
organizational restructuring, alliance, or merger, very often these units consist of two distinct 
subgroups. Employees originating from two different organizations or departments are now 
regrouped together into one new unit, forming an in-subgroup and an out-subgroup in this 
new workgroup. Group members have to decide upon their self-interest, or the group’s 
interest, but - in choosing (not) to cooperate with the group - also weigh their subgroup’s 
interest. The social dilemma then embodies the nested social structure and interests of the 
group members (Wit & Kerr, 2002).  
Group faultline  
When two prior separate groups start working together in one workgroup (e.g. in 
alliance, organizational merger) a strong faultline may arise based on employees’ 
membership of one organization/department or the other (Hambrick et al., 2001). In the 
newly composed group the basis for a faultline – a crack or a divide – is, by definition, 
present and gives rise to two distinct in- and out-subgroups. Members do not come to the 
group as individuals, but rather as representatives from two different social entities (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005), nested in the group. This (salient) subgroup membership will have an 
impact on their decision to contribute to the group. Alliance teams are typical examples of 
such teams that have a strong faultline. In joint ventures, the primary salient attribute of 
parent company affiliations may cause the dormant faultline between subgroups to become 
activated.  
Strong faultlines can increase conflict and distrust across subgroups within the 
workgroup (Choi & Sy, 2010; Greer & Jehn, 2007; Pearsall, Ellis, & Evans, 2008; Polzer et 
al., 2006; Zanutto, Bezrukova, & Jehn,  2011), and negatively affect group performance and 
social integration (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002; Rico, Molleman, Sànchez-
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Manzanares, & Van der Vegt, 2007). These outcomes arise because, in these faultline-based 
groups, individual group members will attend more to the interests of their subgroup within 
that team, to the detriment of the workgroup in which these subgroups are nested (Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998; Rico, Sànchez-Manzanares, Antino, & Lau, 2012). These consequences 
are exacerbated as the strength of the faultline increases. When alignment on a particular 
characteristic (e.g. pre-merger membership of an organization, company affiliation,…) is 
unambiguous, this leads to a strong attribute alignment clarity and stronger faultlines 
(Thatcher & Patel, 2012). A low number of subgroups also increases the strength of the 
faultline significantly (Nishii & Goncalo, 2008; Polzer et al., 2006), resulting in more intra-
subgroup similarity and more inter-subgroup differences. This effect is enhanced when all 
members of the other subgroup actually share membership in a (demographic) social category 
as a natural, pre-existing group (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Geographic dispersion, often 
present in these types of teams, is also found to lead to activated faultlines and conflicts 
(Polzer et al., 2006). Finally, just the fact of bringing together members from two clearly 
distinct groups into one workgroup acts as a faultline trigger and activates already existing 
faultlines (Hambrick et al., 2001). 
Subgroup composition 
 These groups with a strong faultline are not homogeneous – being populated by in-
subgroup and out-subgroup members. The presence of subgroups in this case gives rise to a 
crossed-groups social dilemma. Members of ingroup and outgroup are crossed into one new 
workgroup and in the trade-off between self-interest and group interest, group members will 
also take the interests of their subgroup - that is now nested in the newly formed group - into 
account. Cooperation in this setting can be defined as “the willingness of group members to 
act to the advantage of the workgroup and as such maximize the joint interests of all members 
of both subgroups” (De Pauw et al., 2013). Prior studies (see Schopler & Insko, 1992) 
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consistently showed that participants who are members of a subgroup show de facto less 
concern for the group interest (i.e. are less likely to make the cooperative or C choice) than 
participants who act as single individuals (see also Komorita & Lapworth, 1982; McCallum 
et al., 1985; Rabbie, Visser, & van Oostrum, 1982). 
The presence of subgroups and heterogeneity in group composition instigates inter-
subgroup processes within the workgroup (Carton & Cummings, 2012). Group members 
have “the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own membership subgroup or its members 
more favorably than a non-membership subgroup” (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, p. 
576). Obviously, this stereotyping or inter-subgroup bias (Gaertner et al., 2000; Taifel, 1982; 
Taifel & Turner, 1979) may result in less cooperation of individuals across subgroups, 
compared to within their subgroup, and thus less contribution to the group interests, 
compared to the subgroup and individual interests (Wit & Kerr, 2002). Subgroup biases lead 
people to favor and trust in-subgroup members more than out-subgroup members, and to 
identify more with their in-subgroup than with the full group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Because the group is inherently divided in two subgroups, in-subgroup and out-subgroup 
categorizations will arise (Alderfer, 1987; Taijfel, 1982; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). 
In the same realm, there is a well-known tendency for people to be drawn to, like, and trust 
others like themselves, and to avoid, distrust, and dislike others who are dissimilar (cf. Tsui 
& O’Reilly, 1989). More so, group members often settle inter-group conflict with self-
sacrifice to contribute to ingroup welfare (ingroup love), and to harm competing outgroups 
(outgroup hate) (Bornstein, 2003; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008; De Dreu et al., 2010). 
Clearly, members are likely to prioritize their own subgroup’s interests over the other 
subgroup’s interests and over the interests of the group, in which their subgroup is nested.  
Subgroup size 
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When a new workgroup is formed usually subgroups are of unequal size, especially 
when these groups are getting large (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). This group then contains a 
majority and a minority of (sub)group members aligning on several characteristics (Carton & 
Cummings, 2012; O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010). When these (sub)group members decide to 
contribute to the group, this benefits not only members of the individual’s in-subgroup but 
also members of the out-subgroup. So, either a larger number of in-subgroup members than 
out-subgroup members profit from an individual’s cooperation, or a larger number of out-
subgroup members than in-subgroup members profit from it. Findings with respect to 
whether variation in the size of subgroups is better (Harrison & Sin, 2005; Jehn & 
Bezrukova, 2010; Menon & Phillips, 2010; Phillips, Mannix, Neale, & Gruenfeld, 2004) or 
worse (Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Janis, 1982; Mannix, 1993; O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010; 
Stasser & Titus, 1985) for group outcomes, than when there is low variation in subgroup size 
are contradictory (Carton & Cummings, 2012). Nevertheless, relative subgroup size, as a 
potential antecedent of status (Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Guinote, 2004; Ng, 1982), may 
have a significant impact on cooperation levels toward the group. Subgroups that have 
numerically more members (majority subgroups) tend to have higher status (Guinote, Judd, & 
Brauer, 2002), defined as “the prominence, respect, and influence individuals enjoy in the 
eyes of others” (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006, p. 1094; for other 
definitions see also Fiske, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). So, a member of a majority 
subgroup, nested in the newly composed group, is in a high-status position (compared to the 
minority subgroup) and might contribute more to the group in order to confirm the 
subgroup’s status and identity (Ellemers & Scheepers, 2005; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). 
Even more so, if this majority subgroup is populated by ingroup members, originating from 
the same organization/department and more similar to him, group identification will be 
stronger (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987). Consequently, the member will navigate 
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toward this majority subgroup and most likely contribute more to the workgroup in which 
this subgroup is nested (in MI). On the other hand, when members are part of the low-status 
minority subgroup (in MO), ingroup subgroup members are likely to feel threatened. They 
can react adversely to the fact that the high-status outgroup subgroup, being in the majority, 
will have greater influence (Terry, 2003; van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003) 
In a crossed-groups social dilemma - combining an in-subgroup and an out-subgroup - 
cooperation with the workgroup always comes to the benefit of both subgroups. However, in 
one case the in-subgroup will be in the majority, and in another the out-subgroup will be in 
the majority. Given group members’ preference to place subgroup interests above group 
interests, and the prioritizing of the in-subgroup’s interests over those of the out-subgroup, 
we hypothesize: 
H1: Subgroup composition has a significant effect on cooperation in a faultline-based group. 
Group members cooperate more if the majority of their group consists of in-subgroup 
members (MI), than if the majority of their group consists of out-subgroup members (MO) 
(parochial cooperation). 
 
Faultline activation and deactivation 
For organizations it is not desirable that employees cooperate more with one group 
(with a majority of in-subgroup members) and less with the other (with a minority of in-
subgroup members). The question arises as to which contextual factors might trigger 
individuals to move away from this in-subgroup favoritism towards attention for the 
workgroup as a whole. In other words: how can the group environment influence employees 
to make less distinction between in-subgroup and out-subgroup to cooperate more with the 
new workgroup? 
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Individual, team, and organizational factors can determine whether an array of 
(demographic) characteristics become more or less salient in a group, either emphasizing or 
de-emphasizing subgroup differences (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & 
Gilson, 2008; Thatcher & Patel, 2012). Making subgroup differences more or less salient 
shifts cognitive processes of group members and results in individuals attending more or less 
to the interests of that subgroup (Wit & Kerr, 2002). When the faultline arises primarily due 
to (prior) group or organizational membership, this results in inter-subgroup bias between the 
in-subgroup and the out-group subgroup. So, making the faultline more or less salient in this 
case will result in more or less attention for the in-subgroup and out-subgroup interests or the 
interests of the new workgroup respectively. 
Faultline activation is “the process by which an objective alignment of (demographic) 
characteristics (a potential or dormant faultline) is actually perceived by team members as the 
division of the team into separate subgroups (an activated faultline)” (Jehn & Bezrukova, 
2010, p. 24). The activation of faultlines requires a trigger to initiate the subgroup formation 
(Chrobot-Mason, Ruderman, Weber, & Ernst, 2009), such as the merging of two prior 
separate groups (Hambrick et al., 2001). Faultlines are activated when group members 
identify with a subgroup based on social identification and social categorization processes 
(Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Thatcher & Patel, 2011), also referred to as identity-based 
activated faultlines (Carton & Cummings, 2012). Members classify themselves with others 
based on perceived similarities and identify with them as their in-subgroup, motivated by the 
need for self-esteem and safety (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Higher levels of within-subgroup 
similarity and between-subgroup differentiation make subgroup categorization more likely 
(Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, de Cremer, & 
Hogg, 2004). When categories become salient and the faultline(s) activated, coalitions are 
likely to divide the group. Under such circumstances, subgroup biases lead people to 
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cooperate and expect others to cooperate with in-subgroup members more than out-subgroup 
members, fueling intra-group conflict, which may interfere with information processing 
(Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005; Turner et al., 1987), block communications (O’Reilly, 
Caldwell, & Barnett, 1989), and hinder the negotiation of agreements (Clark, Anand, & 
Roberson, 2000). An individual’s social categorization is not fixed but may vary over time 
and across situations, depending on contextual cues (Brewer, 1991; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 
1999). In faultline activation, when individuals perceive of the group primarily as a collection 
of two subgroups, they will be relatively more concerned with serving subgroup interests 
rather than group interests. So,  members of subgroups do not always interact as individual 
‘agents’ but quite often act on behalf of the social subgroups to which they belong and with 
which they identify (Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
 Faultline deactivation on the other hand is the process of minimizing the salience of 
activated faultlines in teams (Van der Kamp, Tjemkes, & Jehn, 2012). Some specific 
interventions may be effective in focusing individuals on the group as a whole, to enhance 
decision-making in faultline teams, and minimize the adversities of faultlines: team goal 
setting (van Knippenberg, Dawson, West, & Homan, 2011), leadership style (Gratton, Voigt, 
& Erickson, 2007; Kunze & Bruch, 2010), reward structure (Homan et al., 2008), strong team 
identification (Homan et al., 2008; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010), prodiversity beliefs (Homan, 
van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007), task autonomy and goal structure strategies 
(Rico et al., 2007, 2012). 
 Inter-group comparisons can also focus individuals’ attention on their group and lead 
to favoritism toward the own group (Turner, Brown, & Taifel, 1979). For example, the 
prospect of comparing the outcomes of one group to another can enhance a connection 
between members of that group, make them act upon the common goal of obtaining better 
outcomes than the other group and rise contributions to their own group (cf. Carton & 
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Cummings, 2012; Gunnthorsdottir & Rapoport, 2006; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). When 
faultlines operate, such a common goal, evoked by inter-group comparison, can stimulate 
group members to overcome their divisive subgroups (Lau & Murnighan, 2005). A 
superordinate goal or shared objective (Anderson & West, 1998; van Knippenberg et al., 
2011) may override the tendency of identity-based subgroups to promote identity 
fragmentation (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). 
The transformation of group members’ cognitive representation of the inter-subgroup 
interaction as one involving two separate subgroups (in-subgroup and out-subgroup) to one 
involving a single, common group - with a common goal - is a recategorization strategy 
(Gaertner et al., 1993; Wildschut et al., 2003). This social cognitive process decreases the 
distinction between the in-subgroup and the out-subgroup, reduces perceptions of subgroup 
differences, making subgroup categorization less likely, and renders the categorization as one 
group more salient (van Knippenberg, 2003). So although it does not reduce the differences 
between subgroup members per se, the perceived salience of subgroups is reduced (Homan et 
al., 2008). Social (re)categorization can reduce the salience of the strong faultline when 
priming individuals with a superordinate goal that focuses their attention on the group, 
instead of focusing on the presence of subgroups within this group (Dovidio, Gaertner, & 
Validzic, 1998). When the salience of the overarching group is enhanced, this can transform 
the prior ‘we versus they’ dichotomy into a unique ‘us’ category (Brown & Turner, 1981; 
Sherif, 1958), override the negative process effects of activated faultline subgroups (Jehn & 
Bezrukova, 2010), and shift self-sacrificial cooperation to the overarching group level, thus 
benefitting members of both subgroups (Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013; Wit 
& Kerr, 2002). Prior research shows that superordinate goals create a new overarching 
inclusive group categorization and contribute to reducing the inter-subgroup bias associated 
with strong faultline teams (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Rico et al., 2012), resulting in better 
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performance (Homan et al., 2008), reduced coalition formation,  and less team conflict 
(Homan, et al., 2008; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010). We hypothesize:  
H 2: Faultline (de)activation moderates the effect of subgroup composition on cooperation in 
a faultline-based group. Group members show less sensitivity to the subgroup composition if 
they are presented with a superordinate goal for their group (faultline de-activation) than 
when the presence of subgroups in their group is made salient via a subordinate goal 
(faultline activation).  
 
First aim of this paper is to further validate the CSD paradigm by studying the effects 
of group composition on parochial cooperation, i.e., the extent to which individual group 
members show more cooperation toward a heterogeneous group in which members of their 
own subgroup are in the majority than toward a heterogeneous group in which members of 
another subgroup are in the majority. Second aim is to investigate the potential of faultline 
deactivation (via a superordinate goal) to attenuate the effect of group composition on 
parochial cooperation. To this end we conducted two studies with the purpose of replicating 
the results from the first study in the second one, to increase validity of the findings. 
 
STUDY 1 
METHOD 
Sample  
Participants were 145 prospective psychology students of a Western-European 
university, both men (22%) and women with an average age of 17.2 years (SD = 1.08), 
relatively unfamiliar to one another. They were gathered in a lecture hall and volunteered to 
participate in the experiment as part of an introductory class. After being seated they received 
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an envelope with experimental instructions in a booklet
13
. From then on participants were not 
allowed to talk to each other. They were seated far enough from one another to prevent them 
seeing each other’s materials and decisions. 
CSD vignette 
Participants read in a booklet the instructions of a 10-person Crossed-groups Social 
Dilemma (CSD) scenario that was also used by De Pauw et al. (2013) (Appendix 1). As a 
manager, participants had to decide – just as the 9 other managers in their group - to either 
‘limit production’ of their factory (cooperation) to avoid overproduction or to ‘stick to their 
current production level’ (defection), which would result in overproduction if the other 
managers decided similarly. Firms producing at maximum capacity would always earn more 
profit than those reducing their production rate, irrespective of the number of other managers 
who decided to do so. However, the more managers stuck to their high production rates, the 
lower the profits all of them earned. If all ten managers decided to stick to their current 
production rates, this would yield all of them a lower profit (10 million Euros each) than if all 
of them decided to reduce their production rates (25 million Euros each). After private 
reading of the instructions and inspection of the pay-off matrix (Appendix 2), which was 
explained by examples of two choice configurations (3 stick to production \ 7 reduce 
production and 7 stick \ 3 reduce, respectively), participants received information on the 
groups of managers in which they had to make their choice.   
Manipulations 
Subgroup Composition (within subjects)  
Participants were informed they had to make their choice in two differently composed 
10-p. groups, where the managers in each case were psychology students of their own 
university (ingroup subgroup members) and psychology students from another neighboring 
                                                          
13
 We thank Frank de Vos for his assistance with data-collection 
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university (outgroup subgroup members). In one 10-p. group, managers from the own 
university were in the majority. In the other 10-p. group, managers of the neighboring 
university were in the majority. Participants first read the instructions of one of the two 
experimental within-subjects conditions (counterbalanced). The Majority Ingroup (MI) group 
consisted of 7 managers from their own university (including themselves) and 3 managers 
from the neighboring university. The Majority Outgroup (MO) group consisted of 3 
managers from their own university (including themselves) and 7 managers from the 
neighboring university. 
We checked the group composition manipulation with four items, in the MI group and 
MO group separately. Participants were asked to indicate how many of the members of their 
own subgroup (including themselves) they expected to ‘stick to the current production level’ 
and how many they expected to ‘reduce the production’. They also indicated how many of 
the members of the other subgroup they expected to ‘stick’ and how many they expected to 
‘reduce’. All participants comprehended that the 10-p. group consisted of 7 ingroup members 
and 3 outgroup members in condition MI (Majority Ingroup), and that the 10-p. group 
consisted of 3 ingroup members and 7 outgroup members in condition MO (Majority 
Outgroup). 
Faultline (de)activation (between subjects).  
Half of the participants were informed that at the end of the experiment the level of 
cooperation of the in-subgroup members (the managers from their own university) would be 
compared to that of the out-subgroup members (the managers from the other university) 
(faultline activation – subordinate goal). The other half of the participants were told that the 
level of cooperation of the 10-p. groups in which they participated would be compared to that 
of the other 10-p. groups in the simulation (faultline deactivation – superordinate goal) (cf. 
De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999).  
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A Pearson chi-square test indicated that the manipulation of faultline (de)activation 
was successful (χ² [1, n = 145] = 78.02, p < .001). Participants in the faultline activation 
condition correctly reported that the subgroups would be compared after the task. Participants 
in the faultline deactivation condition correctly indicated that the 10-p. groups would be 
compared
14
.  
Measures  
After the manipulation of group composition (MI or MO) and faultline (de)activation, 
participants were requested to fill out their private answers to a series of questions. To assess 
choice behavior, they decided whether they would ‘stick to their present production level’ or 
‘reduce their present production level’.  
They also indicated how many of the participants from their own subgroup and the 
other subgroup they expected to ‘stick’ and how many they expected to ‘reduce’ in this 10-p. 
group. These items measured actual expectations of other group members’ cooperative 
behavior and checked respondents’ comprehension of the group composition. Due to the 
phrasing of the questions, participants’ responses included their own choices in each of the 
two groups. Consequently, we first corrected the original responses of participants who made 
cooperative choices themselves toward the MI group and/or toward the MO group. For 
example, when a participant acted cooperatively ( i.e. indicated that he would reduce his own 
production), and indicated that he expected 5 out of 7 in- subgroup members to cooperate in 
the MI group, then participant’s expected number of co-operators was corrected from 5 to 4; 
so he expected 4 in-subgroup members other than himself to cooperate. Because cooperative 
expectation was measured on a different scale in MI (seven in-subgroup members) than in 
MO (three in-subgroup members), proportions of cooperation were calculated, e.g. if a 
                                                          
14 Twenty participants erroneously reported on the manipulation check of faultline (de)activation, indicating that they did not 
comprehend whether (sub)groups were to be compared. Consequently, these cases were excluded from further analyses. 
There was no difference in the main pattern of results between the total sample (n = 145) and the final sample (n = 125).  
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participant expected 4 other in-subgroup members to cooperate, then the expected proportion 
of cooperation was calculated as 4/6 in-subgroup members (= .67). 
As a means to assess understanding of the pay-off matrix, participants were requested 
to indicate the profits (in million Euros) to be earned by those in the 10-p. group who ‘stuck’ 
and the profits to be earned by those who ‘reduced’.  
After completion of all questions, participants were requested to proceed to the next 
page of the booklet. There they filled out their private answers to the same series of questions 
(choice behavior, cooperative expectations, comprehension of the pay-off matrix,), now for 
the MO group (or the MI group), depending on which condition they were first presented 
with (counterbalanced). Finally, all participants were asked to indicate their gender and age. 
They also read a paragraph on ’guarantee of anonymity’. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire,  identification with the in-subgroup and out-
subgroup members was measured with three items on a 5-point scale (Derks, van Laar, & 
Ellemers, 2009): ‘I identify with L participants ’, ‘I  feel connected with L participants’, ‘I am 
concerned with L participants’ (for the in-subgroup) (α = .88); and ‘ I identify with R 
participants’, ‘I  feel connected with R participants’, ‘I am concerned with R participants’ 
(for the out-subgroup) (α = .93)15. The same scale was adapted to measure identification with 
the MI group and the MO group: ‘I identify with the 10-p. group of 7 L and 3 R participants’ 
(sample item for the MI group) (α = .87); ‘I identify with the 10-p. group of 3 L and 7 R 
participants’ (sample item for the MO group) (α = .88). 
Debriefing  
After completion of the post-experimental questionnaire participants were requested 
to place the booklet back into the envelope. All of the participants were collectively debriefed 
by means of a lecture and a report on some of the results. 
                                                          
15 L participants’ refers to ingroup subgroup members from participants’ own university; ‘R participants’ refers to outgroup 
subgroup members from the other university.   
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Procedure of data analysis 
To test the hypotheses we used two data-analytic approaches. First, to test Hypothesis 
1 and 2, we used the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) procedure (Liang & Zeger, 
1986) that treated the repeated (non)cooperative choices of individual participants in the 
crossed-groups social dilemma game as the units of analysis. As an extension of the 
Generalized Linear Model (logistic regression), this procedure allows for the analysis of 
repeated measurements of binary (‘reduce production’ or ‘stick to production’) response 
variables, with correction for the non-independence of data. Data are assumed to be 
dependent within subjects and independent between subjects. The hypotheses were tested by 
the Wald statistic that has a Chi-square distribution and results were reported in probabilities 
of cooperation in the MI- and MO group separately. 
Second, to understand how participants responded differently to group composition 
under faultline (de)activation, we analyzed participants’ choice patterns - based on their 
repeated choices in MI and MO respectively (C-C, C-D, D-C, D-D)
16
 - with a Chi-square 
analysis. C-C and D-D choice patterns indicated consistent cooperation and  defection, 
respectively, in both MI and MO. C-D patterns indicated cooperation only when in-subgroup 
members were in the majority (MI), not when out-subgroup members were in the majority 
(MO). D-C patterns indicated cooperation only when out-subgroup members were in the 
majority (MO), not when in-subgroup members were in the majority (MI).  
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Order effect. The counterbalanced order of presenting the MI group (7-3) and MO 
group (3-7) did not yield a different pattern of results (Wald χ² (1) = .22, p < .64). Cooperation 
probabilities were very similar in the MI-MO order (.51) as in the MO-MI order (.54).  
                                                          
16 C denoting a Cooperative choice (“limit production”) and D denoting a Defective choice (“stick to the current production 
level”) 
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Hypothesis 1: Subgroup composition. As predicted, there was a main effect of 
subgroup composition on cooperation (B = 1.09, Wald χ² (1) = 19.66,  p < .001), indicating 
that participants were significantly more likely to make a cooperative choice in a MI group 
(.66) than in a MO group (.40), i.e. difference of 26%
17
.  
Hypothesis 2: Interaction Subgroup composition x Faultline (de)activation. There was 
a significant interaction effect of subgroup composition and faultline (de)activation on 
cooperation (B = .60, Wald χ² (3) = 4.09, p < .05), indicating that the effect of subgroup 
composition was different in the faultline activation condition than in the faultline 
deactivation condition. Under faultline activation, participants were more likely to make a 
cooperative choice in the MI group (.73) than in the MO group (.36), with a  difference of 
37% between both groups (Table 3.1)
18
. Under faultline deactivation, participants were also 
more likely to make a cooperative choice in the MI group (.59) than in the MO group (.44), 
but the difference in cooperation rate was significantly less: 15%. Thus,  whether the 
participants’ in-subgroup was in the majority or the minority had less impact on their choice 
to cooperate in the faultline deactivation condition19. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 was also 
supported by the data.  
 
  
                                                          
17 For the ease of interpretation the magnitude of all effects are reported in probabilities instead of Odds ratios (Exp (B)).  
18
 The probabilities obtained from the GEE analyses are calculated via the accumulated frequencies of participants’ 
cooperative choices in the MI and MO group. To obtain the probability of cooperation in the MI group under faultline 
activation the frequencies of C-C and C-D choices are summed / frequency of all pps. under faultline activation = .73. To 
obtain the probability of cooperation in the MO group under faultline activation the frequencies of C-C and D-C choices are 
summed / frequency of all pps. under faultline activation = .36. 
19 These results are based on a (non-linear) transformation of the logOdds ratios into estimated marginal means (expected 
probabilities). A significant interaction effect in GEE logistic regression analysis indicates that the difference in logOdds 
between the conditions is significant. To double-check whether this significance also held for the estimated marginal means, 
a GEE linear regression analysis was performed yielding the same results. 
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Table 3.1. Probabilities of cooperation in the MI group and in the MO group for faultline 
activation and deactivation (n = 125)  
 MI MO 
Faultline activation .73 .36 
Faultline deactivation .59 .44 
Group Composition 
(main effect) 
.66 .40 
 
To understand how participants responded differently to subgroup composition under 
faultline activation and deactivation, we performed a Chi square analysis on their choice 
patterns. This analysis allowed us to compare the frequencies of repeated choices in the MI- 
and MO group (Table 3.2). Choice patterns (MI-MO) were generated by placing participants’ 
choice in the MI group before that in the MO group. There was no significant interaction 
effect of order with group composition and faultline (de)activation (B = .49, Wald χ2 (1) = .25, 
p < .62). Consequently, this recoding strategy could be reliably executed. Results showed that 
choice patterns differed significantly between both conditions (χ² (3) = 6.06,  p < .05). 
 
Table 3.2. Choice patterns for faultline activation and deactivation (n = 125) 
  
C-C 
 
C-D D-C D-D 
Faultline activation 
 
26.6% 
 
 
46.9% 
 
 
9.4% 
 
 
17.2% 
 
Faultline deactivation  
 
32.8% 
 
 
26.2% 
 
 
11.5% 
 
 
29.5% 
 
 
Under faultline deactivation there were less C-D patterns (- 20.7%) and more C-C 
patterns (+ 6.2%), than under faultline activation. In other words, being primed with a 
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superordinate goal resulted in less conditional cooperation (cooperation only if the in-
subgroup formed a majority) with the heterogeneous group (C-D), to the benefit of 
cooperation with both heterogeneous groups (C-C). However, comparing the frequency of D-
D choice patterns between both conditions also showed more D-D patterns in the faultline 
deactivation condition (+ 12.3%). So, although overall cooperation rates (C-C) were 
significantly higher and C-D patterns significantly lower, faultline deactivation also resulted 
in more overall defection (D-D) patterns.  
Additional measures 
(Sub)group identification. Participants identified more with in-subgroup members 
than with out-subgroup members, and this was true under both faultline activation (M = 3.44, 
SD = 1.00  vs. M = 1.90, SD = .95 ) (t (63) = 9.05, p < .0001) and faultline deactivation (M = 
3.45, SD = .98  vs. M = 2.16, SD = .94) (t (60) = 6.83,  p < .0001). Group members also 
identified more with the MI group than with the MO group, both under faultline activation (M 
= 3.43, SD = .87  vs. M = 2.67, SD = .95 ) (t (63) = 5.50, p < .0001) and faultline deactivation 
(M = 3.33, SD = .78  vs. M = 2.81, SD = .81) (t (60) = 3.98, p < .0001). 
Cooperative expectations. Participants expected more cooperation of other in-
subgroup members in the MI group (M = .45, SD = .26) than in the MO group (M = .37, SD = 
.35) (t(119) = 2.14, p < .05). Under faultline deactivation, did participants expect more in-
subgroup members to cooperate in the MO group (M = .42, SD = .36 ) than under faultline 
activation (M = .31, SD = .33 ; t(118) = 1.71, p < .08). 
Choice patterns in faultline deactivation. 
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance in the faultline deactivation 
condition, with post-hoc pairwise comparisons of participants’ identification levels and 
cooperative expectations in C-C vs. C-D patterns and in C-C vs. D-D patterns. This allowed 
us to explore the underlying perceptions of participants choosing for these specific choice 
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patterns in faultline deactivation. Results showed a significant difference in perceptions 
between participants with a C-C pattern (n = 36), a C-D pattern (n = 46), and a D-D pattern (n 
= 29) (F (14, 206) = 2.55, p < .002). 
C-C vs. C-D patterns. Post-hoc analyses indicated that participants with a C-C pattern 
identified more with the out-subgroup (Mdiff = .46, SE = .20, p < .09), identified less with the 
in-subgroup (Mdiff = -.55, SE = .21, p < .04), identified less with the MI group (Mdiff = -.37, SE 
= .18, p < .14),  expected more cooperation of out-subgroup members in the MI group (Mdiff = 
.14, SE = .08, p < .20), and expected more cooperation of in-subgroup members in the MO 
group (Mdiff = .09, SE = .01, ns), compared to participants with a C-D pattern.  
C-C vs. D-D patterns. Post-hoc analyses indicated that participants with a D-D pattern 
identified less with the out-subgroup (Mdiff = -.57, SE = .23, p < .05), and identified less with 
the in-subgroup (Mdiff = -.25, SE = .24, ns), compared to participants with a C-C pattern. They 
expected less cooperation of out-subgroup members (Mdiff = -.22, SE = .08, p < .05) and in-
subgroup members (Mdiff = -.11, SE = .07, ns) in the MI group, and they expected less 
cooperation of out-subgroup members (Mdiff = -.09, SE = .04, p < .05) and in-subgroup 
members  (Mdiff = -.04, SE = .09, ns) in the MO group, compared to participants with a C-C 
pattern.  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we addressed several research gaps. Firstly, most faultline research 
addresses the alignment of demographic characteristics and its impact on the formation of 
subgroups and team outcomes. However, there is a call to further investigation on faultlines 
composed of non-demographic attributes, such as geographic work location (e.g. Polzer et al., 
2006), and workgroup members’ origin in factional groups (Li & Hambrick, 2005). Although 
  127 
faultlines can inhibit team processes, such as cooperative decision-making, to date the 
research on management of team faultlines remains scarce (Rico et al., 2012). 
Secondly, faultline and strategy literature recently introduced the conceptualization of 
alliances as social dilemmas causing tension between cooperation and competition (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005; Zeng & Chen, 2003). However, to date there is little investigation on how 
cooperation can be achieved and sustained in newly composed workgroups, although lack of 
cooperation is a main cause of the relatively high failure rate (Arino & de la Torre, 1988; 
Doz, 1996; Park & Russo, 1996; Teece, 1992; Ulrich & Van Dick, 2007; Yan & Zeng, 1999). 
Past research has focused mainly on the enhancement of cooperation at an organizational 
level, but little attention has been devoted to the implications for employees on the work floor 
being confronted with conflicts of interests in newly composed workgroups.  
Thirdly, although the effects of group composition and subgroups are well-
documented in diversity and faultline literature, these findings have to our knowledge not yet 
been implicated on cooperative decision-making in social dilemmas. Previous social dilemma 
research already showed that the presence of equal-sized subgroups resulted in decreasing 
contributions to the group (Polzer et al., 1999; Polzer, 2004; Wit & Kerr, 2002). However, 
the link between the composition of subgroups and contributions to the group has to date not 
been investigated.   
Finally, this study answers the call for research that investigates the effect of a 
superordinate goal when stronger faultlines are activated (Rico et al., 2012).  
The results of Study 1 confirmed the hypotheses on subgroup composition and 
faultline deactivation. In line with H1, participants cooperated more in the 10-p. group with a 
majority of in-subgroup members (MI group) than in the MO group, with a minority of in-
subgroup members. This finding showed the strong tendency for parochial cooperation and 
group members’ sensitivity for subgroup composition, also found in earlier research by De 
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Pauw et al. (2013). Participants’ identification with the in-subgroup was stronger than with 
the out-subgroup, and they identified more with the MI group than with the MO group. Also, 
they expected more cooperation of other in-subgroup members in the MI group than in the 
MO group. These results indicate that the effect of group composition on cooperative choice 
in the heterogeneous groups might be related to the difference in identification and 
expectations about other (sub)group members’ cooperation in the MI and MO groups (see 
mediation analysis reported after Study 2). The presence of distinct subgroups in the 
faultline-based group instigated inter-subgroup biases and subgroup categorization processes 
(Carton & Cummings, 2012). This led group members to identify more with their in-
subgroup than with the full group, and to attend more to their own subgroup’s interests than 
to the other subgroup’s interests, and to the interests of the group in which their contributions 
came mostly to the benefit of their own in-subgroup (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 
1987). Subgroup processes did not only have an impact on participants’ identification levels, 
but also affected their expectations about other (sub)group members’ cooperation. 
Participants’ behavior was related to these expectations, which is in line with goal 
expectation theory (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) and prior social dilemma research: 
when group members expect cooperation of others, they will also cooperate themselves 
(Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Messick et al., 1983; Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, 
Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983; van Lange & Liebrand, 1989; Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996).  
In line with H2, faultline deactivation via a superordinate goal for the 10-p. group 
attenuated participants’ sensitivity for subgroup composition. Group members showed less 
tendency to cooperate only when the in-subgroup formed a majority (C-D choice pattern) and 
contributed more to both 10-p. groups (C-C pattern), despite the distinct subgroup 
composition. Under faultline deactivation, did participants expect more in-subgroup members 
to cooperate in the MO group, than under faultline activation. We conducted additional 
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analyses on participants’ choice patterns in the faultline deactivation condition to compare 
identification levels and cooperative expectations between these groups of participants. 
Results showed that participants with a C-C pattern displayed stronger identification with the 
out-subgroup and with the MO group, and lower identification with the in-subgroup and with 
the MI group, compared to participants with a C-D choice pattern. Also, participants with a 
C-C pattern expected more cooperation from in-subgroup members in the MO group and 
from out-subgroup members in the MI group, compared to those with a C-D pattern. So, the 
stronger identification with the out-subgroup and with MO group and more expected 
cooperation from group members when they form a minority subgroup, might have caused 
the lower frequency in C-D patterns and the higher frequency in C-C patterns under faultline 
deactivation.  
However, there were also more group members displaying consistent defection (D-D) 
under faultline deactivation. A comparison of participants’ perceptions in C-C and D-D 
choice patterns learned that participants with a D-D choice pattern identified less with in-
subgroup, out-subgroup, and MO group, and expected less cooperation from subgroup 
members in both the MI- and MO group, compared to participants with a C-C pattern. Prior 
research show that a superordinate goal could reduce subgroup categorization in a faultline-
based group (Rico et al., 2012). In case of our study, faultline deactivation with the 
superordinate goal might have resulted in a process of decategorization (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000) for participants with a D-D choice. Due to the strong reduction in salience of subgroup 
distinctions, they categorized themselves at an individual level - not on a group level, as 
members of the 10-p. groups - and perceived themselves and other group members as 
individuals (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). In line with this decategorization, individuals 
attended to their self-interest and decided not to cooperate in none of the two 10-p. groups. 
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This explanation of decategorization fits in most with our results that showed a clear drop in 
identification with both the subgroups and with the 10-p. groups. 
In light of the findings in Study 1, we aimed to replicate these results in a second 
experiment with similar design. This to establish the reliability of our findings and to gain 
more insight into the mechanisms of group identification and cooperative expectations 
underlying the effects of group composition and faultline (de)activation. 
 
STUDY 2  
METHOD 
Sample 
Participants were 157 undergraduate students, enrolled in a ‘Business administration 
skills’ course at a Western-European university.  The sample consisted of both men (51%), 
and women (49%) with an average age of 20.6 years (SD = 1.34). Participants were 
economics / engineering / informational sciences students, again relatively unfamiliar to one 
another. They volunteered to engage in the experiment and received course credit for their 
participation. Participants were gathered in a lecture hall and - after being seated - they 
received an envelope with experimental instructions in a booklet. From then on participants 
were not allowed to talk to each other. They were seated far enough from one another to 
prevent them seeing each other’s materials and decisions. 
Procedure 
The CSD vignette, the manipulations of subgroup composition and faultline 
(de)activation, were similar to the ones used in Study 1.  
The subgroup composition manipulation was assessed using the same four items as in 
Study 1. Again, all participants comprehended that the 10-p. group consisted of 7 in-subgroup 
members and 3 out-subgroup members in condition MI (Majority Ingroup), and that the 10-p. 
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group consisted of 3 in-subgroup members and 7 out-subgroup members in condition MO 
(Majority Outgroup).  
A Pearson chi-square test showed that the manipulation of faultline (de)activation was 
successful (χ² [1, n = 157] = 103.58, p < .001). Participants in the faultline activation 
condition correctly indicated that the subgroups would be compared after the task. 
Participants in the faultline deactivation condition correctly reported that the 10p.-groups 
would be compared
20
.  
As an additional check on the faultline (de)activation manipulation, participants rated 
in the post-experimental questionnaire four one-item measures on a 5-point Likert scale: “In 
my 10-p. groups, the L and R participants formed one group”, “My 10-p. groups split up into 
subgroups of L and R participants”, “The L and R participants all had a common goal: the 
best result for the 10-p. groups”, and “The L and R participants each had their own 
subgroup goal: the best result for their own subgroup”. The former two questions measured 
the extent to which participants perceived a faultline in their 10-p. groups and the latter two 
questions measured the perceived goal structure for their (sub)group (superordinate vs. 
subordinate goal). In the faultline deactivation condition, participants rated their 10-p. groups 
as one group of participants more (M = 2.90, SD = 1.52), than did participants in  the faultline 
activation condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.31, F (1, 155) = 6.87, p < .01). In the faultline 
activation condition, participants rated their 10-p. groups as consisting of two subgroups 
more (M = 3.76, SD = 1.28), than did participants in the faultline deactivation condition (M = 
2.87, SD = 1.47, F (1, 155) = 11.12, p < .001). In the same line, in the faultline deactivation 
condition, participants rated the presence of a superordinate goal for the group as more likely 
(M = 3.63, SD = 1.39), than participants in  the faultline activation condition (M = 2.49, SD = 
1.39, F (1, 155) = 8.39, p < .01). In the faultline activation condition, participants rated the 
                                                          
20
 Fourteen participants erroneously reported on the manipulation check of faultline (de)activation, indicating that they did 
not comprehend whether (sub)groups were to be compared. Consequently, these cases were excluded from further analyses. 
There was no difference in the main pattern of results between the total sample (n = 157) and the final sample (n = 143). 
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presence of a subordinate goal for the subgroup as more likely (M = 3.63, SD = 1.39), than 
participants in the faultline deactivation condition (M = 2.76, SD = 1.43, F (1, 155) = 21.49, p 
< .0001). These results confirmed that the manipulation of faultline (de)activation was 
successful. 
 
Measures 
 After the manipulation of group composition (MI or MO) and faultline (de)activation, 
participants were requested to fill out their private answers to a series of questions. Similar to 
Study 1, the following variables were measured: choice behavior, cooperative expectations, 
comprehension of the pay-off matrix, identification with the in-subgroup, with the out-
subgroup, with the MI group, and with the MO group. 
Test of hypotheses 
Hypotheses were tested with the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) procedure 
to check overall cooperation rates in the MI- and MO group, under faultline activation and 
deactivation. A Chi-square analysis of participants’ choice patterns was conducted to 
understand how participants responded differently to group composition under faultline 
(de)activation. 
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Order. The counterbalanced order of presenting the MI group (7-3) and MO group (3-
7) did not yield a different pattern of results (Wald χ² (1) = .46, p < .50). Cooperation 
probabilities were very similar in the MI-MO order (.46) as in the MO-MI order (.51). 
 Hypothesis 1: Subgroup Composition. There was a significant main effect of 
subgroup composition on cooperation (Wald χ²(1) = 48.11, p < .0001), indicating that, overall, 
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participants made significantly more cooperative choices in the MI group (.66) than in the 
MO group (.31), i.e. a difference of 35%. Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data. 
Hypothesis 2: Interaction Subgroup composition x Faultline (de)activation. There was 
a significant interaction effect of subgroup composition and faultline (de)activation on 
cooperation (B = .18, Wald χ² (3) = 3.92, p < .05), indicating that the effect of subgroup 
composition was different in the faultline activation condition than in the faultline 
deactivation condition (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3. Probabilities of cooperation in the MI group and in the MO group for faultline 
activation and deactivation (n = 143) 
 MI MO 
Faultline activation .70 .26 
Faultline deactivation .62 .36 
Subgroup Composition 
(main effect) 
.66 .31 
 
Under faultline activation, participants made more cooperative choices towards the 
MI group (.70) than towards the MO group (.26), with a  difference of 44% (Table 3.3). 
Under faultline deactivation, participants also made more cooperative choices towards the MI 
group (.62) than towards the MO group (.36), but the difference in cooperation rate between 
the groups was significantly smaller: 26%. Participants in the faultline deactivation condition 
thus made less distinction between the MI- and MO group for their cooperation, than 
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participants in the faultline activation condition
21
. Consequently, Hypothesis 2 was also 
supported by the data.  
To understand how participants responded differently to subgroup composition under 
faultline (de)activation, we performed a Chi square analysis on their choice patterns. This 
analysis allowed to compare the frequencies of repeated choices in the MI- and MO group for 
both conditions (Table 3.4). Choice patterns (MI-MO) were generated by placing 
participants’ choice in the MI group before that in the MO group. There was no significant 
interaction effect of order with group composition and faultline (de)activation (B = .20 Wald 
χ2 (1) = 1.22, p < .27). Consequently, this recoding strategy could be reliably executed.   
 
Table 3.4. Choice patterns for faultline activation and deactivation (n = 143) 
  
C-C 
 
C-D D-C D-D 
Faultline activation   
 
26.1% 
 
 
46.4% 
 
 
2.9% 
 
 
24.6% 
 
Faultline deactivation  
 
32.4% 
 
 
29.7% 
 
 
4.1% 
 
 
33.8% 
 
     
 
Under faultline deactivation, participants showed less C-D choices (- 16.7%), more 
cooperation with both groups (C-C) (+ 6.3%), and more D-D patterns (+ 9.2%). Although 
there was less conditional cooperation (C-D) and more consistent cooperation (C-C), faultline 
deactivation thus also resulted in more overall defection (D-D) patterns (χ² (3) = 3.73, p < .15).  
Additional measures 
(Sub)group identification. Participants identified more with in-subgroup members 
than with out-subgroup members (α = .93), and this was true under both faultline activation 
                                                          
21 These results are based on a (non-linear) transformation of the logOdds ratios into estimated marginal means (expected 
probabilities). A significant interaction effect in GEE logistic regression analysis indicates that the difference in logOdds 
between the conditions is significant. To double-check whether this significance also holds for the estimated marginal 
means, a GEE linear regression analysis was performed yielding the same results. 
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(M = 3.62, SD = .95  vs. M = 1.78, SD = .82 ) (t (78) = 14.03, p < .0001) and faultline 
deactivation (M = 3.48, SD = .87  vs. M = 2.11, SD = .88) (t (60) = 6.83,  p < .0001). They also 
identified more with the MI group (α = .84) than with the MO group (α = .86), and this was 
true under both faultline activation (M = 3.43, SD = .93  vs. M = 2.59, SD = .88 ) (t (78) = 6.98, 
p < .0001) and faultline deactivation (M = 3.29, SD = .96  vs. M = 2.58, SD = .89) (t (77) = 
6.50, p < .0001). 
Cooperative expectations. Participants expected more in-subgroup members to 
cooperate in the MI group (M = .59, SD = .32), than in the MO group (M = .26, SD = .35) 
(t(154) = 10.54, p < .0001). Similarly, participants expected more out-subgroup members to 
cooperate in the MO group (M = .54, SD = .33) than in the MI group (M = .35, SD = .35 ) 
(t(154) = 5.69, p < .0001).  Under faultline deactivation, did participants expect more out-
subgroup members to cooperate in the MI group (M = .41, SD = .34 ), than did participants 
under faultline activation (M = .30, SD = .36) (t(153) = 2.02, p < .05). Under faultline 
deactivation, did participants also expect more in-subgroup members to cooperate  in the MO 
group (M = .32, SD = .34), than under faultline activation (M = .20, SD = .30) (t(153) = 2.25, p 
< .05).  
Choice patterns in faultline deactivation. 
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance in the faultline deactivation 
condition, with post-hoc pairwise comparisons of participants’ identification levels and 
cooperative expectations in C-C vs. C-D patterns and in C-C vs. D-D patterns. This allowed 
us to explore the underlying perceptions of participants choosing for these specific choice 
patterns in faultline deactivation. Results showed a significant difference in perceptions 
between participants with a C-C pattern (n = 24), a C-D pattern (n = 22), and a D-D pattern (n 
= 25) (F (20, 252) = 10.96, p < .0001). 
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C-C vs. C-D patterns. Post-hoc analyses indicated that participants with a C-C pattern 
identified more with the out-subgroup (Mdiff = .62, SE = .17, p < .01) and the MO group (Mdiff 
= .43, SE = .18, p < .05), and identified less with the in-subgroup (Mdiff = -.54, SE = .19, p < 
.05) and the MI group (Mdiff = -.39, SE = .19, p < .11), compared to participants with a C-D 
pattern. They expected more cooperation of out-subgroup members in the MI group (Mdiff = 
.35, SE = .06, p < .0001), and more cooperation of in-subgroup members (Mdiff = .42, SE = 
.06, p < .0001) and of out-subgroup members (Mdiff = .12, SE = .06, p < .13) in the MO group, 
compared to participants with a C-D pattern.  
C-C vs. D-D patterns. Post-hoc analyses indicated that participants with a D-D pattern 
identified less with the out-subgroup (Mdiff = -.40, SE = .18, p < .08), identified less with the 
in-subgroup (Mdiff = -.18, SE = .20, ns), identified less with the MI group (Mdiff = -.61, SE = 
.20, p < .01), and identified less with the MO group (Mdiff = -.44, SE = .19, p < .08), compared 
to participants with a C-C pattern. They expected less cooperation of out-subgroup members 
(Mdiff = -.44, SE = .06, p < .0001) and of in-subgroup members (Mdiff = -.40, SE = .06, p < 
.0001) in the MI group, and they expected less cooperation of in-subgroup members (Mdiff = -
.29, SD = .06, p < .0001) and of out-subgroup members  (Mdiff = -.42, SE = .06, p < .0001) in 
the MO group, compared to participants with a C-C pattern.  
Exploratory Mediation Analysis 
Simple mediation. To gain more insight into the relationships between group 
composition, group identification, cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-
subgroup members, and choice behavior, we conducted an exploratory mediation analysis. 
Current statistical techniques do not allow yet to conduct the analysis with clustered data 
(time in individual) and a binary outcome variable in the model. Consequently, we analyzed 
the effects of the first group composition in which participants made their choice, in either the 
MI group or the MO group. This procedure eliminated the repeatedness from the design 
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which allowed to test for mediation effects with the PROCESS procedure of Hayes (2013). 
Group composition at Time 1 (MI or MO), and Choice at Time 1 (cooperation or defection) 
were defined as the predictor and outcome variable respectively. The variables ‘identification 
with the MI group’, ‘identification with the MO group’, ‘cooperative expectations about in-
subgroup members’, and ‘cooperative expectations of out-subgroup members’ were included 
as parallel mediators in the model. Indirect effects were calculated as the products of the 
estimates (ab) of the effect of the factor on the mediator (a), and the effect of the mediator on 
the dependent variable (b). Whether the indirect effects were significant was determined via 
the bootstrapping confidence intervals.  
In case of small sample size, bootstrapping confidence intervals are likely to be biased 
and the power to detect effects significantly drops (Hayes, 2013). Because the sample size of 
both Study 1 and Study 2 was relatively small (n = 125 and n = 143) to estimate the 
mediation effects, and given the fact that the results of both studies were very similar, we 
combined both samples to estimate the mediation effects. 
From a simple mediation analysis, group composition indirectly influenced 
cooperative choice through its effects on identification with the MI group, on identification 
with the MO group, and on cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and out-subgroup 
members. Participants in the MI group showed stronger group identification (a1 = .69, p < 
.0001), expected more cooperation from in-subgroup members (a2 = .22, p < .0001), and 
expected less cooperation from out-subgroup members (a3 = -6.69, p < .31). And participants 
who identified more with their group (b1 = .54, p < .001), who expected more cooperation 
from in-subgroup members (b2 = 2.12, p < .0001) and more cooperation from out-subgroup 
members (b3 = .95, p < .05), all showed more cooperation with their group. The bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects based on 5000 bootstrap 
samples did not include zero (for ab1 = .37: .17 to .61; for ab2 = .46: .25 to .67; for ab3 = -
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6.31: -48.56 to -1.09 respectively), so there was evidence of the indirect effect of group 
composition on cooperative choice through group identification and cooperative expectations 
about in-subgroup and out-subgroup members.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
During organizational change processes new heterogeneous (factional) workgroups 
are formed with employees originating from prior separated groups. This situation gives rise 
to subgroups divided by a strong faultline, with group members originating from the same 
organization/department as the focal employee (in-subgroup), or originating from the other 
organization/department (out-subgroup). These subgroups form a majority or minority 
representation in the heterogeneous workgroup, depending on the number of members they 
constitute of.  
This research set out to investigate how group members deal with the crossed-groups 
social dilemma that arises in this context: act in their self-interest or act in the interests of the 
heterogeneous workgroup? In line with H1, results showed that group members displayed 
parochial cooperation, contributing more to the group consisting of a majority of in-subgroup 
members, and less when the group consisted of a minority of in-subgroup members. This 
sensitivity for subgroup composition could be attenuated by deactivating the faultline that 
separated both subgroups. When presented with a superordinate goal, group members showed 
less conditional cooperation (C-D) to the benefit of consistent cooperation in workgroups (C-
C), but also to the advantage of more consistent defection (D-D) (H2). Results were 
replicated in a second experimental study. 
Subgroup composition 
Overall, group members perceived the 10-p. groups to consist of two distinct 
subgroups, separated by a strong faultline. Group members clearly used their (sub)group 
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identification as a reference point for decision behavior in the 10-p. groups (see Brewer, 
1979; Brewer & Schneider, 1990; Messick & Brewer, 1983), cooperating more with the MI 
group than with the MO group. They categorized themselves more as members of their own 
subgroup: identification with the in-subgroup was consistently stronger than with the out-
subgroup. In parallel, members affiliated themselves more strongly with the 10-p. group that 
consisted of a majority of in-subgroup members (MI group), than when in-subgroup members 
were in the minority (MO group). These findings are reflective of inter-subgroup bias with 
group members showing more concern for, and affiliation with the own subgroup, and the 
group in which their subgroup was nested as a majority. In line with prior research, the 
process of identification was related to individual cooperation rates in the crossed-groups 
social dilemma, in line with prior research. Several social dilemma studies showed that 
members who strongly identified with their group invested more in public goods dilemmas 
and exercised greater restraint in resource dilemmas than low-identifying group members, 
both in experimental and field studies (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Dawes & Messick, 2000; 
Kramer, 1991; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Kramer & Goldman, 1995; Kramer, Pommerenke, & 
Newton, 1993; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999; Wit & Wilke, 1990). Strong social 
identification incites individuals to assign more weight to their (sub)group’s interests, avoids 
social loafing and stimulates cooperative behavior toward the (sub)group (Rabinovich & 
Morten, 2011; Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
 In the same line, our studies showed that members expected their fellow ingroup 
subgroup members to cooperate more in the MI group than in the MO group. Members who 
identified with the (sub)group perceived other group members to be more identical to 
themselves, displaying similar preferences as themselves, in line with social identity theory 
(Taijfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1987). Based on goal expectation theory (Pruitt & Kimmel, 
1977), group members acted in line with their expectations of what those other subgroup 
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members would do. They expected of other in-subgroup members more cooperation in the 
MI group, and also for themselves displayed overall higher cooperation levels in the MI 
group. Results of both studies also indicated that participants expected out-subgroup 
members to cooperate more in the MO group than in the MI group. Together with the 
expectation of more cooperative behavior of in-subgroup members in the MI group, this is 
indication for the presence of an implicit subgroup-serving norm among members: cooperate 
more if the own subgroup represents a (numerical) majority in the group. Group members’ 
strong identification with in-subgroup members could have activated this implicit norm (Biel 
& Thogersen, 2007; Pillutla & Chen, 1999).  
The exploratory mediation analysis conducted on the first choice participants made 
confirmed that group identification and cooperative expectations of in-subgroup and out-
subgroup members in parallel mediated the effect of group composition on cooperative 
choice.  This technique (Hayes, 2013) was used because to date no procedure has yet been 
developed to execute a mediation analysis on clustered data with a binary outcome variable. 
Limitation is that for this analysis we needed to eliminate the repeatedness from the design, 
changing group composition from a within-subjects factor into a between-subjects factor. 
Also, because group identification and cooperative expectations were both measured after 
participants’ choices, we cannot make firm causal claims. However, measuring these 
variables after the manipulations and before choice, could have confounded the 
manipulations and the measurement could have acted as a manipulation itself. So, the order in 
which the mediators were measured was carefully chosen.  
Faultline (de)activation 
When primed with a superordinate goal (faultline deactivation), group members made 
less distinction between the MI and MO group and showed more C-C and D-D choices.  
Faultline deactivation – minimizing the salience of activated faultlines in teams (Van der 
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Kamp et al., 2012) – seemed to be capable of shifting group members away cooperation from 
conditional cooperation (cooperating only when in-subgroup members are in the majority 
(MI)). Introducing a superordinate goal for the 10-p. group transformed group members’ 
cognitive representation of the inter-group interaction from one involving two separate 
groups (in-subgroup and out-subgroup) - with each their own subgroup goals - to one 
involving a single, common ingroup, with a common goal (Gaertner et al., 1993; Wildschut et 
al., 2003). Results showed that participants in effect perceived a different goal structure under 
faultline deactivation, reporting the presence of one common goal for the group to be more 
likely than a subordinate goal for the separate subgroups. In the faultline activation condition 
subgroup goals were more salient among participants. Also, participants considered group 
members to form one group more in the faultline deactivation condition than in the faultline 
activation condition. So, although recategorization did not reduce the differences between 
group members per se, the perceived salience of subgroups was reduced (Homan et al., 
2008).  
Additional analyses comparing participants’ perceptions between C-C and C-D choice 
patterns in the faultline deactivation condition, clearly showed that both identification 
processes and cooperative expectations influenced participants’ choices to cooperate or not. 
Future research should look closer into the perceptual and motivational mechanisms 
underlying the distinct choice patterns in faultline deactivation, compared to faultline 
activation. Based on the discontinuity effect studies (Wildschut et al., 2003; Wildschut & 
Insko, 2007), future research could also investigate two mechanisms as viable pathways for 
explaining the distinct levels of cooperation under a subordinate and superordinate goal in 
crossed-groups social dilemmas. The distrust, or fear explanation states that the anticipation 
of interacting with another subgroup activates an outgroup schema, consisting of learned 
beliefs and expectations that inter-subgroup interactions are competitive (Insko & Schopler, 
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1998; Pemberton, Insko, & Schopler, 1996)
22
. The social support, or greed explanation 
underlines that subgroup members can provide mutual support for the competitive pursuit of 
immediate self-interest, and that such social support is unavailable to individuals (Insko et al., 
1990; Schopler et al., 1993; Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). Social support can reduce 
the normative constraints on the competitive behavior of other group members. 
Although recategorization via a superordinate goal resulted in less C-D patterns and 
more C-C patterns, it also resulted in more D-D patterns. Under faultline deactivation, more 
group members decided to defect in both 10-p. groups, compared to faultline activation. Prior 
research showed that faultline deactivation can lead to identity threat (Pearsall, Ellis, & 
Evans, 2008). Establishing a superordinate goal and categorization can undermine the 
distinctiveness of the subgroups, producing a threat to the integrity of members’ separate 
subgroup identities and their need for subgroup distinctiveness.  As a result, group members 
could maintain relatively high or even increased levels of inter-subgroup bias (Brown & 
Wade, 1987; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997). Group members 
feel that their subgroup identity is not accounted for in the workgroup and counteract with 
non-cooperative behavior in the workgroup. However, faultline deactivation with the 
superordinate goal can also result in a process of decategorization (Gaertner & Dividio, 
2000) for participants with a D-D choice. Due to the strong reduction in salience of subgroup 
distinctions, they categorize themselves at an individual level - not on a group level, as 
members of the 10-p. groups - and perceive themselves and other group members as 
individuals (Hewstone et al., 2002). Individuals then attend to their self-interest and decided 
not to cooperate in both 10-p. groups. 
A comparison of participants’ perceptions in C-C and D-D choice patterns learned 
that in the D-D choice pattern, participants identified less with the in-subgroup, the out-
                                                          
22 Note the similarity of this hypothesis with the social identity literature on inter-group bias. 
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subgroup, the MI group and the MO group, and expected less cooperation from subgroup 
members in both the MI- and MO group, compared to participants with a C-C pattern. The 
significant drop in identification and the pessimistic expectation of other group members’ 
cooperation points to decategorization as explanation for the more frequent D-D patterns 
under faultline deactivation.  
Superordinate recategorization alone is thus not always the optimal strategy to 
promote inter-subgroup harmony and cooperation (Dovidio et al., 1998; González & Brown, 
2003). Maintaining the salience of subgroups within a recategorized superordinate group 
might avoid identity threat and decategorization and the increase in inter-subgroup bias 
(Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006), leading to more cooperation in heterogeneous workgroups 
(Dovidio, et al., 1998). Subgroup identities may even enhance cooperation with the 
workgroup (between subgroups), because they acknowledge the distinctiveness of the 
subgroup, compared to other subgroups (cf. Barreto & Ellemers, 2002; Eggins, Haslam, & 
Reynolds, 2002; Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Rabinovich & 
Morten, 2011). In sum, respecting group members’ subgroup identification and 
distinctiveness, while simultaneously recognizing aspects of commonality with the out-
subgroup can be particularly valuable and beneficial to increase cooperation levels with the 
workgroup (cf. Dovidio et al., 1998).  
Nevertheless does the establishment of functional inter-subgroup processes remain 
difficult, because often positive and negative effects are jointly promoted (Carton & 
Cummings, 2012;  van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Too much focus on subgroup 
identities may override the positive effects of recategorization and too little can further 
increase inter-subgroup bias. This dynamic is also reflected in the results of our two studies: 
faultline deactivation minimized the salience of subgroup differences, resulting in more 
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consistent cooperation. On the other hand, were cooperation levels toward both 10-p. groups 
simultaneously lower with overall defection towards both faultline-based groups  
Clearly, we need to create the conditions for superordinate goals to work, depending 
on the specific context in which (sub)groups are interacting (Crisp, Turner, & Hewstone, 
2010). The benefits of superordinate goals might be achieved better when they are combined 
with other managerial strategies (see also Rico et al., 2012). A viable avenue to explore in 
future research is the role of leadership in the effectiveness of faultline deactivation on 
cooperation levels in heterogeneous groups. Team leaders are continuously challenged by 
situations in which social identification - based conflicts can occur, due to faultlines that 
cross a group’s structure (Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009). The presence of a leader in 
heterogeneous groups might reduce outgroup schemas (Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 
2012; Pittinsky & Simon, 2007) and establish trust in the (cooperative) intentions of other 
subgroup members. Articulating a vision for long term cooperation as the only viable option 
for all (sub)group members to tackle the crossed-groups social dilemma, might be a powerful 
means to simultaneously strengthen superordinate categorization. A leader supervising group 
members’ cooperation might instill more assurance that under his management members 
from the outgroup subgroup will also cooperate, which considerably lowers the risk for group 
members to be the ‘sucker’ rather than the ‘savior. Prior social dilemma research already 
established a strong consensus that people are more willing to contribute when greed or fear 
is minimized (Zeng & Chen , 2003).  
Managerial implications 
Group heterogeneity and the presence of subgroups, due to a (strong) faultline, 
presents members with a crossed-groups social dilemma and poses some challenges for team 
management. We propose a threefold strategy to deal with faultlines and their effects on 
cooperation and (sub)group conflict. 
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First, a team leader could assess the presence of (dormant) faultlines and the chances 
of them being activated. This involves gauging the objective demographic characteristics and 
individual attributes of team members, see if and how they align, and assess the contextual 
factors that might determine activation of faultlines (e.g. subgroup identification, status, intra-
team trust, leadership). This should be a continuous process throughout group development, 
because the salience of subgroups and their identities might decrease or increase as the group 
matures, requiring flexible interventions. 
Second, based on this assessment, managers could try to prevent faultline activation, 
using specific strategies in the initial phases of (sub)group development. In groups where a 
strong faultline arises this may be next-to impossible and in some cases undesirable. A team 
leader could avoid, however, that additional faultlines - based on other demographic 
characteristics - get stacked on top of this strong faultline, further increasing the faultline gap 
between subgroups. 
Third, in the presence of activated faultlines, several interventions could be advanced 
to tackle the potential harmful effects on (sub)group processes and performance. A team 
leader could work on inter-subgroup biases by stimulating positive contacts between 
members of distinct subgroups, as a personalization strategy to move beyond subgroup 
differences. Bringing subgroups together and establishing common goals should unfold with 
respect for subgroup distinctiveness and identities, and demographic and subgroup related 
group tasks should be avoided via for example the cross-cutting of work roles (Rico et al., 
2012). Team leaders should also mind subgroup size ensuring that minorities’ opinions and 
interpretations are as much respected and taken into account as those of majority subgroups. 
Limitations and future research 
Besides its theoretical and practical implications, our study is limited in several ways, 
inspiring avenues for future research. First, this study investigated cooperative decision-
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making in a strong faultline group with two distinct subgroups, based on social category 
diversity. In organizational teams a variety of faultlines might arise based on other 
(demographic) characteristics such as educational background, gender, organizational 
tenure,… Prior research showed that alternative faultline bases were differentially associated 
with team outcomes (Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto, & Thatcher, 2009). Social-category based 
faultlines were negatively related to team performance and cooperation whereas information-
based faultlines were not. So, taking into consideration other faultlines present in these 
heterogeneous groups might yield different effects on cooperation levels, compared to the 
social category based faultline alone. Future research should look into the interaction effects 
of several types of faultlines on cooperation levels in crossed-groups social dilemmas. It 
could be that for example informational faultlines act as a moderator on the effect of 
subgroup composition, independently or in addition to social-category based faultlines, 
activating or deactivating the strong faultline in factional groups. 
Second, the presence of the two distinct subgroups, divided by a strong faultline, gave 
rise to complex inter-subgroup processes. To date there has been limited examination of 
inter-group processes within teams, more so between teams and organizations (see Zheng & 
Chen, 2003; McCarter, Mahoney, & Northcraft, 2011; Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000). 
Faultline deactivation processes, especially with identity based faultlines, are a double-edged 
sword with frequently both positive and negative effects on cooperation levels. Identifying 
other contextual factors (such as leadership, power structures, subgroup trust, subgroup 
threat) as faultline deactivators, capable of accentuating positive inter-subgroup processes 
and avoiding negative inter-subgroup processes is a fruitful avenue for further research (see 
also Carton & Cummings, 2012).  
Third, prior research already showed that the size and number of subgroups can 
impact group processes and outcomes considerably (Harrison & Sin, 2005; Jehn & 
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Bezrukova, 2010; Menon & Phillips, 2010; O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010; Polzer et al., 2006). 
Our studies investigated the effects of subgroup (numerical) majority and minority (MI and 
MO group) on cooperative decision making, keeping the number of subgroups (two) and total 
group size (10 members) constant. In teams, the number of faultlines will determine the 
number of subgroups, and the location of the faultline will determine variation in the size of 
subgroups, varying from equal size to small and large subgroups (Carton & Cummings, 
2012). Future studies with the crossed-groups social dilemma may vary the number and size 
of subgroups by adding more demographic complexity, and adapting group size. This can 
increase insight in boundary conditions of the group composition effect on cooperation within 
and between subgroups, also in interaction with potential faultline deactivators. 
Finally, the effect of subgroups on team performance and cooperation tends to change 
over time (Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010), and repeated (sub)group interactions might allow 
members to surmount their stereotypes and categorizations, diminishing the negative effects 
of faultlines on group processes (e.g. Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002; Jehn et al., 
1999).  Participants generally cooperate more in a multi-trial game than in a one-trial game as 
it allows for group members to learn and understand the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with cooperation and defection (goal expectation theory of Pruitt & Kimmel, 
1977) and build trust. Future research might be geared towards the set-up of repeated rounds 
crossed-groups social dilemma games with (bogus) feedback about (sub)group members’ 
decisions to better capture (sub)group dynamics over time and the mediating mechanisms that 
are in play. In combination with longitudinal field research in organizations undergoing a 
merger, an alliance this would allow us to assess over-time effects of faultlines in several 
phases of the organizational and (sub)group change processes. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Vignette Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma Game 
Imagine all ten of you being the manager of one of ten private firms producing product X. In 
order to increase your profits, you all have just made large private investments to heighten the 
production capacity of product X. Because all ten of you did so, each in his or her own firm, 
the total production of X will soon exceed the public demand, resulting in a drop in prizes. 
You all have to choose between sticking to your present (high) production rate or reducing 
your production rate to a level under its present capacity. Firms producing at maximum 
capacity will always earn more profit than those reducing their production rate, irrespective 
of the number of other managers who decide to do so. However, the more firms that stick to 
their high production rates, the lower the profits all of you earn on product X: If all ten of you 
decide to stick to your high production rates, this will yield all of you a lower profit (10 
million Euros each) than if all of you decide to reduce your production rates (25 million 
Euros each). In the table below, you see how profits vary as a function of the decisions made 
in your 10-person group.  
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APPENDIX  2. Pay-off matrix of the 10-p. Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma game 
 
 
Choice     Pay- off for “stick”   Pay-off for “reduce” 
configuration     (x million)   (x million) 
 
 
 0 STICK \         10 REDUCE   ---   25 
 1 STICK \  9 REDUCE   28   23 
 2 STICK  \  8 REDUCE   26   21 
 3 STICK  \   7 REDUCE   24   19 
 4 STICK  \   6 REDUCE   22   17 
 5 STICK  \   5 REDUCE   20   15 
 6 STICK   \   4 REDUCE    18   13 
 7 STICK  \   3 REDUCE   16   11 
 8 STICK  \   2 REDUCE   14     9 
 9 STICK   \   1 REDUCE   12     7 
10 STICK  \   0 REDUCE   10   --- 
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ABSTRACT 
Despite the increasing prevalence of faultline-based groups in the workforce, and the 
potential of leadership to capitalize on the positive effects of diversity, to date this connection 
has remained relatively unexplored. We propose that the presence of a visionary leader 
allows group members to tackle the crossed-groups social dilemma that arises when an in-
subgroup and an out-subgroup are in place. Results indicated that members consistently 
showed parochial cooperation, i.e., more cooperation toward a group with a majority of in-
subgroup members than toward a group with a majority of out-subgroup members.  When 
deactivating the faultline with a superordinate goal, a visionary leader increased members’ 
overall cooperation with the group. Leader affiliation with either subgroup did not have an 
effect on cooperation levels in the group.  
 
Keywords: Faultlines, In-subgroup, Out-subgroup, Subgroup composition, Subgroup size, 
Faultline deactivation, Factional group, Superordinate goal, Visionary leadership, Leader 
affiliation, Group prototypicality, Inter-group leadership, Parochial cooperation, Crossed-
groups social dilemma 
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INTRODUCTION  
 In our globalized world, teams and workgroups have become more diverse due to 
increasing internationalization of organizations, in operations and in workforce (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005; Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006; Zaccaro, Marks, & DeChurch, 
2012). Common practice after joint ventures, mergers, and other organizational 
restructurings, is the formation of new workgroups, consisting of employees originating from 
different organizations or departments that are now restructured into one. The emergence of 
these heterogeneous groups poses significant challenges to leadership.  
On the one hand will subgroups arise, depending on the alignment of the individual 
differences within the group, also referred to as faultlines (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Group 
faultlines frequently result in greater conflict, reduced team cohesion, performance and 
satisfaction (Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Choi & Sy, 2010; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003) and their 
presence has important implications for inter-subgroup dynamics (Harrison & Klein, 2007; 
O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010).  
Also, bringing together members from two clearly distinct groups into one workgroup 
acts as a faultline trigger and results in an active faultline already in existence (Hambrick, Li, 
Xin, & Tsui, 2001). This faultline divides the new group (Li & Hambrick, 2005) into two 
distinct subgroups with group members representing two social entities. They categorize 
members of their own subgroup as ingroup while viewing the other subgroup as outgroup 
(Polzer et al., 2006). Employees are faced with a social dilemma because of the inherent 
tension between cooperation and competition in this new group. Group members now do not 
only have to decide upon their self-interest, and the group’s interest, but will also take their 
subgroup’s interest into account. The social dilemma then embodies the nested social 
structure and interests of the group members (Wit & Kerr, 2002). More specifically, due to 
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the presence of subgroups, a crossed-groups social dilemma arises because members of an in-
subgroup and out-subgroup are crossed into one workgroup. Cooperation in this setting is 
defined as “the willingness of group members to act to the advantage of the workgroup and as 
such maximize the joint interests of all members of both subgroups” (De Pauw, Wit, & Van 
den Broeck, 2013). It is of utmost importance to group outcomes and the success of 
organizational change processes that leaders prevent and deal with subgroup formation and 
its resulting group conflict (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010). 
Prior research by De Pauw et al. (2013) showed that members of such groups - with 
two subgroups divided by a strong faultline - would cooperate more if their in-subgroup was 
in the majority than when their in-subgroup was in the minority. A promising strategy to 
decrease this sensitivity for (sub)group composition was to deactivate the faultline via a 
superordinate goal. Then group members showed more consistent cooperation in these 
groups. However, other members displayed more defection patterns, as they did not 
cooperate with either group, consisting of a majority or minority of in-subgroup members. So 
a superordinate goal in itself might be insufficient to deal with the negative effects of active 
faultlines and subgroupings. When group members feel that their subgroup’s identity - setting 
them distinctively apart from the workgroup in which this subgroup is nested – is not 
sufficiently respected, they can counteract and reduce cooperation levels with the workgroup 
(Brewer, 1991; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010). 
Clearly, there is a need to identify the conditions under which superordinate goals work best 
(Crisp, Turner, & Hewstone, 2010). Previous research proposed that the benefits of a 
superordinate goal might be better achieved when combined with managerial and leadership 
strategies (Rico, Sànchez-Manzanares, Antino, & Lau 2012), such as visionary leadership.  
Aim of this study is to investigate, with the crossed-groups social dilemma paradigm, 
the impact of a superordinate goal for the faultline-based group in combination with visionary 
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leadership as a strategy to reduce group members’ sensitivity to subgroup composition, to 
maximize consistent cooperation with the group. In addition, we explore whether the 
subgroup affiliation of the leader exerts an effect on cooperation levels in the group. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
When two prior separate groups start working together in one workgroup (e.g. in 
alliance, organizational merger) a strong faultline may arise based on employees’ 
membership of one organization/department or the other (Hambrick et al., 2001). In the 
newly composed group the basis for a faultline – a crack or a divide – is, by definition, 
present and gives rise to two distinct in- and out-subgroups. Members do not come to the 
group as individuals, but rather as representatives from two different social entities (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005), nested in the group. This (salient) subgroup membership will have an 
impact on their decision to contribute to the group. Alliance teams are typical examples of 
such teams that have a strong faultline. In joint ventures, the primary salient attribute of 
parent company affiliations may cause the dormant faultline between subgroups to become 
activated.  
Strong faultlines can increase conflict and distrust across subgroups within the 
workgroup (Choi & Sy, 2010; Greer & Jehn, 2007; Pearsall, Ellis, & Evans, 2008; Polzer et 
al., 2006; Zanutto, Bezrukova, & Jehn, 2011), negatively affect group performance and social 
integration (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002; Rico, Molleman, Sànchez-Manzanares, 
& Van der Vegt, 2007) but also result in individual group members attending to the interests 
of their subgroup only within that workgroup (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Rico et al., 2012). 
These consequences are even exacerbated as the strength of the faultline further increases, 
resulting in more intra-subgroup similarity and more inter-subgroup differences (Thatcher & 
Patel, 2012).  
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Subgroup composition 
 These groups with a strong faultline are not homogeneous – being populated by in-
subgroup and out-subgroup members. The presence of subgroups in this case gives rise to a 
crossed-groups social dilemma. Members of ingroup and outgroup are crossed into one new 
workgroup and in the trade-off between self-interest and group interest, group members will 
also take the interests of their subgroup - that is now nested in the group - into account. Prior 
studies (Schopler & Insko, 1992) consistently showed that participants who are members of a 
subgroup show de facto less concern for the group interest (i.e. are less likely to make the 
cooperative choice) than participants who act as single individuals (see also Komorita & 
Lapworth, 1982; McCallum et al., 1985; Rabbie, Visser, & van Oostrum, 1982). 
The presence of subgroups and heterogeneity in group composition instigates inter-
subgroup processes within the workgroup (Carton & Cummings, 2012). Group members 
have ‘the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own membership subgroup or its members 
more favorably than a non-membership subgroup’ (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002, p. 
576). Obviously, this stereotyping or inter-subgroup bias (Gaertner et al., 2000; Taifel, 1982; 
Taifel & Turner, 1979) may result in less cooperation of individuals across subgroups, 
compared to within their subgroup, and thus less contribution to the group interests, versus 
the subgroup and individual interests (Wit & Kerr, 2002). Subgroup biases lead people to 
favor and trust in-subgroup members more than out-subgroup members, and to identify more 
with their in-subgroup than with the full group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Because the group is 
inherently divided in two subgroups, in-subgroup and out-subgroup categorizations will arise 
(Alderfer, 1987; Taijfel, 1982). In the same realm, there is a well-known tendency for people 
to be drawn to, like, and trust others like themselves, and to avoid, distrust, and dislike others 
who are dissimilar (e.g., Tsui & O’Reilly, 1989). More so, group members often settle inter-
group conflict with self-sacrifice to contribute to ingroup welfare (ingroup love), and to harm 
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competing outgroups (outgroup hate) (Bornstein, 2003; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008; 
De Dreu et al., 2010). Clearly, members are likely to prioritize their own subgroup’s interests 
over the other subgroup’s interests and over the interests of the group, in which their 
subgroup is nested.  
Subgroup size 
When a new workgroup is formed usually subgroups are of unequal size, especially 
when these groups are getting large (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). This group then contains a 
majority and a minority of (sub)group members aligning on several characteristics (Carton & 
Cummings, 2012; O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010). When these (sub)group members decide to 
contribute to the group, this benefits not only members of the individual’s in-subgroup but 
also members of the out-subgroup. So, either a larger number of in-subgroup members than 
out-subgroup members profit from an individual’s cooperation, or a larger number of out-
subgroup members than in-subgroup members profit from it. Findings with respect to 
whether variation in the size of subgroups is better (Harrison & Sin, 2005; Jehn & 
Bezrukova, 2010; Menon & Phillips, 2010; Phillips, Mannix, Neale, & Gruenfeld, 2004) or 
worse (Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Janis, 1982; Mannix, 1993; O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010; 
Stasser & Titus, 1985) for group outcomes, than when there is low variation in subgroup size 
are contradictory (Carton & Cummings, 2012). Nevertheless, relative subgroup size, as a 
potential antecedent of status (Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Guinote, 2004; Ng, 1982), may 
have a significant impact on cooperation levels toward the group. Subgroups that have 
numerically more members (majority subgroups) tend to have higher status (Guinote, Judd, & 
Brauer, 2002), defined as “the prominence, respect, and influence individuals enjoy in the 
eyes of others” (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006, p. 1094; for other 
definitions see also Fiske, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). So, a member of a majority 
subgroup, nested in the newly composed group, will be in a high-status position (compared to 
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the minority subgroup) and might contribute more to the group in order to confirm the 
subgroup’s status and identity (Ellemers & Scheepers, 2005; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). 
Even more so, if this majority subgroup is populated by ingroup members, originating from 
the same organization/department and more similar to him, and subgroup identification will 
be stronger (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987). Consequently, the member will navigate 
toward this majority subgroup and most likely contribute more to the workgroup in which 
this subgroup is nested (in MI). On the other hand, when members are part of the low-status 
minority subgroup (in MO), they are likely to feel threatened. They can react adversely to the 
fact that the high-status out-subgroup, being in the majority, will have greater influence 
(Terry, 2003; van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003) 
In a crossed-groups social dilemma, combining in- and out-subgroups, cooperation 
with the workgroup always comes to the benefit of both subgroups. However, in one case the 
in-subgroup will be in the majority, and in another the out-subgroup will be in the majority. 
Given members’ preference to place subgroup interests above group interests, the prioritizing 
of the in-subgroup’s interests over those of the out-subgroup, and the high status of majority 
subgroups compared to minority subgroups, we hypothesize: 
H1: Subgroup composition has a significant effect on cooperation in a faultline- based group. 
Group members cooperate more if the majority of their group consists of in-subgroup 
members (MI), than if the majority of their group consists of out-subgroup members (MO) 
(parochial cooperation).  
 
Faultline deactivation and superordinate goal 
For group leaders and their organizations it is desirable to increase employees’ 
cooperation levels in all groups, regardless of their composition. Because strong faultlines 
divide these workgroups into separate subgroups and cause dysfunctional group processes 
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(Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Choi & Sy, 2010; Jackson et al., 2003; van Knippenberg & 
Schippers, 2007), the question is how to attenuate the negative effects of these faultlines. The 
process of faultline deactivation minimizes the salience of activated faultlines in teams and 
groups (Van der Kamp, Tjemkes, & Jehn, 2012). Prior research shows that a superordinate 
goal can reduce the salience of subgroup differences and stimulate some group members to 
make equally high contributions toward groups, regardless of group composition (De Pauw et 
al., 2013). This superordinate goal, however, can also evoke decategorization processes 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) and an identity threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1999; Breakwell, 1983; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Jetten, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1997), reflected in consistently lower cooperation rates of (sub)group members. 
A useful solution to counteract these negative effects of faultline deactivation along 
identity-based faultlines is maintaining salience of the subgroups within the group. This 
strategy respects group members’ own subgroup identification and distinctiveness, while 
recognizing aspects of commonality with the out-subgroup and reducing inter-subgroup bias 
(Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006; Dovidio, Gaertner & Validzic, 1998)  However, maintaining 
subgroup salience is also a delicate balance: too much focus on subgroup identities can 
override the positive effects of the superordinate goal, too little can result in less cooperation 
with the group.  
We propose combining faultline deactivation via a superordinate goal, with visionary 
leadership, to deal with the potential identity threat and decategorization, associated with the 
superordinate goal. This intervention may allow to capitalize on the positive effects of a 
superordinate goal in faultline-based groups (De Pauw et al., 2013). Research on the 
effectiveness of different managerial and leadership strategies to deal with identity-based 
group faultlines, is scarce to date, although it has been advanced as a promising avenue worth 
exploring (Kunze & Bruch, 2010; Rico et al., 2012). In the following passage we will 
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describe the importance of visionary leadership in particular, to increase cooperation levels in 
a heterogeneous faultline-based group. 
Visionary leadership 
Leadership can be described as “a relationship in which some people are able to 
persuade others to embrace values, attitudes and goals, and to exert effort on behalf of those 
values, attitudes and goals” (Hogg et al., 2006). As a process of social influence in groups, it 
involves mobilizing individuals to achieve a collective goal (Chemers, 2001), and plays a key 
role in enabling individual and organizational performance (Bass, 1990). Effective leadership 
involves developing and maintaining group cohesiveness (Dobbins & Zaccaro, 1986; 
Weinberg & McDermott, 2002) and is critical to deal with the increased diversity of groups 
to realize the potential added value it brings (Chen & Van Velsor, 1996; DiTomaso & 
Hooijberg, 1996; Homan & Jehn, 2010; Huo, Molina, Sawahata, & Deang, 2005; Keraney & 
Gebert, 2009; Somech, 2006). 
In mixed-motive situations - such as the conflict of interests for members of faultline-
based groups - choosing to cooperate with the group involves an orientation that focuses on 
the future consequences of the immediate choice, be it a proximate or distant inter-
personal/inter-group event (Insko et al., 1998; Insko et al., 2001; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). If 
group members decide to abstain from cooperation in the factional group, however, this is 
driven by a short-term orientation that focuses on the immediate consequences for one’s own 
side. To maximize outcomes on the short term, the optimal choice is the non-cooperative one 
because this will lead to higher payoffs. However, in the prospect of interacting repeatedly 
with members of the opposing subgroup, it is important to maximize outcomes across a 
number of interactions. In this situation, the strategy of competition will not maximize 
outcomes and individuals can be motivated to move away from mutual competition to 
cooperation (Insko et al., 1998). Several studies already demonstrated the positive impact of 
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leadership on cooperation with the group in social dilemmas (e.g. De Cremer & van 
Knippenberg, 2002; Mulder & Nelissen, 2010; Pinter et al., 2007; Stouten, De Cremer, & 
Van Dijk, 2005; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Leaders can increase cooperation by 
encouraging group members to contribute their time and/or finances to the group and by 
supervising and regulating the provision of common resources. A leader that envisions 
repeated interactions in the future can induce a long-term perspective (‘shadow of the 
future’), and - from the stand-point of maximizing outcomes - motivate group members to 
shift away from their self-interest and subgroup-interest to the interests of the group (cfr. 
Axelrod, 1984; Kelley, 1984, 1997; Rapoport, 1967).  
Visionary leadership creates and articulates idealized, value-based, future-oriented 
images that shape the behaviors of follower group members (e.g., Greer, Homan, De Hoogh, 
& Den Hartog, 2012; Griffin, Parker, & Mason, 2010; Rafferty & Griffin, 2004; Shamir, 
Zakay, Breinin, & Popper, 1998; Stam, van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2010). This type of 
leadership - as a central component of transformational and charismatic leadership theories -  
is associated with clear and shared goals (Schippers, Den Hartog, Koopman, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008) and has positive effects on team states, processes, and performance 
(Bono & Judge, 2003; Waldman, Ramirez, House, & Puranam, 2001). Vision can mobilize 
group members to invest in the group, and to act on behalf of the group (Bass, 2008; 
Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Shamir, House, & 
Arthur, 1993). A leader with a vision for the future of the group and its members, 
emphasizing the importance of cooperation in light of further interactions and the 
establishment of a long-term relationship, has potential to extend the ‘shadow of the future’ 
(cf. Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Insko et al., 1998; Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels, & 
Duell, 2006) and could significantly reduce inter-subgroup bias. The leader’s 
transformational vision acts as a goal that motivates effort towards the future expressed in 
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this vision and stimulates inter-subgroup cooperation in the faultline-based group (cf. Berson, 
Shamir, Avolio, & Popper, 2001; Shamir et al., 1993; Zeng & Chen, 2003)  
Consequently, we hypothesize: 
H2: A leader with a vision for the future of the group will increase cooperation with the 
faultline-based group, regardless of its (sub)group composition.  
 
Visionary leadership and heterogeneous groups 
The visionary leader of a faultline-based group will have to address the separate 
subgroups of ingroup- and outgroup members. In this context, leadership needs to encourage 
cooperation across subgroups, and prevent conflict and other negative inter-subgroup 
processes, to increase cooperation with the faultline-based group as a whole (Hogg, van 
Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012). To gain insight into how leaders deal with the presence of 
subgroups and motivate members in diverse groups to tackle the conflicts of interest, we 
build upon inter-group leadership, faultline, and diversity literature. Although, to date,  
research has had limited attention for leadership across (sub)groups (Pittinsky & Simon, 
2007) and the connection between group faultlines and leadership (Kunze & Bruch, 2010; 
Rico et al. 2012), prior studies offer some direction.  
Transformational leadership has been found to increase the positive effects of age-
based faultlines (Kunze & Bruch, 2010), of functional diversity (Somech, 2006), of 
educational background diversity (Shin & Zhou, 2007) on for example team performance 
(Kearney & Gebert, 2009). This type of leadership has the potential to craft a new collective 
identity (Conger, Kanungo, & Menon, 2000; Halevy, Berson, & Galinsky, 2011; Kunze & 
Bruch, 2010; Pittinsky & Simon, 2007) by introducing shared factors (Gaertner et al., 1993).  
Other research shows that a leader who did not categorize group members into 
subgroups had more impact if he also displayed visionary behaviors; and visionary leadership 
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was more effective if the leader showed no subgroup categorization tendency (Greer et al., 
2012). De Pauw and colleagues (2013) confirmed the potential of a superordinate goal to 
overcome the negative effects of (sub)group composition in faultline-based groups, where 
minimizing subgroup categorizations could result in increased cooperation levels. However, 
on its own this was not an optimal strategy to promote inter-subgroup harmony (Dovidio et 
al., 1998) as it also resulted in a fair amount of group members to abstain from cooperation 
with the group. Combining both lines of research, we propose that a visionary leader who 
deactivates the faultline via a superordinate goal - and thus minimizes subgroup 
categorization tendencies – has clear potential to increase cooperation levels and to minimize 
defection patterns in a faultline-based group. By treating all group members alike in one 
social category, regardless of their subgroup affiliation, the leader’s vision for the future of 
the group and the importance of cooperation will resonate more strongly. Also, envisioning a 
long-term collaboration between members of the subgroups can counteract the potential 
identity threat and decategorization, associated with recategorization via the superordinate 
goal. We hypothesize: 
H3A: A visionary leader who deactivates the faultline via a superordinate goal for the 
faultline-based group will reduce group members’ sensitivity to (sub)group composition of 
the group. This type of leader can maximize consistent cooperation and minimize consistent 
defection with the faultline-based group. 
 
Leader affiliation  
The leader of a faultline-based group most frequently originates from the one or the 
other membership subgroup, which is common practice after change processes, such as 
mergers, joint ventures (see Li & Hambrick, 2005; Zeng & Chen, 2003). As such, the leader 
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is affiliated more closely to one subgroup than to the other, which can impact his potential to 
increase cooperation levels in this group (Hogg et al., 2012). 
A vast amount of leadership research has focused on the effects of the individual 
leader’s characteristics on cooperation (Yukl, 2002). However, leadership is embedded in the 
social systems or groups (Chemers, 2001; Hall & Lord, 1995; Haslam & Platow, 2001; Lord, 
Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001; Pawar & Eastman, 1997), as the leader himself is most often 
also a (sub)group member. Consequently, characteristics of the leader as a (sub)group 
member can influence leadership effectiveness (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; van 
Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003).  
The social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 
2003; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; van Knippenberg et al., 2004) emphasizes the 
interaction between individuals’ (sub)group identification and the leader’s effectiveness in 
engaging members to contribute time, energy, effort, and resources to interdependent tasks 
and actions that benefit the group and organization. Individual perception of a common 
identity with the leader is crucial for the leader’s effectiveness in mobilizing individual 
efforts toward collective goals (Ellemers et al., 2004). For (sub)group members who strongly 
identify with their (sub)group, leadership endorsement, perceptions of leadership 
effectiveness, and actual leadership effectiveness are strongly influenced by how (sub)group 
prototypical the leader is perceived to be (Hogg et al., 2006). This prototypicality implies that 
the leader is representative of the (sub)group’s identity and acts according to the (sub)group 
norm (Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998). (Sub)group members will 
often favor leaders who display (sub)group prototypical characteristics ahead of those who 
display qualities that are simply stereotypical of leaders in general (De Cremer, van Dijke, & 
Mayer, 2010; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011).  
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Because leaders whose origins lie within the in-subgroup tend to be perceived as 
more prototypical (for this subgroup) than those whose origins lie in an out-subgroup, it 
follows that they are more strongly endorsed than leaders with out-subgroup origins (Bruins, 
Ellemers, & De Gilder, 1999; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 
1999). When the leader is affiliated with members’ own subgroup, they believe him to 
safeguard their subgroup’s interests as “one of us” (Duck & Fielding, 2003; van Knippenberg 
et al., 2000). This type of leader will be more effective in getting his vision for the faultline-
based group across, influencing inter-subgroup dynamics, and increasing cooperation levels 
toward the group (Halevy et al., 2011; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003;  Hogg et al., 2012).  
We hypothesize:  
H3B: A visionary leader who deactivates the faultline via a superordinate goal for the 
faultline-based group will increase cooperation of subgroup members toward the group more 
if he is affiliated with the same subgroup as those members, compared to a visionary leader 
who deactivates the faultline via a superordinate goal and originates from the other 
subgroup. 
 
METHOD 
Sample 
Participants were 320 undergraduate students enrolled in a ‘Business administration 
skills’ course at a Western-European university. The sample consisted of 56% men, and 44% 
women with an average age of 20.7 years (SD = 1.40). Participants were relatively unfamiliar 
to one another. They volunteered to engage in the experiment and received course credit for 
their participation. Participants were gathered in a lecture hall and - after being seated - they 
received an envelope with experimental instructions in a booklet
23
. From then on participants 
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 We thank Jasmijn Verbrigghe and Lore Van Gorp for their assistance with data-collection 
  185 
were not allowed to talk to each other. They were seated far enough from one another to 
prevent that their answers, marked in the booklet, could be seen by fellow participants. 
CSD vignette 
Participants read in a booklet the instructions of a 10-person Crossed-groups Social 
Dilemma (CSD) scenario (De Pauw et al., 2013) (Appendix 1). As a manager, participants 
had to decide – just as the 9 other managers in their group - to either ‘limit production’ of 
their factory (cooperation) to avoid overproduction or to ‘stick to their current production 
level’ (defection), which would result in overproduction if the other managers decided 
similarly. Firms producing at maximum capacity would always earn more profit than those 
reducing their production rate, irrespective of the number of other managers who decided to 
do so. However, the more managers stuck to their high production rates, the lower the profits 
all of them earned. If all ten managers decided to stick to their current production rates, this 
would yield all of them a lower profit (10 million Euros each) than if all of them decided to 
reduce their production rates (25 million Euros each). After private reading of the instructions 
and inspection of the pay-off matrix (Appendix 2), which was explained by examples of two 
choice configurations (3 stick to production \ 7 reduce production and 7 stick \ 3 reduce, 
respectively), participants received information on the groups of managers in which they had 
to make their choice.   
Manipulations 
Subgroup Composition (within subjects)  
Participants were informed they had to make their choice in two differently composed 
10-p. groups, where the managers in each case were students of their own university (in-
subgroup members) and students from another neighboring university (out-subgroup 
members). In one 10-p. group, managers from the own university were in the majority. In the 
other 10-p. group, managers of the neighboring university were in the majority. Participants 
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first read the instructions of one of the two experimental within-SS conditions 
(counterbalanced). The Majority Ingroup (MI) group consisted of 7 managers from their own 
university (including themselves) and 3 managers from the neighboring university. The 
Majority Outgroup (MO) group consisted of 3 managers from their own university (including 
themselves) and 7 managers from the neighboring university. 
Leadership (between subjects) 
In the control condition, participants were told that the level of cooperation of the 10-
p. groups in which they participated would be compared with that of the other 10-p. groups in 
the simulation. In this condition participants thus received a superordinate goal prime 
(faultline deactivation) (cf. De Pauw et al., 2013). 
In the two leadership conditions, all participants received a prime on visionary 
leadership. They were informed that the leader believed it to be important that all managers 
successfully cooperated in the 10-p. groups, irrespective of their affiliations. This with the 
purpose of installing a long-term collaboration in the 10-p groups. These participants also 
received the superordinate goal prime (the leader would compare the results of the 10-p. 
groups). In other words, the presence of a superordinate goal was treated as a constant 
variable in the experiment (in all conditions the faultline was deactivated via a superordinate 
goal). The difference in effects between the leadership conditions versus the control condition 
thus could be properly attributed to the effects of visionary leadership instead of the 
superordinate goal, which did not differ across experimental conditions. 
To investigate the effect of leader affiliation, half of all participants in the leadership 
conditions were told that the visionary leader originated from their own university (in-
subgroup affiliation), and the other half was told that the leader originated from the other 
university (out-subgroup affiliation). The difference in effects between the leadership 
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conditions could be attributed to leader affiliation, because visionary leadership and 
superordinate goal did not differ across both experimental conditions. 
In sum, all participants received the superordinate goal prime; participants in both 
leadership conditions were primed with visionary leadership, but in one condition this leader 
had an in-subgroup affiliation, and in the other condition the leader had an out-subgroup 
affiliation. 
Measures  
After the manipulation of subgroup composition and leadership, participants were 
requested to fill out their private answers to a series of questions. To assess choice behavior, 
they decided whether they would ‘stick to their present production level’ or ‘reduce their 
present production level’.  
They also indicated how many of the participants from their own subgroup and the 
other subgroup they expected to ‘stick’ and how many they expected to ‘reduce’ in this 10-p. 
group. These items measured actual expectations of group members’ cooperative behavior 
and checked respondents’ comprehension of the group composition. Due to the phrasing of 
the questions, participants’ responses included their own choices in each of the two groups. 
Consequently, we first corrected the original responses of participants who made cooperative 
choices themselves toward the MI group and/or toward the MO group. For example, when a 
participant acted cooperatively ( i.e. indicated that he would reduce his own production), and 
indicated that he expected 5 out of 7 in-subgroup members to cooperate in the MI group, that 
participant’s expected number of co-operators was corrected from 5 to 4; so he expected 4 in-
subgroup members other than himself to cooperate. Because cooperative expectation was 
measured on a different scale in the MI group (seven in-subgroup members) than in the MO 
group (three in-subgroup members), proportions of cooperation were calculated; e.g. if a 
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participant expected 4 other in-subgroup members to cooperate, then the expected proportion 
of cooperation was calculated as 4/6 in-subgroup members (= .67). 
As a means to assess understanding of the pay-off matrix, participants were requested 
to indicate the profits (in million euros) to be earned by those in the 10-p. group who ‘stuck’ 
and the profits to be earned by those who ‘reduced’.  
After completion of all questions, participants were requested to proceed to the next 
page of the booklet. There they filled out their private answers to the same series of questions 
(choice behavior, cooperative expectations, pay-off matrix), now for the MO group (or the 
MI group), depending on which condition they were first presented with (counterbalanced). 
Finally, all participants were asked to indicate their gender and age. They also read a 
paragraph on ’guarantee of anonymity’. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire,  identification with in-subgroup and with out-
subgroup members was measured with three items on a 5-point scale (Derks, van Laar, & 
Ellemers, 2009): ‘I identify with L participants ’, ‘I  feel connected with L participants’, ‘I am 
concerned with L participants’ (for the in-subgroup) (α = .90); and ‘ I identify with R 
participants’, ‘I  feel connected with R participants’, ‘I am concerned with R participants’ 
(for the out-subgroup) (α = .92)24. The same scale was adapted to measure identification with 
the MI group and with the MO group: ‘I identify with the 10-p. group of 7 L and 3 R 
participants’ (sample item for the MI group) (α = .88); ‘I identify with the 10-p. group of 3 L 
and 7 R participants’ (sample item for the MO group) (α = .88).  
Perception of the leader’s concern with subgroup interests, was measured with two 
items on a 5-point scale: ‘I expect the leader of my 10-p. groups to safeguard the interests of 
the L participants’, ‘I expect the leader of my 10-p. groups to safeguard the interests of the R 
participants’ respectively. 
                                                          
24
 L participants’ refers to in-subgroup members from participants’ own university; ‘R participants’ refers to out-subgroup 
members from the other university.   
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Identification with the leader was measured with one item on a 5-point scale: ‘I feel 
connected with the leader of my 10-p. groups.’ 
Inter-subgroup bias between in-subgroup members and out-subgroup members was 
measured with two items: ‘I expect L participants to mainly attend to their personal interests’ 
and ‘I expect L participants to mainly attend to the collective interests’ (for in-subgroup 
members); ‘I expect R participants to mainly attend to their personal interests’ and ‘I expect 
R participants to mainly attend to the collective interests’ (for out-subgroup members). 
Debriefing  
After completion of the post-experimental questionnaire participants were requested 
to place the booklet back into the envelope. All of the participants were collectively debriefed 
by means of a lecture and a report on some of the results. 
Procedure of data analysis 
To test the hypotheses we used two data-analytic approaches. First, to test Hypothesis 
1, 2, and 3, we used the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) procedure (Liang & Zeger, 
1986) that treated the repeated (non-)cooperative choices of individual participants in the 
crossed-groups social dilemma game as the units of analysis. As an extension of the 
Generalized Linear Model (logistic regression), this procedure allows for the analysis of 
repeated measurements of binary (‘reduce production’ or ‘stick to production’) response 
variables, with correction for the non-independence of data. Data are assumed to be 
dependent within subjects and independent between subjects. The hypotheses were tested by 
the Wald statistic that has a Chi-square distribution and results were reported in probabilities 
of cooperation in the MI- and MO group separately. 
Second, to understand how participants responded differently to subgroup 
composition under a visionary leader, we analyzed participants’ choice patterns - based on 
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their repeated choices in MI and MO respectively (C-C, C-D, D-C, D-D)
25
 - with a Chi-
square analysis. C-C and D-D choice patterns indicated consistent cooperation and  defection, 
respectively, in both MI and MO. C-D patterns indicated cooperation only when in-subgroup 
members were in the majority (MI), not when out-subgroup members were in the majority 
(MO). D-C patterns indicated cooperation only when out-subgroup members were in the 
majority (MO), not when in-subgroup members were in the majority (MI).  
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Manipulation checks.  
We checked the group composition manipulation with four items, in the MI group and 
MO group separately. Participants were asked to indicate how many of the members of their 
own subgroup (including themselves) they expected to ‘stick to the current production level’ 
and how many they expected to ‘reduce the production’. They also indicated how many of 
the members of the other subgroup they expected to ‘stick’ and how many they expected to 
‘reduce’. All participants comprehended that the 10-p. group consisted of 7 in-subgroup 
members and 3 out-subgroup members in condition MI (Majority Ingroup), and that the 10-p. 
group consisted of 3 in-subgroup members and 7 out-subgroup members in condition MO 
(Majority Outgroup). 
A Pearson chi-square test showed that the manipulation of leader affiliation was 
successful (χ² [1, n = 173] = 82.91, p < .001). Participants correctly indicated in the visionary 
in-subgroup leader condition that the leader originated from their own institute. Participants 
in the visionary out-subgroup leader condition reported the leader to originate from the other 
institute
26
.  
                                                          
25 C denoting a Cooperative choice (‘limit production’) and D denoting a Defective choice (‘stick to the current production’) 
26 In a pilot study (n = 158) we measured the extent to which group members perceived their leader to be prototypical for the 
MI group and for the MO group, with 2 items (α = .89) on a 5-point scale (e.g. “The leader of this group has a lot in 
common with the group members”). Participants perceived the ingroup leader to be more prototypical for the MI group (M = 
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Cooperative choice behavior.  
Order effect. The counterbalanced order of presenting the MI group (7-3) and MO 
group (3-7) did not yield a different pattern of results (B = -.20, Wald χ² = 1.25, p < .26). 
Cooperation probabilities were very similar in the MI-MO order (.39) as in the MO-MI order 
(.44).  
Hypothesis 1: Subgroup composition. As predicted, there was a strong main effect of 
subgroup composition on cooperation (B = .90, Wald χ² (1) = 35.79,  p < .001), indicating that 
in the MI group (.55) participants made significantly more cooperative choices than in the 
MO group (.33), i.e. difference of 22%
27
.  
Hypothesis 2: Visionary leadership. There was a main effect of leadership on 
cooperation (Wald χ² (2) = 5.91, p < .05), in which both visionary leadership conditions 
yielded more cooperation in participants than the control (superordinate goal) condition (.35). 
Participants made significantly more cooperative choices under a visionary in-subgroup 
leader (.48) (B = .54, Wald χ² (1) = 3.79,  p < .05) and under a visionary out-subgroup leader 
(.47) (B = .56, Wald χ² (1) = 4.96,  p < .03). Hypothesis 2 was thus confirmed. Whether the 
leader of the group was affiliated with the in-subgroup (visionary in-subgroup leader) or the 
out-subgroup (visionary out-subgroup leader) had no effect on the cooperation rates (B = 
.018, Wald χ² (1) = .005,  p < .94).  
Hypothesis 3: Interaction Subgroup composition x Leader affiliation. Participants 
made more cooperative choices toward the MI group than toward the MO group, but this did 
not differ across the conditions (Wald χ² (2) = 1.99,  p < .36) (Table 4.1).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3.38, SD = .85 ) than the outgroup leader (M = 2.53, SD = .93, F (1, 156) = 36.65, p < .001). They indicated the outgroup leader 
to be more prototypical for the MO group (M = 3.21, SD = .92) than the ingroup leader (M = 2.54, SD = .68 , F (1, 156) = 
26.47, p < .001). 
In this pilot study we also explored the extent to which leader vision was clear to the group members, with one item (“The 
group leader wants to make cooperation successful in both 10-p. groups with the prospect of a long-term collaboration”). In 
both leadership conditions, scores were high and there was no significant difference in ratings under the ingroup leader (M = 
4.29, SD = .80) and the outgroup leader (M = 4.09, SD = .74 , F (1, 156) = 1.18, p < .11). 
 
27 For the ease of interpretation the magnitude of all effects are reported in probabilities instead of Odds ratios (Exp (B)).  
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Table 4.1. Probabilities of cooperation in the MI group and the MO group under a visionary 
in-subgroup leader and a visionary out-subgroup leader, compared to the control condition 
(n = 253) 
 MI MO 
Control (superordinate goal) .46 .24 
Visionary in-subgroup leader .61 .35 
Visionary out-subgroup leader .55 .40 
 
As a first step in testing Hypothesis H3A, we compared cooperation levels in the 
visionary in-subgroup leader condition and the visionary out-subgroup leader condition both 
to the control condition (superordinate goal). Results showed that the difference in 
cooperation toward MI and MO was fairly equal in the visionary in-subgroup leader 
condition (.26) and control condition (.22 ) (B = .04, Wald χ² (1) = .19,  p < .66)
28
. There was 
also no significant difference in cooperation toward MI and MO between the visionary out-
subgroup leader condition (.15) and the control (.22) condition (B = - .07, Wald χ² (1) = .69,  p 
< .47),   
As a first step in testing Hypothesis H3B, we compared cooperation levels in the visionary in-
subgroup leader condition (.26) to the visionary out-subgroup leader condition (.15). These 
conditions were not significantly different from one another (B = .11, Wald χ² (1) = 1.73,  p < 
.18).   
A second step in testing H3A and H3B was to perform an analysis of the choice 
patterns to understand the impact of leadership on group members’ decisions to cooperate in 
                                                          
28
 The probabilities obtained from the GEE analyses are calculated via the accumulated frequencies of participants’ 
cooperative choices in the MI and MO group. To obtain the probability of cooperation in the MI group under a visionary in-
subgroup leader the frequencies of C-C and C-D choices are summed / frequency of all pps. under a visionary leader = .61. 
To obtain the probability of cooperation in the MO group under a visionary in-subgroup leader the frequencies of C-C and 
D-C choices are summed / frequency of all pps. under a visionary leader = .35. 
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both MI- and MO groups. Choice patterns (MI-MO) were generated by placing participants’ 
choice in the MI group before that in the MO group. There was no significant interaction 
effect of order with group composition and leadership (B = - .31, Wald χ2 (1) = .17, p < .68). 
Consequently, this recoding strategy could be reliably executed. Table 4.2 shows the 
frequencies of all choice patterns per experimental condition. 
 
Table 4.2. Choice patterns for visionary in-subgroup leadership, visionary out-subgroup 
leadership, and the control condition (n = 253) 
  
C-C 
 
C-D D-C D-D 
Control  
(superordinate goal) 
 
16.3% 
 
 
30% 
 
 
7.5% 
 
 
46.3% 
 
     
Visionary in-subgroup 
leader  
27.4% 33.7% 7.4% 31.6% 
 
Visionary out-subgroup 
Leader 
 
33.3% 21.8% 6.4% 38.5% 
 
In the control condition, most participants did not cooperate with either MI or MO 
(D-D = 46.3%) or cooperated only with the MI group (C-D = 30%). When a visionary in-
subgroup leader was introduced, participants showed more cooperation with both MI and 
MO (C-C) (+ 11.1%), less defection toward both groups (D-D) (- 14.7%), and a similar level 
of C-D choices (+ 3.7%), compared to the control condition (χ² (3) = 5.04,  p < .08). The 
presence of a visionary out-subgroup leader resulted in more C-C choices (+17%), less D-D 
choices (-7.8%), and less C-D choices (-8.2%), compared to the control condition (χ² (3) = 
6.25,  p < .05).  
In sum, Hypothesis H3A was partly confirmed: visionary leadership did not reduce 
group members’ sensitivity to subgroup composition, but it did increase consistent 
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cooperation (C-C), and it did reduce consistent defection (D-D). There was no significant 
difference in choice patterns between the visionary in-subgroup leader and the visionary out-
subgroup leader (χ² (3) = 3.22,  p < .20). Hypothesis H3B was not confirmed. 
Additional measures 
(Sub)group identification. 
Participants identified more with in-subgroup members than with out-subgroup 
members, and this was true in the control condition (M = 3.34, SD = .99 vs. M = 1.98, SD = 
.64) (t (79) = 11.47, p < .0001), under a visionary in-subgroup leader (M = 3.66, SD = .86 vs. 
M = 2.22, SD = .84) (t (94) = 12.01, p < .0001) and under a visionary out-subgroup leader (M = 
3.61, SD = .77 vs. M = 2.15, SD = .76) (t (76) = 12.64,  p < .0001). Group members also  
identified more with the MI group than with the MO group, in the control condition (M = 
3.08, SD = .93 vs. M = 2.40, SD = .88) (t (63) = 6.54, p < .0001), under a visionary in-
subgroup leader (M = 3.49, SD = .80 vs. M = 2.53, SD = .77) (t (94) = 10.47, p < .0001), and 
under a visionary out-subgroup leader (M = 3.31, SD = .86 vs. M = 2.53, SD = .80) (t (77) = 
6.80, p < .0001). 
Identification with the in-subgroup differed across the experimental conditions (F (2, 
250) = 2.76, p < .06): Identification with the in-subgroup was stronger under a visionary in-
subgroup leader than in the control condition (Mdiff = .30, SE = .13, p < .05), and stronger 
under a visionary out-subgroup leader than in the control condition (Mdiff = .25, SE = .14, p < 
.07).  
Identification with the out-subgroup also differed across the experimental conditions 
(F (2, 250) = 2.12, p < .12): Identification with the out-subgroup was stronger under a visionary 
in-subgroup leader than in the control condition (Mdiff = .24, SE = .12, p < .05), but not 
significantly stronger under a visionary out-subgroup leader than in the control condition 
(Mdiff = .15, SE = .12, p < .21).  
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Identification with the MI group differed across the experimental conditions (F (2, 250) 
= 4.21, p < .01): Identification with the MI group was stronger under a visionary in-subgroup 
leader than in the control condition (Mdiff = .38, SE = .13, p < .01), but not significantly 
stronger under a visionary out-subgroup leader than in the control condition (Mdiff = .20, SE = 
.14, p < .15). Identification with the MO group did not differ significantly across the 
experimental conditions (F (2, 250) = .51, p < .60).  
Cooperative expectations.  
In the MI group participants expected more in-subgroup members to cooperate (M = 
.59, SD = .31) than in the MO group (M = .34, SD = .36; t (244) = 10.54, p < .0001). Similarly, 
in the MO group did participants expect more out-subgroup members to cooperate (M = .56, 
SD = .29) than in the MI group (M = .39, SD = .34; t (244) = 5.69, p < .0001).   
Expectations about other in-subgroup members’ cooperation in the MI group did not 
differ significantly across the experimental conditions (F (2,250) = 1.21, p < .30), neither did 
expectations about other in-subgroup members’ cooperation in the MO group (F (2,250) = .75, 
p < .47), or expectations about out-subgroup members’ cooperation in the MI group (F (2,250) 
= 1.93, p < .15), or expectations about out-subgroup members’ cooperation in the MO group 
(F (2,250) = .34, p < .71).  
Leader’s concern for subgroup interests. 
 Participants expected a visionary in-subgroup leader to be more concerned with the 
interests of the in-subgroup (M = 3.20, SD = 1.01) than a visionary out-subgroup leader (M = 
2.82, SD = .96, F (1,171) = 6.33, p < .01). Similarly, they expected a visionary out-subgroup 
leader to be more concerned with the interests of the out-subgroup (M = 3.42, SD = .97), than 
a visionary in-subgroup leader (M = 2.65, SD = .78; F (1, 171) = 25.43, p < .0001). 
Leader identification. 
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Participants’ identification with the leader was somewhat higher under a visionary in-
subgroup leader (M = 2.88, SD = .94) than under a visionary out-subgroup leader (M = 2.63, 
SD = .99; F (1, 171) = 3.00, p < .09), but not significantly. 
Inter-subgroup bias: members’ concern for personal and collective interests (Table 4.3). 
 Expectations about other in-subgroup members’ concern for collective interests 
differed across the experimental conditions (F (2, 252) = 3.55, p < .05): Participants expected 
other in-subgroup members to attend more to collective interests under a visionary in-
subgroup leader (MD = .38, SE = .14, p < .01), and under a visionary out-subgroup leader 
(MD = .22, SE = .15, p < .14 ), compared to the control condition. 
Expectations about other in-subgroup members’ concern for personal interests also 
differed across the experimental conditions (F (2, 252) = 7.44, p < .001): Participants expected 
other in-subgroup members to attend less to personal interests under a visionary in-subgroup 
leader (MD = -.59, SE = .16, p < .0001) and under a visionary out-subgroup leader (MD = -
.46, SE = .17, p < .01), compared to the control condition. 
Expectations about out-subgroup members’ concern for collective interests differed 
across the experimental conditions, though non-significantly (F (2, 252) = 1.46, p < .24): 
Participants expected out-subgroup members to attend more to collective interests under a 
visionary in-subgroup leader (MD = .23, SE = .15, p < .13), and under a visionary out-
subgroup leader (MD = .23, SE = .16, p < .15) compared to the control condition.  
Expectations about out-subgroup members’ concern for personal interests differed 
across the experimental conditions, though non-significantly (F (2, 252) = 1.95, p < .15): 
Participants expected out-subgroup members to attend less to personal interests under a 
visionary in-subgroup leader (MD = -.18, SE = .15, p < .25) and under a visionary out-
subgroup leader (MD = -.32, SE = .16, p < .05), compared to the control condition. 
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Table 4.3. Means and Standard Deviations of concern for personal and collective interests 
expected from in-subgroup and out-subgroup members in the three experimental conditions 
 
Control  
(superordinate 
goal) 
Visionary in-subgroup 
leader 
 
Visionary out-subgroup 
leader 
 
In-subgroup M                SD M                SD M                SD 
Personal interests 3.49            1.03 2.89            1.12 3.04            .97 
Collective interests 2.66            .94 3.04            .97 2.88            .90 
Out-subgroup M                SD M                SD M                SD 
Personal interests 3.52            1.03 3.35            1.02 3.21            .98 
Collective interests 2.54            .93 2.77            1.07 2.78            .98 
 
Exploratory Mediation Analysis 
Simple mediation: Group composition. To gain more insight into the relationships 
between group composition, group identification, cooperative expectations of in-subgroup 
and out-subgroup, and choice behavior, we conducted an exploratory mediation analysis. 
Current statistical techniques do not allow yet to conduct the analysis with clustered data 
(time in individual) and a binary outcome variable in the model. Consequently, we analyzed 
the effects of the first group composition in which participants made their choice, in either the 
MI group or the MO group. This procedure eliminated the repeatedness from the design 
which allowed to test for mediation effects with the PROCESS procedure of Hayes (2013). 
Group composition at Time 1 (MI or MO), and Choice at Time 1 (cooperation or defection) 
were defined as the predictor and outcome variable respectively. The variables ‘identification 
with the MI group’, ‘identification with the MO group’, ‘cooperative expectations of in-
subgroup members’, and ‘cooperative expectations of out-subgroup members’ were included 
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as parallel mediators in the model. Indirect effects were calculated as the products of the 
estimates (ab) of the effect of the factor on the mediator (a), and the effect of the mediator on 
the dependent variable (b). Whether the indirect effects were significant was determined via 
the bootstrapping confidence intervals.  
Results from the simple mediation analysis showed that group composition indirectly 
influenced cooperative choice through its effects on identification with the MI group, on 
identification with the MO group, and on cooperative expectations about in-subgroup and 
out-subgroup members. In the MI group participants showed stronger group identification (a1 
= .79, p < .0001), they expected more cooperation of in-subgroup members (a2 = .18, p < 
.0001), and they expected less cooperation of out-subgroup members (a3 = -.17, p < .0001). 
Participants who identified more strongly with their group (b1 = .48, p < .01), who expected 
more cooperation of in-subgroup members (b2 = 2.72, p < .0001) and more cooperation of 
out-subgroup members (b3 = 1.23, p < .01), all showed more cooperation towards their group. 
The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects based on 5000 
bootstrap samples did not include zero, which indicated significance of the effects (for ab1 = 
.38: .71 to .14; for ab2 = .50: .76 to .28; for ab3 = .21: .07 to .41 respectively).  
Simple mediation: Visionary leadership. To test whether the effect of visionary 
leadership on choice related either to group identification, to cooperative expectations, or to 
both we conducted another simple mediation analysis, comparing the control condition to the 
(visionary) leadership conditions. To control for the effect of group composition, this variable 
was included in the model as a covariate. The simple mediation analysis showed that leader 
vision indirectly influenced cooperative choice through its effect on identification with the 
MI group, and on identification with the MO group, but not through its effect on cooperative 
expectations of in-subgroup and out-subgroup members. Participants showed stronger 
identification with the 10-p. group under a visionary leader, compared to the control 
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condition (a1 = .28, p < .05), but they did not expect significantly more cooperation from in-
subgroup members (a2 = .05, p < .33), or significantly more cooperation from out-subgroup 
members (a3 = .04, p < .35) under a visionary leader. Participants who identified more with 
their 10-p. group (b1 = .44, p < .05), who expected more cooperation from in-subgroup 
members (b2 = 2.73, p < .0001) and more cooperation from out-subgroup members (b3 = 
1.22, p < .05), all showed more cooperation with their 10-p. group. The bias-corrected 
bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects based on 5000 bootstrap samples did 
not include zero for group identification, which indicated significance of the indirect effect of 
leader vision via group identification only (for ab1 = .12: .02 to .31; for ab2 = .13: .09 to .33; 
for ab3 = -.05: -.02 to -.17 respectively). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This study integrated findings from faultline and diversity literature (e.g. Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010) with theory on charismatic and visionary 
leadership (e.g. Bass, 2008), inter-group leadership (e.g. Pittinsky & Simon, 2007), and social 
identity processes in leadership (e.g. Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; Haslam, 
Reicher, & Platow, 2011) to investigate the effects of visionary leadership and leader 
affiliation on group members’ cooperation levels in a faultline-based group. To date, research 
on group faultlines and leadership is scarce, although the presence of a leader can determine 
whether diversity positively or negatively affects team functioning (Joshi & Roh, 2009; van 
Knippenberg et al., 2004; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Also, the impact of 
leadership on cooperation in nested- and crossed-groups social dilemmas has remained 
unexplored, despite the theoretical underpinnings for its effects. Our study is one of the first 
that provides a test of the effects of visionary leadership and leader affiliation on cooperation 
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levels in a faultline-based group, where group members need to deal with a crossed-groups 
social dilemma due to subgroupings. 
Results indicated that group members showed parochial cooperation, i.e., more 
cooperation toward a heterogeneous group with a majority of in-subgroup members than 
toward a heterogeneous group with a majority of out-subgroup members. Visionary 
leadership combined with a superordinate goal for the group increased members’ overall 
cooperation with the  group, over and above faultline deactivation with a superordinate goal. 
Moreover, a visionary leader could, to a certain extent, attenuate the negative effects 
associated with recategorization via a superordinate goal. Leader affiliation with either 
subgroup did not have an effect on cooperation levels in the factional group.  
Subgroup composition 
In line with previous research by De Pauw and colleagues (2013), we replicated the 
effect of subgroup composition on cooperation in a faultline-based group. Again, 
identification levels were driving group members’ decisions to cooperate or not. Stronger 
identification with the in-subgroup and the MI group (in which this subgroup was nested as a 
majority), compared to the out-subgroup and the MO group, indicated (sub)group favoritism 
(Hewstone et al., 2002; Turner, 1987). Also, according to goal expectation theory (Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977), group members acted in line with their expectations of what others would do. 
The expectation that members of the in-subgroup would cooperate more in the MI (Majority 
Ingroup) group than in the MO (Majority Outgroup) group, and the majority presence of in-
subgroup members with whom they identified more strongly in the MI group were related to 
higher cooperation levels in the MI group than in the MO group. Results of the exploratory 
mediation analysis confirmed the significant indirect effect of group composition on 
cooperative choice, both via group identification and cooperative expectations. 
Visionary leadership 
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In heterogeneous groups with a strong faultline, the presence of inter(sub)group bias 
is mainly associated with this faultline splitting up the group in an in-subgroup and an out-
subgroup (Li & Hambrick, 2005). Several solutions to address the negative effects of 
subgroupings have been proposed in previous research, linked to faultline deactivation to 
minimize the salience of the activated faultline in the group (e.g. Carton & Cummings, 2012; 
Van der Kamp et al., 2012). The introduction of a superordinate goal for the faultline-based 
group could minimize group members’ sensitivity for the subgroup composition, resulting in 
more consistent cooperation (De Pauw et al., 2013). However, this process also resulted in a 
significant amount of group members consistently not cooperating (D-D choice pattern), 
mainly due to decategorization processes. The current study showed that the introduction of a 
visionary leader could significantly reduce identity threat and inter-subgroup bias, associated 
with the presence of a superordinate goal. 
First, under a visionary leader, group members expected other members of the group 
to increase their concern for the collective interests and to attach less importance to their 
personal interests. They expected this shift of both in-subgroup and out-subgroup members, 
in similar levels. Second, under a visionary leader, group members’ identification levels with 
the in-subgroup, with the out-subgroup, and with the MI group all rose significantly. So, 
participants showed less bias between in-subgroup and out-subgroup members, expected 
more concern overall for the collective interests of the group, and showed stronger 
identification with the group under a visionary leader. Also, group members showed more 
cooperation in the faultline-based group under a visionary leader. Consequently, the presence 
of a visionary leader can be considered as a context that allowed the superordinate goal to 
thrive better (cf. Crisp et al., 2010). The finding that the visionary leader promoted stronger 
identification with the group, was in line with previous research (Kark, Shamir, & Chen, 
1993) and showed the potential of a visionary leader to enhance feelings of identification, 
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connection, and involvement with other group members, independent of their affiliation (see 
also Reicher et al., 2005; Shamir et al., 1993).  
An exploratory mediation analysis confirmed the indirect effect of visionary 
leadership on cooperative choice, however only for group identification, and not for 
cooperative expectations. In sum, a visionary leader increased identification with the group, 
made participants expect from other group members more concern for collective interests and 
less concern for personal interests, and increased cooperation levels with the group.  
The fact that group members less sharply distinguished their concern for personal and 
group interests (cf. De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984; Polzer, 2004; Taifel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987; Wit & 
Kerr, 2002), indicated that the effects of visionary leadership could be explained by the goal 
transformation mechanism. In line with prior research, where a superordinate goal for the 
group - in the absence of a visionary leader - did impact identification with the group (De 
Pauw et al., 2013), these findings bring reason to bear that a superordinate goal only – not 
supported by a leadership vision – indeed is insufficiently powerful to motivate members of a 
faultline-based group to act cooperatively beyond their subgroupings. 
Although cooperation levels in the faultline-based groups were significantly higher 
under a visionary leader than in the control condition, still a fair amount of group members 
showed cooperation only when their in-subgroup was in the majority. Also, identification 
levels with the MO group were not significantly stronger under a visionary leader. Visionary 
leadership, in combination with a superordinate goal, thus could not entirely desensitize 
members for (sub)group composition to the extent that parochial cooperation levels reduced 
significantly. Group members were triggered more by the (sub)group composition than by the 
leader’s vision for the future of the group. Prior research, where transformational leaders 
were perceived to emphasize vague and distant goals (Shamir et al., 1993), could explain why 
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some group members did not act in line with this (long-term) vision. Followers may be more 
affected by a visionary leader if they have beneficiary contacts that expose them to the 
concrete effects of the leader’s vision (Grant & Berry, 2012; Grant et al., 2007). Also, to 
enhance inter(sub)group relationships in faultline-based groups, promoting positive 
inter(sub)group contact is essential (Allport, 1954; Polzer et al., 2006), preferably combined 
with group members working together on a superordinate goal to decrease inter(sub)group 
bias (Gaertner et al., 2000; Sherif et al., 1961). Consequently, our study provided a 
conservative test of the impact of visionary leadership in faultline-based groups.  
A fruitful avenue for future research would be to test in a follow-up vignette study or 
lab experiment the effects of leader vision - in combination with faultline (de)activation via a 
superordinate goal - by comparing cooperation levels in the faultline-based group under a 
visionary leader to those under another type of leader (for example transactional leadership), 
or to cooperation levels under a leader with no vision. Measuring cooperative behavior as a 
(Likert-) scaled outcome variable – rather than as a binary categorical variable – will increase 
power to estimate this three-way interaction. Data are then analyzed with the repeated-
measures ANOVA procedure, instead of with the Generalized Estimating Equations 
procedure. The design of this study allows to investigate the specific effect of leader vision 
and relate it to cooperation levels in the faultline-based group. 
In a next phase, we could investigate leader vision in a field experimental setting, 
where group members relate to a leader in position, have inter(sub)group contacts and 
potentially observe the vision’s effects on beneficiaries. Followers will be more affected by a 
leader’s vision if they have beneficiary contacts that expose them to the concrete effects of 
the leader’s vision (Grant, 2012; Grant et al., 2007). And, to enhance inter(sub)group 
relationships in faultline-based groups, promoting positive inter(sub)group contact is essential 
(Allport, 1954; Polzer et al., 2006), preferably combined with group members working 
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together on a superordinate goal to decrease inter(sub)group bias (Gaertner et al., 2000; 
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). 
 
However, a certain ‘threshold’ level of parochialism and in-subgroup favoritism is 
most likely very difficult or even impossible to overcome. Some employees will be more 
resistant to recategorization and to cooperation with the faultline-based group, which requires 
them to act beyond subgroupings. To a certain extent, it might even be desirable to maintain 
people’s primary (sub)group identification (Wit & Kerr, 2002) – with its associated 
(sub)group processes of bias and ingroup love - because identification with and belonging to 
a (sub)group is an essential psychological process for motivation at work (Ashforth, Harrison, 
& Corley, 2008; Ellemers et al., 2004).  
Leader affiliation 
Visionary leadership increased cooperation levels in a faultline-based group 
significantly, but the subgroup affiliation of this leader had no distinct impact. Cooperation 
levels were very similar in groups with a visionary leader with in-subgroup affiliation or out-
subgroup affiliation. Nevertheless did group members themselves anticipate there to be 
differences in cooperation, based on the visionary leader’s affiliation: Subgroup members 
would cooperate more under a leader that was affiliated to their own subgroup. And the 
visionary leader would attend more to the interests of the subgroup with which he is 
affiliated.  To mobilize individual efforts toward collective goals, group members’ perception 
of a common identity with their leader is crucial (Ellemers et al., 2004). Our study showed 
that members felt equally connected to their visionary leader, regardless of his affiliation.  
Also, although under a visionary leader identification with the groups increased, there 
was no difference in these identification levels between a visionary leader affiliated with the 
in-subgroup or the out-subgroup. These results were in line with prior findings where the 
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leader’s vision dominated his representativeness. Compared to representative leaders, 
visionary leaders could inspire greater willingness to participate in collective action (Bono & 
Ilies, 2006), and group members tended to endorse a visionary but unrepresentative leader 
more than a representative but non-visionary leader (Halevy et al., 2011).  
We expected less cooperation under a visionary out-subgroup leader, but this leader 
could equally reassure group members with his concern for the superordinate group, a 
prerequisite for positive inter(sub)group relations and cooperation (Duck & Fielding, 1999, 
2003; Jetten, Duck, Terry, & O’Brien, 2002). Both visionary in-subgroup and out-subgroup 
leaders emphasized the importance of cooperation for a long-term collaboration, regardless of 
group members’ affiliation. The effect of a leader’s affiliation in the presence of subgroups 
might thus be contingent on the content of the leader’s vision. If the vision shows concern for 
the whole group – further minimizing the salience of subgroups – this might reduce the effect 
of subgroup affiliation, whereas a vision reflecting preoccupation with the subgroup interests 
most likely increases the impact of subgroup affiliation.  
The effect of leader subgroup affiliation might also depend on the status of the 
subgroups in the faultline-based group. Prior studies showed that low-status groups were 
more concerned with a leader’s premerger group affiliation than high-status groups (Jetten et 
al., 2002). Consequently, an in-subgroup affiliated leader might be more effective to increase 
cooperation of in-subgroup members toward the MO group (where the in-subgroup is a lower 
status group), whereas the leader’s out-subgroup affiliation might better address the concerns 
of out-subgroup members in the MI group (where the out-subgroup is a lower status group). 
On the other hand, when the leader would stress equality of the subgroups - assuaging 
concerns of ingroup favoritism – members might be less preoccupied by the leader’s 
subgroup affiliation (Jetten et al., 2002). Future research would benefit from the investigation 
of these different contingencies between leader vision, affiliation, and subgroup composition 
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to increase our understanding of effective inter(sub)group leadership in faultline-based 
groups.  
Nevertheless, when introducing a subgroup affiliated leader in a faultline-based 
group, this leader will always remain more representative for one subgroup than for the other, 
unless he has mutual affiliations with both subgroups. A boundary-spanning leader, because 
of his strong links and significant interactions with both in-subgroup and out-subgroup 
members, may have the ability to transform subgroup interest and detrimental competition 
between subgroups into collaboration and cooperation that optimizes inter-subgroup 
performance (Hogg et al., 2012). Duck and Fielding (1999) found that  nomination of a leader 
from one subgroup or the other divided rather than united members of the larger group, 
promoting identification at the subgroup level rather than at the superordinate group level. In 
addition, a leader’s subgroup affiliation was a hindrance to his effectiveness in leading the 
superordinate group. Subgroup members perceived leaders who were not aligned with either 
subgroup in particular to be more fair, more concerned for the interests of the superordinate 
group, and more impartial in their concern for the interests of the various subgroups.  
Managerial relevance 
Leaders of faultline-based groups need to deal with (activated) faultlines and 
subgroupings on a daily basis. During organizational changes and collaborations, such as 
mergers, alliances, and joint ventures, workgroups arise with members originating from 
different organizations or departments. Group members are then presented with the trade-off 
between self-interest, subgroup interests and group interest. The presence of a leader who 
motivates, supervises, and addresses relational and identity considerations can have a major 
impact on cooperation levels in these heterogeneous groups. Reducing the salience of 
subgroups with a superordinate goal can be an effective strategy to increase group 
cooperation, when combined with visionary leader behaviors. Leaders need to communicate a 
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clear, future-oriented vision for the group in line with the categorization of members as one 
group.  
However, rhetoric alone may not suffice. Establishing an inter-subgroup relational 
identity (cf. Hogg et al., 2012) via interactions with both subgroups, addressing mutual 
concerns, and especially the display of role behavior, may be essential to increase 
considerations for and cooperation with the larger group. Group members might not feel that 
strongly about the leader’s affiliations with either subgroup, as long as he has a strong vision 
on the future of the group and the importance of collaborations. When delegating a leader to a 
newly formed heterogeneous group, management could opt for either an external visionary 
leader with no subgroup affiliations, an internal visionary leader with subgroup affiliations, or 
a visionary leader that ties into both subgroups. Future research should investigate whether 
the latter type of leader is better capable to balance identity concerns – because of his 
affiliation with both (or more) subgroups - which would allow the leader’s vision to capitalize 
on the positive effects of diversity and maximize cooperation with the faultline-based group. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Vignette Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma Game 
“Imagine all ten of you being the manager of one of ten private firms producing product X. In 
order to increase your profits, you all have just made large private investments to heighten the 
production capacity of product X. Because all ten of you did so, each in his or her own firm, 
the total production of X will soon exceed the public demand, resulting in a drop in prizes. 
You all have to choose between sticking to your present (high) production rate or reducing 
your production rate to a level under its present capacity. Firms producing at maximum 
capacity will always earn more profit than those reducing their production rate, irrespective 
of the number of other managers who decide to do so. However, the more firms that stick to 
their high production rates, the lower the profits all of you earn on product X: If all ten of you 
decide to stick to your high production rates, this will yield all of you a lower profit (10 
million Euros each) than if all of you decide to reduce your production rates (25 million 
Euros each). In the table below, you see how profits vary as a function of the decisions made 
in your 10-person group”.  
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Appendix 2. Pay-off matrix of the 10-p. Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma game 
 
 
Choice     Pay- off for “stick”   Pay-off for “reduce” 
configuration     (x million)   (x million) 
 
 
 0 STICK \         10 REDUCE   ---   25 
 1 STICK \  9 REDUCE   28   23 
 2 STICK  \  8 REDUCE   26   21 
 3 STICK  \   7 REDUCE   24   19 
 4 STICK  \   6 REDUCE   22   17 
 5 STICK  \   5 REDUCE   20   15 
 6 STICK   \   4 REDUCE    18   13 
 7 STICK  \   3 REDUCE   16   11 
 8 STICK  \   2 REDUCE   14     9 
 9 STICK   \   1 REDUCE   12     7 
10 STICK  \   0 REDUCE   10   --- 
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This dissertation set out to investigate antecedents of cooperative decision-making in 
heterogeneous groups, with subgroups divided by a faultline. In these groups, members have 
to deal with a crossed-groups social dilemma: they weigh individual, subgroup, and group 
interests simultaneously when deciding whether or not to contribute to the group.  
 
More specifically, we aimed to realize six research objectives. The first was to develop the 
crossed-groups social dilemma (CSD) game as a suitable experimental tool to study decision-
making in a faultline-based heterogeneous group. The second was to investigate with the 
CSD game the effect of group composition - how the present subgroups relate to each other 
in the group - on members’ decision to cooperate with the group. The third objective aimed to 
determine the extent to which prosocial and proself members’ cooperation levels differed, 
depending on the group composition. The fourth objective was to study the effect of faultline 
(de)activation as a way of attenuating the impact of group composition on cooperation levels. 
The fifth and sixth objective investigated the combined strategy of leadership and faultline 
deactivation on cooperation levels, focusing on the effect of visionary leadership and the 
leader’s affiliation. 
 
To this end, we conducted five experimental studies that were bundled in three papers. In 
these studies, we investigated the effects of both individual antecedents (social value 
orientation) and situational antecedents (faultline (de)activation, visionary leadership, and 
leader affiliation) of cooperation, in interaction with the composition of the heterogeneous 
faultline-based group. This concluding chapter discusses how our findings contribute to the 
social dilemma literature, the faultline literature, and the leadership literature, while 
identifying fruitful avenues for future research. We also address the methodological 
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contributions and limitations of the conducted studies. To conclude, we highlight the 
managerial implications of our findings. 
 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Contributions to the social dilemma literature 
First, although the effects of group composition and subgroups are well-documented in 
diversity and faultline literature, these findings have to our knowledge not yet been related to 
on cooperative decision-making in social dilemmas. Previous social dilemma research 
already showed that a focus on present subgroups results in decreasing contributions to the 
group (Polzer, Stewart, & Simmons, 1999; Polzer, 2004; Wit & Kerr, 2002). However, the 
link between subgroup composition, subgroup size, and cooperation with the group has to 
date been scarcely investigated.   
 
Second, our research indicates that, in general, members of a heterogeneous group, consisting 
of two distinct subgroups, prefer to cooperate when this group consisted of a majority of in-
subgroup members than when it consisted of a majority of out-subgroup members, which 
shows preference for the own subgroup. This is in line with prior social dilemma research 
where group members acted more in the subgroup’s interest and less in terms of the group’s 
interest, when they categorized themselves as members of the subgroup (Wit & Kerr, 2002). 
However, in our research, a significant proportion of (prosocial) participants chose to forfeit 
self-interest and cooperate with the group (C-C – consistent cooperation), despite strong 
subgroup identification (and more cooperative expectations of their in-subgroup than of the 
out-subgroup members). Other participants (proselves) acted selfishly toward the group (D-D 
consistent defection), and thus placed self-interest above (sub)group interest. These findings 
complement social dilemma research as they show that the presence of subgroups and 
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associated subgroup identification does not necessarily result in less attention for the 
collective interests in a social dilemma. 
 
Third, these studies also provided some new insights in the boundary conditions of social 
value orientation effects. From prior research we know that social value orientation will exert 
its effects mainly in situations of high uncertainty (de Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & de 
Cremer, 2006; Roch & Samuelson, 1997). Although the presence of a strong faultline – as a 
strong situation - usually would allow for little inter-personal differences in people’s behavior 
(Snyder & Ickes, 1985), prosocials acted in line with their tendency to cooperate more 
whereas proselves acted mostly selfish. These findings add to the literature showing that not 
all strong situations automatically lead to the suppression of behavior in line with individual 
social value orientation, but that it might depend on the type of situation. The degree to which 
prosocials and proselves will be influenced by the strength of the situation or perceive the 
situation as strong can differ. In prior research, proselves are found to act mostly self-
interested in a wide array of contexts, so they are most consistent in their behavior and less 
influenced by the context. Prosocials, on the other hand, revealed themselves in a context of 
mixed motives as attending more to their own (sub)group’s interests than to the collective 
interest (Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013). Future research should further 
investigate in which types of (strong) situations prosocials and proselves might act 
differently, and how strong they perceive the situation. 
 
Future research 
Another viable avenue for future research is to explicitly measure participants’ reasons to 
cooperate in the heterogeneous MI (Majority Ingroup) group and the MO (Majority 
Outgroup) group, next to group identification and cooperative expectations, to tease out the 
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motivational mechanism underlying prosocials’ and proselves’ decisions. This would offer 
more insight in their motives for consistent cooperation and consistent defection respectively.  
 
Also, the effects of social value orientation in crossed-groups social dilemmas might differ 
over time. In a one-shot game, participant choices are mostly a function of disposition, whereas 
in an iterated context with repeated rounds, behavior is not only a function of dispositional 
social motives but more so of other group members’ prior behavior (Balliet, Parks, & 
Joireman, 2009). The effects of SVO on cooperation in a crossed-groups social dilemma may 
alter over time, based on the feedback (given in between rounds) of others’ behavior. Prior 
research showed that co-operators and individualists assimilated the low level of cooperation 
of competitive partners, whereas competitor’s behavior did not change in response to another 
competitor (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). So, although SVO has 
been found to be a stable trait over time (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008), the presence of 
competitors in the group - even in a minority - could drastically shift cooperation rates (see 
also Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramírez-Marín, 2009) in crossed-groups social dilemmas 
and may shift prosocials’ C-C choices to D-D and C-D choices. Also, the effects of SVO will 
likely change as the group matures: reactions to other group members’ behavior might be 
different in the initial phase of group formation compared to when employees are more 
familiar with one another, and gained experience in working together.  
 
Contributions to the faultline literature 
First, most faultline research addresses the alignment of demographic characteristics and its 
impact on the formation of subgroups and team outcomes. However, there is a call to further 
investigation on faultlines composed of non-demographic attributes, such as workgroup 
members’ origin in factional groups (Li & Hambrick, 2005), and geographic work location 
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(e.g. Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006). Also, although faultlines can inhibit team 
processes, such as cooperative decision-making, to date the research on management of team 
faultlines has remained scarce (Rico, Sànchez-Manzanares, Antino, & Lau, 2012). Our 
research showed that the ingroup or outgroup signature of group members – as the basis for a 
strong faultline – has an impact on their cooperation with the group, with higher cooperation 
levels in case the in-subgroup is in the majority. Results also indicated that the presence of a 
leader, who deactivates the faultline and displays a long-term vision for the group, can 
stimulate members’ consistent cooperation and reduce consistent defection. In this way, we 
addressed both research gaps formulated above.  
 
Second, faultline and strategy literature recently introduced the conceptualization of mergers 
and alliances as social dilemmas causing tension between cooperation and competition (Li & 
Hambrick, 2005; Zeng & Chen, 2003). However, to date there is little investigation on how 
cooperation can be achieved and sustained in newly composed workgroups, although lack of 
cooperation is a main cause of the relatively high failure rate (Arino & de la Torre, 1988; 
Doz, 1996; Park & Russo, 1996; Teece, 1992; Ulrich & Van Dick, 2007; Yan & Zeng, 1999). 
Past research has focused mainly on the enhancement of cooperation at an organizational 
level, but little attention has been devoted to the implications for employees on the work floor 
being confronted with a conflict of interests in these heterogeneous faultline-based 
workgroups.  
Third, this study answers the call for research that investigates the effect of a superordinate 
goal when stronger faultlines are activated (Rico et al., 2012). We showed that superordinate 
goal-setting alone is not always the optimal strategy to promote inter-subgroup harmony and 
cooperation (cf. Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; González & Brown, 2003). Faultline 
deactivation with a superordinate goal - in the presence of distinct subgroups - resulted in a 
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process of decategorization (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) for participants who refuted 
cooperation with the groups. Due to the strong reduction in salience of subgroup distinctions, 
they categorized themselves at an individual level - not at a group level, as members of the 
group - and perceived themselves and other group members as individuals (Hewstone, Rubin, 
& Willis, 2002). Acting upon this decategorization, individuals attended to their self-interest 
and decided not to cooperate with the groups.  
 
Finally, we gained preliminary insight in the underlying mechanism of the group composition 
effect on cooperation levels in heterogeneous groups. Previous faultline and diversity studies 
already indicated that the effects of heterogeneous group composition on group- and 
individual performance and group member satisfaction are determined by the salience of a 
certain form of diversity (i.e. gender, organizational tenure, pre-merger organization of 
origin,…) experienced by group members (Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Jehn, Bezrukova, & 
Thatcher, 2007; Lawrence, 1997). Perceived differences even have a stronger effect on group 
outcomes than actual differences (Strauss, Barrick, & Connerley, 2001; Turban & Jones, 
1988). In our studies, the presence of a strong faultline - splitting up the group in an in-
subgroup and out-subgroup subgroup - led to social category diversity. We showed that 
(sub)group identifications clearly impacted cooperation levels in the heterogeneous group: 
participants identified more with the group consisting of a majority of in-subgroup members, 
and also attended more to the interests of this group. However, not only identification 
processes were determining cooperative choice, but also cooperative expectations about in-
subgroup and out-subgroup members. These findings were in line with prior research 
showing the correlation between expectations about other’s behavior and about cooperation 
in social dilemmas (Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Messick et al., 1983; Schroeder, 
Jensen, Reed, Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989; Wade-Benzoni, 
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Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996). Both (sub)group identification and cooperative expectations 
thus acted as parallel mediators of the group composition effect.  
 
Future research 
First, this study investigated cooperative decision-making in a strong faultline group with two 
distinct subgroups, based on social category diversity. In organizational teams, a variety of 
faultlines might arise based on other demographic characteristics such as educational 
background, gender, organizational tenure,… Prior research showed that alternative faultline 
bases were differentially associated with team outcomes (Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto, & 
Thatcher, 2009). Social-category based faultlines were negatively related to team 
performance and cooperation whereas information-based faultlines were not. So, taking into 
consideration other types of faultlines present in these heterogeneous groups might yield 
different effects on cooperation levels, compared to the social category based faultline alone. 
Future research should look into the interaction of several types of faultlines on cooperation 
levels in crossed-groups social dilemmas. It could be that for example informational 
faultlines act as a moderator on the effect of group composition, independently or in addition 
to social-category based faultlines, activating or deactivating the strong faultline in factional 
groups. 
 
Second, the presence of the two distinct subgroups, divided by a strong faultline, gave rise to 
complex inter-subgroup processes. To date there has been limited examination of inter-group 
processes within teams, more so between teams and organizations (see Zeng & Chen, 2003; 
McCarter, Mahoney, & Northcraft, 2011; Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000). Faultline 
deactivation processes, especially with identity based faultlines, are a double-edged sword 
with frequently both positive and negative effects on cooperation levels. Identifying other 
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contextual factors (such as leadership, power structures, subgroup trust, subgroup threat) as 
faultline deactivators, capable of accentuating positive inter-subgroup processes and avoiding 
negative inter-subgroup processes is a fruitful avenue for further research (see also Carton & 
Cummings, 2012).  
 
Third, prior research already showed that the size and number of subgroups can impact group 
processes and outcomes considerably (Harrison & Sin, 2005; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; 
Menon & Phillips, 2010; O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010; Polzer et al., 2006). Our studies 
investigated the effects of subgroup (numerical) majority and minority (MI and MO group) 
on cooperative decision making, keeping the number of subgroups (two) and total group size 
(10 members) constant. In teams, the number of faultlines will determine the number of 
subgroups, and the location of the faultline will determine variation in the size of subgroups, 
varying from equal size to small and large subgroups (Carton & Cummings, 2012). Future 
studies with the crossed-groups social dilemma may vary the number and size of subgroups 
and adapt group size. This would increase our understanding of boundary conditions of group 
heterogeneity and faultline (de)activation effects on cooperation within and between 
subgroups. 
 
Finally, the effect of number and type of subgroups on team performance and cooperation 
tends to change over time (Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010). Repeated (sub)group interactions may 
allow members to surmount their stereotypes and categorizations, diminishing the effects of 
faultlines on group processes (e.g. Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002; Jehn, Northcraft, 
& Neale, 1999).  Participants generally cooperate more in a multi-trial game than in a one-
trial game as it allows for group members to learn and understand the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with cooperation and defection (cf. goal expectation theory of Pruitt 
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& Kimmel, 1977) and build trust. Future research might be geared towards the set-up of 
repeated rounds crossed-groups social dilemma games with (bogus) feedback about 
(sub)group members’ decisions to better capture (sub)group dynamics over time and the 
mediating mechanisms that are in play. In combination with longitudinal field research in 
organizations undergoing a merger, an alliance this would allow to assess over-time effects of 
faultlines in several phases of the organizational and (sub)group change processes. 
 
Contributions to the leadership literature 
For group leaders and their organizations it is desirable to increase employees’ cooperation 
levels in all heterogeneous groups, regardless of their composition. Because strong faultlines 
divide these workgroups into separate subgroups and cause dysfunctional group processes 
(Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Choi & Sy, 2010; Jackson, Joshi, Erhardt, 2003; van 
Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007), the question is how to attenuate the negative effects of 
these faultlines and how to deal with subgroupings. 
 
Despite the increasing prevalence of faultline-based groups in the workforce, and the 
potential of leadership to capitalize on the positive effects of diversity, to date this connection 
has remained relatively unexplored. In this dissertation, we integrated findings from faultline 
and diversity literature (e.g. Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010) with theory 
on charismatic and visionary leadership (e.g. Bass, 2008), inter-group leadership (e.g. 
Pittinsky & Simon, 2007), and social identity processes in leadership (e.g. Hogg, 2001; Hogg 
& van Knippenberg, 2003; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011) to investigate the effects of 
visionary leadership and leader affiliation on group members’ cooperation levels in a 
faultline-based group.  
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To date, research has had limited attention for leadership across subgroups (Pittinsky & 
Simon, 2007) and the connection between group faultlines and leadership (Kunze & Bruch, 
2010; Rico et al., 2012), although the presence of a leader can determine whether diversity 
positively or negatively affects team functioning (Joshi & Roh, 2009; van Knippenberg et al., 
2004; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Also, the impact of leadership on cooperation in 
nested- and crossed-groups social dilemmas has remained unexplored.  
 
Our study is one of the first that provides a test of the effects of visionary leadership and 
leader affiliation on cooperation levels in a heterogeneous faultline-based group, where 
members need to deal with a crossed-groups social dilemma due to subgroupings. We 
showed that a visionary leader who deactivates the faultline via a superordinate goal - and 
thus minimizes subgroup categorization tendencies – has clear potential to increase 
cooperation levels and to minimize defection patterns in this group. The presence of a 
visionary leader could be considered as a context that allowed the superordinate goal to thrive 
better (cf. Crisp, Turner, & Hewstone, 2010). The finding that the visionary leader promoted 
stronger group identification, was in line with previous research (see Kark, Shamir, & Chen, 
1993) and showed the potential of a leader’s vision for the future of the group to enhance 
feelings of identification, connection, and involvement with other group members, regardless 
of their affiliation (see also Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 
1993). In this study, the (subgroup) affiliation of the leader had no effect on cooperation 
levels. 
 
Future research 
First, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to investigate  in a follow-up vignette 
study or lab experiment the effects of leader vision - in combination with faultline 
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(de)activation via a superordinate goal - by comparing cooperation levels in the faultline-
based group under a visionary leader to those under another type of leader (for example 
transactional leadership), or to cooperation levels under a leader with no vision. Measuring 
cooperative behavior as a (Likert-) scaled outcome variable – rather than as a binary 
categorical variable – will increase power to estimate this three-way interaction. Data are then 
analyzed with the repeated-measures ANOVA procedure, instead of with the Generalized 
Estimating Equations procedure. The design of this study allows to investigate the specific 
effect of leader vision and relate it to cooperation levels in the faultline-based group. 
In a next phase, we could investigate leader vision in a field experimental setting, where 
group members relate to a leader in position, have inter(sub)group contacts and potentially 
observe the vision’s effects on beneficiaries. Followers will be more affected by a leader’s 
vision if they have beneficiary contacts that expose them to the concrete effects of the 
leader’s vision (Grant, 2012; Grant et al., 2007). And, to enhance inter(sub)group 
relationships in faultline-based groups, promoting positive inter(sub)group contact is essential 
(Allport, 1954; Polzer et al., 2006), preferably combined with group members working 
together on a superordinate goal to decrease inter(sub)group bias (Gaertner et al., 2000; 
Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). 
 
Second, future research could investigate the effect of leader subgroup affiliation in relation 
to the status of the subgroups. Prior studies showed that low-status groups were more 
concerned with a leader’s premerger group affiliation than high-status groups. (Jetten, Duck, 
Terry, & O’Brien, 2002). Consequently, an in-subgroup affiliated leader might be more 
effective to increase cooperation of in-subgroup members toward the MO group (where the 
in-subgroup is a lower status group), whereas the leader’s out-subgroup affiliation might 
better address the concerns of out-subgroup members in the MI group (where the out-
  242 
subgroup is a lower status group). On the other hand, when the leader would stress equality of 
the subgroups - assuaging concerns of ingroup favoritism – members might be less 
preoccupied by the leader’s subgroup membership (Jetten et al., 2002). Future research would 
benefit from the investigation of these different contingencies between leader vision, 
affiliation, and subgroup composition to improve our understanding of effective 
inter(sub)group leadership in faultline-based groups.  
 
Third, when introducing a subgroup affiliated leader in a faultline-based group, this leader 
will always remain more representative for one subgroup than for the other, unless he has 
mutual affiliations with both subgroups. A boundary-spanning leader, because of his strong 
links and significant interactions with both in-subgroup and out-subgroup members, may 
have the ability to transform subgroup interest and detrimental competition between 
subgroups into collaboration and cooperation that optimizes inter-subgroup performance 
(Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012). Future research should look into the effects of 
introducing a boundary spanning leader in faultline-based groups.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Next to the theoretical contributions, this dissertation made some important methodological 
contributions as well.  
 
Methodological contributions 
First, we developed a new game theoretic paradigm to study cooperative decision-making in 
heterogeneous groups with subgroups, where members are confronted with conflicts of 
interest in crossed-groups social dilemmas. Previous games investigated either inter-group 
cooperation between a separated ingroup and outgroup, or intragroup cooperation with 
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subgroups nested in a homogeneous group. In the Crossed-Groups Social Dilemma game, we 
modeled an ingroup subgroup and an outgroup subgroup in a heterogeneous group. This 
significantly extends the possibilities to simulate and investigate decision-making in diverse 
groups. Measuring cooperation levels repeatedly in different group compositions generated 
choice patterns and allowed to determine which composition would yield the most 
cooperation. To date, the impact of group composition on cooperative decision-making in 
social dilemmas is scarcely researched.   
 
Second, we conducted five experimental studies, of which two were aimed at replicating the 
established effects of social value orientation (Paper 1) and faultline (de)activation (Paper 2). 
As such, we gained a significant total sample size (n = 1418), and we can be confident about 
the robustness of our findings. 
 
Third, we ensured the reliability and validity of the vignette that was used, in several ways. 
We checked the involvement and commitment of the participants with an open-ended 
question, asking them to motivate their choice to limit production or to continue to produce at 
the same level. The answers to this question also allowed to check participants’ 
understanding on the content of the vignette (cover story). In addition, we included a check 
on participants’ understanding of the pay-off matrix and the group composition. All 
participants comprehended that the 10-p. group of managers consisted of either 7 in-subgroup 
managers and 3 out-subgroup managers (in the MI group), or of 3 in-subgroup managers and 
7 out-subgroup managers (in the MO group). The few participants that did not comprehend 
the pay-off matrix were excluded from further analyses. Also, the use of different populations 
for our studies - with both psychology and economics/business students - and the fact that the 
obtained results were similar in these populations, strengthened reliability claims.  
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Methodological limitations 
Although this dissertation has made several theoretical and methodological contributions, 
there are also a number of methodological limitations to be addressed.  
 
The exploratory mediation analyses we conducted with the PROCESS procedure of Hayes 
(2013) were limited in two ways. First, we analyzed the effects of the first group composition 
in which participants made their choice - in either the MI group or the MO group - on 
cooperation levels. This procedure eliminated the repeatedness from the design which may 
yield different results than when we conducted the mediation analysis on group composition 
as a within-subjects factor. However, because the current statistical techniques do not allow 
yet to conduct the analysis with clustered data (time in individual) and a binary outcome 
variable in the model, this procedure was most viable to gain (preliminary) evidence on the 
relationships between group composition, identification, cooperative expectations, and 
cooperation. Even more so, this procedure is to be preferred above the causal steps strategy of 
Baron and Kenny (1986), which shows some significant limitations and is no longer 
commonly accepted. The most serious criticism relates to the fact that inferences about the 
indirect effect should be based on an estimate of the indirect effect ab, not on the outcome of 
a set of hypothesis tests about a and b separately (Hayes, 2013).  
 
Second, group members’ identification and cooperative expectations were measured after 
they had made a cooperative and/or competitive choice. Clearly, these choices might have 
influenced the reports of participants’ perceptions and can be linked to post-hoc justification 
(Messé & Sivacek, 1979). Also, we should be cautious about making causal inferences since 
the cause did not precede the effect in time and alternative causal explanations may be in 
place. Nevertheless, the measurement of perceptions after the choice and not after the 
manipulation was a deliberate strategy as we wanted to prevent that these explicit measures - 
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where items were sometimes framed in line with the manipulation - could confound the 
manipulation or even overrule it.  
 
Another methodological limitation of this research relates to the use of the experimental 
game as research method. On the one hand, experimental games have been very popular 
research tools for a variety of reasons. They yield precise behavioral measures of the 
concepts under study, as opposed to questionnaire measures, and are less sensitive to social 
desirability. They also provide the means to formally describe the type of social 
interdependence one is interested in and are relatively easy to administer (Pruitt & Kimmel, 
1977). On the other hand, the gaming paradigm has been criticized for making too much 
abstraction of real life situations in which group members usually know each other, are able 
to exchange information or to communicate about their goals or motives. Also, this method of 
experimental research mostly uses student samples, which may raise questions about the 
external validity or generalizability of findings (Nemeth, 1972; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002; van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013).  
Nevertheless, whether the experimental setting and procedure resemble phenomena that 
occur in the real world is secondary to “experimental realism”, where the experimental 
setting and procedure capture the intended essence of the constructs of interest (Colquitt, 
2008). This realism allows to establish valid causal relationships, which is most important in 
scientific research, and for which the experimental method is most suitable (Mook, 1983). 
 
In addition, several meta-analyses (Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999; Cohen-Carash & 
Spector, 2001) have shown that there is a high degree of generalizability from the lab to the 
field. In other words, we may trust that the results of highly controlled experimental studies 
can be replicated in the field.  To reinforce this claim, we believe the most important strategy 
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is to engage in “a full-cycle approach” to conducting research (Chatman & Flynn, 2005). This 
research strategy combines observation of naturally occurring phenomena with manipulation-
based research settings to establish the power and generality of these phenomena along the 
way. We cannot automatically assume that field research is better apt to avoid the problems 
of relying on one methodological approach, or that the results obtained with a field research 
method are more valid than those from experimental research. Moreover, problems such as 
social desirability with self-reported questionnaire measures (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003), the measurement of intentions and not actual behavior (Colquitt, 2008), the 
unmeasured variables problem (James, 1980), and flawed causality inference (Shadish et al.,  
2002) are typically associated with field research.  
 
Post-doc research 
To address the concern with generalizability and the potential limitations of the experimental 
research method, we also conducted a field study, aimed at testing the results from our 
experiments in the field. We surveyed employees and team leaders (n = 215) in two large 
healthcare organizations undergoing a merger, giving rise to newly composed teams. We 
investigated the effect of faultline activation (the extent to which team members perceive 
subgroups) and faultline strength (the extent of a (demographic) alignment across members 
within a group) on individual cooperation levels. Cooperation was measured as team 
members’ organizational citizenship behavior toward other team members (OCB-I) and 
toward their post-merger organization (OCB-O), and as perceived conflict in the team (task, 
process, and relationship). In the same line of the experimental studies, we studied whether 
this relationship was moderated by social value orientation, social categorization processes 
(identification with the subgroups and with the team), and/or leadership type (vision and 
prototypicality of the leader). We obtained multiple source data as team managers reported on 
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the outcome measures of organizational citizenship and conflict with the team managers, and 
team members reported on the predictor variables. 
 
This study was set-up as a longitudinal research project of two waves with a time lag of one 
year, to learn how the proceeding of the process of merger might have an impact on the 
relationships under investigation. We collected data for wave 1 during the course of our PhD 
and will collect the wave 2 data in 2014. The data of wave 1 are currently being analyzed and 
cannot yet be integrated in this doctoral dissertation.  
 
We will also collect additional data in organizations, by means of a field experiment. This 
procedure has the benefits of random assignment, experimental manipulation, and 
maintaining levels of experimental control while simultaneously strengthening claims of 
external validity and the generalizability of results (Cárdenas, 2000; Shadish et al., 2002). 
Also, expanding the results of an investigation under closely controlled conditions to include 
interactions between larger groups with more meaningful group identities and boundaries 
makes it more pertinent to real-world situations.               
 
MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation contributes not only to theory and methodology, but also to managerial 
practice. In this section, we discuss a number of managerial contributions and implications, 
integrated from our three empirical studies. 
 
Composition of workgroups  
Insights from the present studies have implications for organizations. Employees who work 
simultaneously with members of their ingroup and with members of an outgroup are likely 
more willing to cooperate when their cooperation profits mainly members of their ingroup. 
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They will cooperate more if their group consists of a majority of in-subgroup members than 
when it consists of a minority of in-subgroup members (and their cooperation mainly profits 
out-subgroup members). Similarly, they might cooperate more in groups that merely consist 
of in-subgroup members than in heterogeneous groups that consist of both ingroup and 
outgroup  members.  
 
Prosocial and proself group members 
However, not all employees will act alike when confronted with the same situation: The 
present results suggest that employees with a prosocial SVO are more willing to show 
cooperative behavior in heterogeneous groups, not only toward in-subgroup members, but 
also toward the out-subgroup. Proselves, on the other hand, are much more likely to show 
less cooperation toward their in-subgroup ánd out-subgroup. For organizations this implies 
that the same inter-group situation can elicit fundamentally different responses from different 
employees, depending on their social value orientation. 
Clearly, team management will need to be diversified and adapted to (subgroups of) team 
members, with attention for the composition of the team. A majority of prosocials in the team 
could be advantageous, because consistent contributors can act as a role model to other 
members and create an implicit group norm of cooperation (Weber & Murnighan, 2008). 
However, a minority of proselves can be more persuasive and influential than the co-operators, 
who tend to be ignored when in the minority. This because group members accord more 
weight to their messages than to those of co-operators (Steinel et al., 2009). Overall, proselves 
showed lower cooperation rates and preferred self-interest over cooperation with the group.  
 
A longer-term solution to the cooperation on an organizational level would not only be the 
search for consistent co-operators displaying organizational citizenship behaviors, but more 
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so to garner broad support when they do emerge. These team members can effectively 
catalyze cooperation, even when other group members’ inclinations are not prosocial, and 
often appear to benefit from their cooperative actions (Weber & Murnighan, 2008). 
Encouraging organizational citizenship behavior of employees will come to the benefit of 
individuals, teams, and the broader organization, and it carries potential to dissipate the 
negative effects of heterogeneous group composition.   
 
Dealing with faultlines 
Group heterogeneity and the presence of subgroups, due to a (strong) faultline, presents 
members with a crossed-groups social dilemma and poses some challenges for team 
management. We propose a threefold strategy to deal with faultlines and their effects on 
cooperation and (sub)group conflict. First, a team leader could assess the presence of 
(dormant) faultlines and the chances of them being activated. This involves gauging the 
objective demographic characteristics and individual attributes of team members, see if and 
how they align, and assess the contextual factors that might determine activation of faultlines 
(e.g. subgroup identification, status, intra-team trust, leadership). This should be a continuous 
process throughout group development, because the salience of subgroups and their identities 
might decrease or increase as the group matures, requiring flexible interventions. 
 
Second, based on this assessment, managers could try to prevent faultline activation, using 
specific strategies in the initial phases of (sub)group development. In groups where a strong 
faultline arises this may be next-to impossible and in some cases undesirable. A team leader 
could avoid, however, that additional faultlines - based on other demographic characteristics - 
get stacked on top of this strong faultline, further increasing the faultline gap between 
subgroups. 
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Third, in the presence of activated faultlines, several interventions could be advanced to 
tackle the potential harmful effects on (sub)group processes and performance. A team leader 
could work on inter-subgroup biases by stimulating positive contacts between members of 
distinct subgroups, as a personalization strategy to move beyond subgroup differences. 
Bringing subgroups together and establishing common goals should unfold with respect for 
subgroup distinctiveness and identities, and demographic and subgroup related group tasks 
should be avoided via for example the cross-cutting of work roles (Rico et al., 2012). Team 
leaders should also mind subgroup size, ensuring that minorities’ opinions and interpretations 
are as much respected and taken into account as those of majority subgroups. 
 
Leadership 
Leaders of heterogeneous (factional) groups need to deal with activated faultlines and 
subgroupings on a daily basis. During organizational changes and collaborations, such as 
mergers, alliances, and joint ventures, workgroups arise with members originating from 
different organizations or departments. The presence of a leader who motivates, supervises, 
and addresses relational and identity considerations can have a major impact on cooperation 
levels in these mixed groups. Reducing the salience of subgroups with a superordinate goal 
can be an effective strategy to increase group cooperation, when combined with visionary 
leader behaviors. Leaders need to communicate a clear, future-oriented vision for the group 
in line with the categorization of members as one group.  
 
But rhetoric alone may not suffice. Establishing an inter-subgroup relational identity (cf. 
Hogg et al., 2012) via interactions with both subgroups, addressing mutual concerns, and 
especially the display of role behavior, is essential to increase considerations for and 
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cooperation with the larger group. Group members might not feel that strongly about the 
leader’s affiliations with either subgroup, as long as he has a strong vision on the future of the 
group and the importance of collaborations. When delegating a leader to a newly formed 
factional group, management could opt for either an external visionary leader with no 
subgroup affiliations, an internal visionary leader with subgroup affiliations, or a visionary 
leader that ties into both subgroups. The latter one could balance identity concerns, related to 
the signature of the leader, and allow the leader’s vision to capitalize on the positive effects 
of diversity and maximize cooperation with the factional group. 
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Teams worden steeds belangrijker in organisaties, voor besluitvormingsprocessen en 
productie (Bettenhausen, 1991; Ilgen, Major, Hollenbeck, & Sego, 1993; Kozlowski & Bell, 
2003). De krachten verenigen via samenwerking in teams, om te komen tot creativiteit en 
sociale innovatie, levert bovendien een competitief voordeel op (Zaccaro, Marks, & 
DeChurch, 2012). 
 
Door globalisering en toenemende internationalisering van organisaties, zijn teams nu meer 
divers dan vroeger (Li & Hambrick, 2005; Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006; Zaccaro et 
al., 2012). Bovendien ontstaan na veranderprocessen - zoals fusies en acquisities, allianties, 
samenwerkingsverbanden en interne herstructurering – nieuw samengestelde teams, waarbij 
werknemers uit verschillende organisaties en/of afdelingen nu samen gegroepeerd worden. In 
deze heterogene teams vormen zich dan (minstens) twee subgroepen. Teamleden 
vertegenwoordigen twee (of meer) sociale entiteiten en categoriseren leden van hun eigen 
subgroep als ‘in-groep’ en beschouwen de andere subgroepsleden als ‘out-groep’. 
 
Verschillende uitdagingen ontstaan voor dergelijke heterogene teams. Ten eerste, zijn de 
aanwezige subgroepen veelal ongelijk in grootte en vormen ze bijgevolg een minderheid of 
meerderheid (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Deze samenstelling van het team zal een impact 
hebben op de motivatie van leden om al dan niet bij te dragen tot (het belang van) hun team. 
De teamleden worden namelijk geconfronteerd met een gekruiste-groepen sociaal dilemma: 
verder blijven handelen in hun eigen belang of dat van hun vorige team – dat nu slechts een 
subgroep vormt in het nieuwe team – of handelen in het belang van ieder en bijdragen tot het 
nieuw samengesteld team? Kiezen voor eigenbelang brengt steeds het meest op voor het 
individu op de korte termijn, ongeacht wat de andere teamleden beslissen, maar alle 
teamleden zijn beter af indien iedereen samenwerkt. 
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Ten tweede, ontstaan er inter-subgroepprocessen in het team (Carton & Cummings, 2012): 
teamleden evalueren hun eigen ‘in-subgroep’ gunstiger dan de ‘out-subgroep’ (Gaertner et 
al., 2000; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), waardoor ze vaak minder zullen bijdragen tot de 
belangen van het team, in vergelijking met de belangen van hun subgroep en hun individueel 
belang (Wit & Kerr, 2002).  
 
Organisaties en hun managers staan voor de uitdaging om de leden van deze heterogene 
(nieuw samengestelde) teams te motiveren om bij te dragen tot het team en zo het sociale 
dilemma op te lossen. Samenwerking gaat niet enkel ten voordele van het team, maar is ook 
in het belang van de organisatie in zijn geheel. Doel van dit doctoraatsonderzoek is de 
identificatie van individuele en contextuele antecedenten van samenwerking in dergelijke 
heterogene (nieuw samengestelde) teams, waar leden – in aanwezigheid van subgroepen – 
geconfronteerd worden met een gekruiste-groepen sociaal dilemma. 
 
In het eerste hoofdstuk, geven we een overzicht van de sociaal dilemma literatuur en 
bevindingen uit de faultline en diversiteitsliteratuur, om zo het theoretisch kader op te 
bouwen op het kruispunt van beide onderzoeksdomeinen. We focussen ook op de rol van 
leiderschap om samenwerking te motiveren in de heterogene (nieuw samengestelde) teams. 
We definiëren de onderzoeksdoelen van dit doctoraat en lichten de verschillende 
experimentele studies toe die we hebben uitgevoerd. 
 
In het tweede hoofdstuk, beschrijven we de ontwikkeling van het gekruiste-groepen sociaal 
dilemma (CSD) game. Dit game laat toe om besluitvorming te bestuderen in heterogene 
(nieuw samengestelde) teams, in aanwezigheid van twee (of meer) subgroepen. In twee 
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empirische studies valideren we het CSD game en tonen we het effect van 
groepssamenstelling aan: teamleden werken meer samen indien hun in-subgroep een 
meerderheid vormt in het team dan wanneer de eigen subgroep in de minderheid is 
(parochiale samenwerking). Identificatie met de groep en verwachtingen over samenwerking 
van de andere (sub)groepsleden blijken te fungeren als tussenschakel in deze relaties 
(mediatie). We bestuderen het effect van sociale waardeoriëntatie als antecedent van 
samenwerking in heterogene (nieuw-samengestelde) teams. De resultaten tonen dat 
individuen met een prosociale waardeoriëntatie consistent samenwerken (cooperation), 
ongeacht de samenstelling van het team, terwijl een proself waardeoriëntatie resulteert in 
consistent niet-samenwerken (defection). 
 
In het derde hoofdstuk, onderzoeken we het effect van faultline deactivatie als situationele 
antecedent van coöperatieve besluitvorming in heterogene (nieuw samengestelde) teams. 
‘Faultlines’ zijn “hypothetische scheidingslijnen die een team opsplitsen in twee (of meer) 
subgroepen op basis van één of meerdere kenmerken” (Lau & Murnighan, 1998, p. 328), 
zoals pre-fusie team lidmaatschap. Deze scheidingslijnen resulteren vaak in meer team 
conflict, verminderde samenhang, performantie, en tevredenheid van het team  (Barkema & 
Shvyrkov, 2007; Choi & Sy, 2010; Jackson, Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003; Kerr & Tindale, 2004; 
Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003). Bijgevolg is het belangrijk om de 
subgroepsvorming die gepaard gaat met deze scheidingslijnen te voorkomen en de 
(negatieve) effecten ervan te verminderen. De resultaten van twee empirische studies tonen 
aan dat faultline deactivatie  - via het stellen van een gemeenschappelijk doel voor het team - 
ervoor zorgt dat teamleden in hun beslissing tot (al dan niet) samenwerken minder beïnvloed 
worden door de (sub)groepssamenstelling. Er zijn enerzijds meer teamleden die consistent 
gaan samenwerken, ongeacht de groepssamenstelling, maar er zijn anderzijds ook meer 
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teamleden die consistent niet samenwerken. Om dit laatste fenomeen te beperken is kan het 
van belang zijn om het gemeenschappelijk doel voor het team te combineren met andere 
managementstrategieën, zoals leiderschap. 
 
In het vierde hoofdstuk, beschrijven we de impact van een visionaire leider, met een 
gemeenschappelijk groepsdoel, op samenwerking in heterogene (nieuw samengestelde) 
teams. Een leider met een lange-termijn visie voor de toekomst van het team kan teamleden 
mobiliseren om te investeren in het team en om te handelen in het belang van de groep (Bass, 
2008; Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Shamir, 
House, & Arthur, 1993). Gezien de heterogene samenstelling van het team met subgroepen, 
kan de affiliatie van de leider met één van deze subgroepen ook een effect hebben op de 
samenwerking met het team, waarbij een in-subgroep geaffilieerde leider waarschijnlijk meer 
invloed heeft dan een out-groep geaffilieerde leider (Bruins, Ellemers, & De Gilder, 1999; 
Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 
1999). Uit de resultaten van de empirische studie blijkt dat een visionaire leider de 
samenwerking in heterogene teams kan verhogen, ongeacht de samenstelling van het team. 
Bovendien zijn er onder een visionaire leider, in combinatie met het gemeenschappelijke 
groepsdoel, niet enkel meer consistent samenwerkende teamleden, maar ook minder 
teamleden die consistent niet samenwerken. De affiliatie van de leider met de in-subgroep of 
de out-subgroep heeft in deze studie geen impact op de samenwerking van teamleden. 
 
Het vijfde hoofdstuk vat de theoretische, methodologische en praktische implicaties van dit 
doctoraat samen. De uitgevoerde studies leveren een bijdrage aan de literatuur over sociale 
dilemma’s, over faultline en diversiteit, en over leiderschap. We bespreken deze bijdragen en 
doen suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek in elk van deze domeinen. Ook de keuze voor de 
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experimentele methodologie met zijn voor- en nadelen komt uitvoerig aan bod. Tot slot 
worden de praktische implicaties van de onderzoeksresultaten voor managers en teamleiders 
die werken in heterogene groepen, in aanwezigheid van subgroepen, toegelicht. 
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